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Despite its indisputable recent expansion, Islamic banking is still poorly understood
in many parts of the Muslim world and it is a puzzle to much of the West. Its practice
varies from one country to another, for it is subject to different interpretations of the
Shari'a by the local fuqaha. Many scholars believe that Islamic banking should place
equal emphasis on ethics and profitability to enhance equality and fairness in society
as a whole. Although the concept of profit/loss sharing is generally considered the
most appropriate form of Islamic contract, its application to the Islamic banking
system has provoked some criticism. Islamic banks need to make a profit if they are
to compete with conventional banks, which focus exclusively on profit
maximization. The profit generated by Islamic banks would allow them to offer
higher remuneration to their shareholders and depositors and to invest in product
innovation and technology.
This study explores various aspects of Islamic banking, especially its basis of
the Shari'a. The discussion includes a look at the history of banking, the develop¬
ment of financial intermediaries and the importance of Islamic banks in this role to
cater for the needs of Muslims, and the basic principles of Islamic economics. To
understand why Islamic banks do not operate fully according to the principles of
profit/loss sharing, particularly in Malaysia, it is necessary to analyse the reasons for
this situation.
The main challenge to Islamic banking in modern society is risk. Unlike con¬
ventional banks, Islamic banks are constrained by the Shari'a's prohibition of riba on
investments and financing, so risk management is top priority. This thesis examines
risk in detail: how its concept is viewed by scholars and financial organizations
around the world and its management in practice with special reference to the
financial systems in Malaysia, using Bank Islam (M) Berhad, its first Islamic bank,
as a case study. Using historical and modern evidence, the thesis analyses the
possible means ofmanaging risk in Islamic banking so that the Islamic banks comply
with the Shari'a, yet be fully competitive with their conventional counterparts.
vii
Figures
5.1 Standard procedure for product development 222
5.2 Responsibilities of the Management Risk Control Committee (MRCC) 242
5.3 Importance of Shari'a compliance in risk management 243
Tables
1.1 Position of the four main schools (madhahib) on riba al-nasi'a
and riba al-fadl 51
3.1 Islamic financial industry: phases of development 113
3.2 Islamic banks vs conventional banks 135
3.3 Financial institutions offering Islamic banking services
(as 19 October 2006) 136
3.4a No. of financial institutions offering Islamic banking services 137
3.4b No. of branches/IBS counters offering Islamic banking services 137
3.5a Deposit and investment 148
3.5b Financing (fund-based) 148
3.5c Fee-based 149
3.5d Trade financing 149
3.5e Card services 149
3.5f Banking services 149
3.6 Islamic financing activities in the Malaysian Islamic banking system
according to contracts 153
3.7 Islamic banking system: Direction of financing 154
3.8 Musyarakah and mudharabah vs. al-bai' bithaman ajil and
murabahah financing contracts 157
3.9 Bank Islam Malaysia: Direction of financing 158
4.1 Comparison of Islamic and conventional banking 183
4.2 Analysis of the two models of Islamic banking operations 195
4.3 Mudaraba and musharaka principles: characteristics and conditions 196
5.1 Deposit funds for BIMB for financial year ended 30 June (2004-2006) 235
Acknowledgements
I should like to express my gratitude for and deepest appreciation of the assistance
and support provided by the following individuals and institutions towards the com¬
pletion ofmy thesis:
Professor Emeritus William R. Roff, my principal supervisor, for his excellent,
untiring supervision, comments, advice, assistance, criticism and guidance. I am
indebted to his genuine efforts, together with his strict and thorough, but extremely
useful criticism, in correcting my jargon and unclear points, making valuable sugges¬
tions and generally helping me to produce a presentable thesis.
Dr Yasin Dutton, my former principal supervisor, who left the Department in
2006, for giving invaluable assistance and making insightful observations.
Dr Ayman Shihadeh, my co-supervisor, for his constructive suggestions and
assistance. Although his contribution has been made towards the end of the thesis,
nevertheless, it has made a marked impact on the content.
University Utara Malaysia (UUM) and Public Services Department (now the
Higher Education ofMalaysia) for granting me their sponsorship of this study leave.
Bank Islam (M) Berhad in Malaysia for allowing me to carry out my fieldwork
and providing the necessary facilities and assistance. I am truly indebted to Mr
Mudahir Omar (Assistant General Manager, Risk Management Division), Mr Nasri
Ismail (from the Internal Audit Department), Mr Ismail Taib (from the Marketing
Department), Mr Asnul Hadi Yeop Abdullah (formerly Senior Manager of the
Corporate Banking Department), Encik Najib Shaharudin (formerly Chief Executive
Officer of Bank Islam [L] Limited), and Mr Mustapha Hamat (Chief Executive
Officer at the Islamic Banking and Finance Institute Malaysia Sdn. Bhd), all of
whom gave me useful guidance in researching material.
Dr Andrew Newman and Dr Elisabeth Kandell from the Department of Islamic
and Middle Eastern Studies for giving me some very useful criticism ofmy first-year
report.
Sylvia J. Hunt, my dear friend, for her help with language, also for her
encouragement and moral support.
Rafisam Hashim, my beloved husband, for his encouragement, unfailing sup¬
port and keeping my spirits up to enable me to complete this thesis.
Zainol Abdul Hamid and Zainab Husin, my parents, whose vision, commit¬
ment and unfailing support have contributed to my academic success.
Mohd Rifqi Hafiz, Mohd Rafi'uddin Hanif and Nur Hana Zulaikha, my
children, whose presence has brought me happiness and meaning throughout my
academic sojourn in Edinburgh and provided me with the strength to excel in my
research.
Hashim and Rokiah (my in-laws), Sue Roff, Professor Sudin, Associate
Professor Dr Nur Adiana, Associate Professor Dr Anggapan, Associate Professor Dr
Norhayati, Rosemaliza, Norlida and Rohaya also for their encouragement and
support.
Last, but not least, as a Muslim and a student, I believe that this written work
has been accomplished only by the Grace of Allah and He knows best what is true





AIBIM: Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia
BAFIA: Banking and Financial Institutions Act
BIMB: Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad
BNM: Bank Negara Malaysia or Central Bank of Malaysia
IAIB: International Association of Islamic Banks
IBA 1983: Islamic Banking Act 1983
IBFIM: Islamic Banking and Finance Institute Malaysia Sdn Bhd
IDB: Islamic Development Bank
IFI: Islamic Financial Institution
IFSB: Islamic Financial Services Board
IIFM: International Islamic Financial Market
INCE1F: International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance
LMC: Liquidity Management Centre
NSAC: National Shari'a Advisory Council
PBUH: peace be upon him
PLS: profit and loss sharing
RENTAS: Real Time Electronic Transfer of Funds and Securities or Sistem
Penjelasan Kasar Masa Nyata
SPEEDS: Electronic Transfer System for Funds and Securities or Sistem
Pemindahan Elektronik untuk Dana dan Sekuriti
Introduction
In 1970, Islamic banking was almost unknown. By the early years of the twenty-first
century, however, Islamic banking has become a reality that cannot be ignored, for it
is growing at a steady pace. The value of Shari'a-compliant accounts worldwide is
estimated to be between US$200 billion and US$500 billion and it is growing at an
average annual rate of 10-15 per cent.1 It is predicted that Islamic banks will control
around 40-50 per cent of Muslims' savings by 2009/10, for the population of
Muslims in the world in 2006 has been calculated to be more than 1.2 billion.2 It
should be noted, however, that banking is the most developed part of the Islamic
financial system, which also covers capital markets and all types of financial inter¬
mediation.
It is difficult to date precisely the establishment of the first modern Islamic
bank. Most of the literature states that the first modern Islamic savings bank was
opened in the Egyptian town of Mit Ghamr during the 1960s. That experiment did
not last very long, and it was not until 1975, when the Nassir Social Bank was
established as an interest-free commercial bank in Egypt, that Islamic banking began
to take hold in the Muslim world. From that beginning, Islamic banking increased by
2006 to more than 300 Islamic financial institutions in more than 75 countries. The
entire banking system in Iran, Pakistan and Sudan has been converted to Islamic
1
Statement by the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Datuk Seri Najib Razak, when
officiating at the opening of the Islamic Financial Forum in Kuala Lumpur. See, Kamarul
Yunus, "Malaysia Faces Increasing Competition in Islamic Banking", Business Times
(2005). Cited 30 November 2005 from http://www.btimes.com.mv .
2 Tarek S. Zaher and M.Kabir Hassan, "A Comparative Literature Survey of Islamic Finance
and Banking", Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, vol. 10, no.4 (2001), p. 170.
banking.3 In addition, Malaysia, Indonesia and Jordan are among the countries that
have chosen to operate Islamic banking alongside the conventional system. This is
achieved by the opening of "Islamic windows"4 in conventional institutions or the
establishment of separate banks or branches and subsidiaries specializing in Islamic
financial products.
It should be borne in mind that although the emergence of Islamic banking was
in response to the market needs of Muslims, these banks are not religious institutions,
for they provide banking services for non-Muslim customers as well. An important
development in Islamic banking in the early years of the twenty-first century has
been the entry of some conventional banks into the Islamic market. Outside the
Muslim world. Islamic banking facilities have been offered by many countries, such
as Denmark and Great Britain, as well as by some of the international banking giants,
like the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Citibank, and Chase Man¬
hattan. In the capital market during this period, Dow Jones has created more than 60
Islamic market indexes that follow Shari'a-compliant stocks in many global mar¬
kets.5 Dow Jones rejects companies whose practices are incompatible with Shari'a
principles, for example, if they have material ownership in or revenue from prohi¬
bited activities, such as intoxicants, gambling and pig products. Manufacturers of
tobacco and armaments, although not strictly forbidden in the Shari'a, are also
excluded from the index.6
3
Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Tarik Yousef, "Islamic Bank and Investment Financing", Journal
ofMoney, Credit and Banking, vol.32, no.l (2000), p.93.
4 Islamic windows are special facilities offered by conventional banks to provide services to
Muslims who wish to engage in Islamic banking.
5 Dow Jones Islamic Fund Website: http://www.diindexes.com . Cited on 8 December 2006.
6 Ibid.
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Despite its expansion, Islamic banking is still poorly understood in many parts
of the Muslim world and it is a puzzle to much of the West. If Muslims are confused,
then in the view of non-Muslims, the Islamic banking system seems too complex, for
it is markedly different from conventional banking operations. Indeed, the practice of
Islamic banking varies from one country to another, for it is subject to different
interpretations of the Shari'a by the local fuqaha. It is also governed by local laws
and financing policy. The Western perspective has been clearly expressed by
Divanna:
Finding a single definition of Islamic banking and finance is difficult to come
by, due to numerous interpretations. To most Western bankers and some Mus¬
lims, the general definition of what constitutes Islamic banking appears ambigu¬
ous, differing slightly in each country, becoming less clear as one gets closer to
the details of financial instruments and transactions.7
According to Warde,
No definition of Islamic finance is entirely satisfactory. To every general
criterion - a financial institution owned by Muslims, catering to Muslims,
supervised by a Shari'a Board, belonging to the International Association of
Islamic Banks (IAIB), etc.8
In short, Islamic banking can be classified as a financial system organized on a
basic element of Islam, that is, the Shari'a. Specifically, the fiqh al-mu'amalat
(Islamic commercial law) regulates the relationship among human beings and covers
all trade-related and economic activities. None of the four basic elements can be
separated from its inter-relationship with the others, for each element represents an
essential part of the whole religion of Islam. Therefore, although Islamic banks offer
mostly the same functions as the conventional banks, they do this in distinctly differ-
7
Joseph A. Divanna, Understanding Islamic Banking: The Value Proposition that
Transcends Cultures (Cambridge, UK: Leonardo and Francis Press, 2006), p. 1.
8 Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh
University Press, 2000), p.5.
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ent ways from their conventional counterparts. Many scholars, such as Chapra, Iqbal,
Taqi Usmani, Warde, Lewis and Algoud and Iqbal and Molyneux, believe that
Islamic banking should place equal emphasis on the ethical, moral, social and religi¬
ous aspects of financial dealings to enhance equality and fairness in society as a
whole.9 The prohibition of riba, maysir (gambling) and gharar are to protect the
interests of all the parties concerned and thus to promote social harmony. Although
the prohibition of interest is the nucleus of the Islamic financial system, describing it
simply as "interest free" does not give the whole picture, for it is supported by other
principles of Islamic doctrine, such as advocating risk-sharing, individuals' rights
and duties, property rights and the sanctity of the contract.10 Therefore, another
unique feature of Islamic banking is the construction of a system that promotes risk
sharing, co-operation, mutual assistance, and the sharing of the profits between the
investors and the users of funds.
The ethical and moral aspects are also reflected in the commercial dealings in
which the Islamic banks engage, for these organizations cannot support or invest in
companies whose activities conflict with the moral principles of Islam. Even though
the transactions themselves might be free of riba, maysir and gharar, they can still
be deemed unlawful according to the Shari'a if they are connected with banned items
such as alcohol, pig products and gambling as well as immoral activities such as
9
See, Muhammad Umer Chapra, Towards a Just Monetary System (Leicester, UK: The
Islamic Foundation, 1985); Zamir Iqbal, "Islamic Financial Systems", Finance and
Development (June 1997), pp.42-45; Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to
Islamic Finance (New Delhi: Idara Isha'at-e-Diniyat, 1999); Warde, op. cit.; Mervyn K.
Lewis and Latifa M. Algaoud, Islamic Banking (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2001);
Munawar Iqbal and Philip Molyneux, Thirty Years ofIslamic Banking: History,
Performance and Prospects (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). A brief
discussion of the theory of Islamic banking can be found in Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi,
Banking without Interest (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1983a).
10
Iqbal, op. cit., p.42.
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pornography and prostitution. Thus, there is an ethical and moral filter in Islam,
based on the definition of halal (permissible) and haram (prohibited).
The unique feature of the Islamic banking system is that its nature and structure
promote social responsibility. It is a method of organizing financial transactions
based on Shari'a principles, thus connecting the system with a genuine concern for
ethically and socially responsible activities. Its aim is to provide socio-economic
benefits to the community, rather than being driven by profit maximization." The
International Association of Islamic Banks (IAIB) comments as follows on this
aspect of Islamic banking:
The Islamic bank takes into prime consideration the social implications that
may be brought about by any decision or action taken by the bank. Profitability
- despite its importance and priority - is not therefore the sole criterion or the
prime element in evaluating the performance of Islamic banks, since they have
to match both between the material and the social objectives that would serve
the interests of the community as a whole and help achieve their role in the
sphere of social mutual guarantee. Social goals are understood to form an
inseparable element of the Islamic banking system that cannot be dispensed
with or neglected.12
Nevertheless, Islamic banks are not charitable organizations, for they must also
make a profit if they are to compete with conventional banks, which focus exclu¬
sively on profit maximization. The profit generated by Islamic banks would allow
them to offer higher remuneration to their shareholders and depositors and to invest
in product innovation and technology. Scholars point out that although profit is
important to Islamic banks, this should not be their sole or primary goal.13 It is also
suggested that being Islamic organizations, they are expected to achieve only a
'1 See footnote 9.
12
Warde, op. cit., p. 153.
"
Ibid., p. 154. Warde stated that in Iran, a maximum rate of profit is determined by the
Central Bank.
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reasonable rate of return.14 To date, however, there has no clear means of deter¬
mining a fair price or a reasonable rate. Indeed, Islamic banks have to compete with
conventional banks in a world in which the conventional banks do not play by the
same rules.
It is accepted by most scholars of Islam that a banking system constructed to
promote risk-sharing, co-operation and mutual assistance is reflected in the principle
of profit/loss sharing, which, in turn, is the cornerstone of Islamic banking.
Mudaraba and musharaka are both forms of profit/loss sharing.15 As stated by
Warde, the principle of profit/loss sharing
is at once the most "authentic" form of Islamic finance since it replicates trans¬
actions that were common in the early days of Islam, the one that is most con¬
sistent with the value system and the moral economy of Islam and the most
"modern" one. Thus, it is believed that Islamic banks are supposed to offer
instruments consistent with the religious beliefs and cultural characteristics of
Muslim societies.16
Although most scholars consider profit/loss sharing the most valid and most
favourable form of Islamic contracts, its application to the Islamic banking system
has received some criticism. For example, Naqvi argues that the institution of
mudaraba is not sacred, since it is not based on the Qur'an and Hadith but was the
14 For example, Sudin Haron states: "Like any other business entity, Islamic banks are
expected to make a profit from their operations. It is considered unjust of Islamic banks if
they are unable to provide sufficient returns to the depositors who have entrusted their
money to them. While making a profit from the business is allowed in Islam, at the same
time Muslims are prohibited from committing any excess. Applying this message to banking
operations means that Islamic banks are prohibited from making excessive profit at the
expense of their customers." Sudin Haron, "The Philosophy of Islamic Banking", in
Anthology ofIslamic Banking, ed. Asma Siddiqi (London: Institute of Islamic Banking and
Insurance, 2000), p.58.
15
See, for example, Laurance M. Crane and David J. Leatham, "Profit and Loss Sharing in
Agriculture: An Application of Islamic Banking", Agribusiness, vol.9, no.4 (1993), p.407;
Aggarwal and Yousef, op. cit., p.96.
16
Warde, op. cit., p. 153.
6
custom of the pre-Islamic Arabs.17 Borhan points out that the theoretical concept of
Islamic banking based on profit/loss sharing was originally developed from the expli¬
cit assumption of a general prohibition of interest.18 Among other objections to the
application of these concepts is that a medieval-style contract may not necessarily be
suitable for modern economic realities, for it could lead to one party taking advan¬
tage of the other as well as creating difficulties in management and regulation.
Ariff asserts that the earlier contributions to the discussion of Islamic banking
were little more than a mention in passing.19 At that time, scholars were concentra¬
ting on the wider aspects of Islamic economics or simply making a few comments
rather than presenting a carefully considered argument.20 Then, in 1955, Uzair raised
the question of applying mudaraba in interest-free banks.21 However, his argument
that a "bank should not make any capital investment with its own deposits' rendered
his analysis somewhat impractical."22 In 1966, al-Arabi suggested the implementa-
17
Naqvi states: "It is interesting to note that, according to Ibn Hazm, the institution of
mudaraba is not based on the Holy Qur'an or on any of the Holy Prophet's tradition. It was
only a custom of the pre-Islamic Arabs. Mudaraba was practiced in pre-Islamic Arabia. The
tribe ofQuraish had no other livelihood but trade. The old people, women, children and
orphans used to give their capital based on mudaraba to the merchants for a certain part of
the profit. All the loss in mudaraba was borne by the capital owner and not by the merchant,
who took the capital for the purpose of trade." Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, Ethics and
Economics: An Islamic Synthesis (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1981), p. 135.
18 Joni Tamkin Borhan, "The Doctrine and Application of Partnership in Islamic Commercial
Law with Special Reference to Malaysian Experiments in Islamic Banking and Finance".
Unpublished PhD thesis (Edinburgh University, 1997), p. 190.
19 Mohamed Ariff, "Islamic Banking", Asian Pacific Economic Literature, vol.2, no.2
(September 1988), pp.46-62.
20 Ibid. Ariff states, for example, that in his discussion of Islam and the theory of interest,
Qureshi (1946) regarded banking as a social service, which should be sponsored by the
government in the same way as public health and education. However, neither writer
mentioned profit sharing. Ariff also reviews Ahmad (1952), stating that Ahmad referred to
possible partnership arrangements between businessmen and banks. Yet, there was no
definition of the partnership principles, nor was it clear who would bear the loss, if any.
21
Muhammad Uzair, An Outline ofInterestless Banking (Karachi, Pakistan: Raihan
Publications, 1955).
22
Ariff, op. cit., p. 51
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tion of mudaraba principles in the banking system and he also discussed briefly the
impact of usury and interest on the community.23 In 1963, Siddiqi suggested that the
Islamic banking model should be based on mudaraba and shirka (now termed
musharaka). His work, originally published in Urdu, was not available in English
until 1983.24 However, Siddiqi believed that an Islamic banking system would be
successful only in a country where the Shari'a was enforced. Therefore, usury would
be prohibited and anyone indulging in activities based on usury would be punished.25
In the framework suggested by Chapra in 1985, the author emphasizes that there is
more to Islamic banking than just the abolition of usury.26 Chapra's model of Islamic
banking demonstrates how it differs from conventional banking, in that its role is
oriented more towards social responsibility than the maximization of profit. In addi¬
tion, Islamic banks should provide equity-oriented financing or profit/loss sharing.27
In practice, however, contrary to the expectations of the supporters of Islamic bank¬
ing, most Islamic funds are restricted to short-term and low-risk investments with
slim profit margins. Further analysis of lending activities has also found that Islamic
banks prefer to lend funds for the short term and secured by collateral. These funds
tend to be directed away from agriculture and industry and towards retail or trade
financing.28
23 Mohammad Abdullah al-Arabi, "Contemporary Banking Transactions and Islam's Views
Thereon", Islamic Review (1966), pp. 10-16.
24Ariff, op.cit., p.51. See, Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Banking without Interest
(Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1983a).
25 Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Issues in Islamic Banking (Leicester, UK: The Islamic
Foundation, 1983b).
26
Ariff, op. cit., p. 52.
27
Chapra, op. cit., p. 155.
28
Aggarwal and Yousef, op. cit., p. 94.
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Malaysia is a country where 62.8 per cent of the population are Muslim and
whose government is committed not only to developing Islamic banking but also to
establishing a complete financial system.29 Indeed, in 2001, to strengthen the industry
further, Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Bank of Malaysia) formulated a ten-year
strategy as part of its Financial Sector Master Plan to achieve the goal of 20 per cent
of banking assets held in Islamic banks by 2010. At the end of 2005, Islamic banking
assets constituted only 11.3 per cent of the total banking assets, which indicates that
there is a greater potential to be exploited.
Like their fellow Muslims elsewhere, Muslims in Malaysia have for a long
time wished to apply the principles of the Shari'a to banking and finance. However,
the situation in Malaysia poses a serious challenge to Islamic banks, for they have to
compete with the conventional banks, which are already well established and which
operate according to a completely different philosophy. It should be noted that it is
very difficult for an organization to compete in a different system, where the bench¬
mark of the corporate performance is profit. In addition, the Islamic financial system
in Malaysia has been criticized for excessive reliance on the murabahah (mark-up)
and bai' bithaman ajil (deferred payment) since the establishment of the first Islamic
bank, Bank Islam (M) Berhad.30 Thus, the Islamic banks have been accused of being
29 Tan Sri Jaafar Hussein, the former governor of Bank Negara Malaysia in November 1991,
said: "I have a dream, and my dream is that I will be able to see, in my lifetime, a fully
fledged Islamic financial system side by side with the existing conventional system, both
equally sophisticated and modern." See, Borhan, op. cit., p. 197.
,0 Criticisms include the Islamic banks' over-reliance on these techniques of operation
(mark-up and deferred payment), which are suspected of opening the back door to usury.
These techniques are also regarded as the counterparts to the practice of usury, as followed
by the conventional banks. It has been stated that the mark-up charged by the Islamic banks
is about the same as the rate of interest if it is converted into a proportion of the principal..
Therefore, the Islamic banks have been accused of charging interest in a hidden form and
operating in a similar way to the conventional banks, though without the "label" of interest.
9
concerned only with making a profit, while neglecting the welfare aspect of their
operations.'1 Some local products are not accepted globally either, owing to objec¬
tions from Islamic scholars of other countries, who doubt that the system complies
fully with the principles of the Shari'a.32
Structure of the Thesis
The issues mentioned above led me to research and understand all that is known
about Islamic banking, in particular, its basis and salient features. Since Islamic
banking is a sub-division of Islamic economics, it is important to examine the
foundation of Islamic economics and some critiques of the system, which have been
made by certain scholars. In addition, this study explores the importance of Islamic
banks as financial intermediaries to cater for the needs of Muslims. To understand
why Islamic banks do not operate fully according to the principles of profit/loss
sharing, particularly in Malaysia, it is necessary to study the system itself and its
development. Since the question of risk has always been highlighted as the reason for
the general lack of profit/loss-sharing modes of financing in the Islamic banking
system, it is important to understand this attitude from both the Islamic and
conventional perspectives as well as to discover the management of risk in Islamic
banking system in Malaysia.
See, for example, Saiful Azhar Rosly and Mohd Afandi Abu Bakar, "Performance of Islamic
and Mainstream Banks in Malaysia", Journal ofSocial Economics, vol.30 no.12 (2003),
pp.1249-1265; Sudin Haron and Norafifah Ahmad, "Islamic Financial System in Malaysia:
Issues Re-examined". Paper presented at the Muzakarah Pakar: Kearah 20% Pasaran
Perbankan Islam 2010: Strategi Sistem Perbankan Islam. Institut Kefahaman Islam (IKIM)
and Persatuan Institusi-Institusi Perbankan Islam Malaysia (AIBIM), Kuala Lumpur, 12-13
March, 2002.
jl It has been asserted that Islamic banks belong to Tijari (commercial sector). Therefore, as
commercial organizations, Islamic banks need to protect the interests of their depositors and
shareholders by maintaining a reasonable rate of return on their investments.
'2 Halim Wahab, "The Debate Continues", Malaysian Business (16 May 2004), pp.38-39.
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Following this introduction, the thesis is divided into five chapters:
1. Chapter 1 discusses the Shari'a as the comprehensive law of Islam. It also
discusses riba and its prohibition in Islam. Although riba has been covered
extensively by many scholars in earlier research, it is important to have a basic
knowledge of the subject before proceeding to the rest of the discussion.
2. Chapter 2 examines the requirement for Islamic banks as financial intermedi¬
aries to cater for the needs of Muslims and includes historical evidence of
deposits and financing practices from the pre-Islamic to the medieval period.
The chapter also discusses the basic principles in Islamic economics and how
they are viewed by some Islamic scholars. In addition, the critiques of Islamic
economics are touched upon.
3. Chapter 3 describes the development of Islamic banking around the world and
specifically in Malaysia. This chapter also analyses the implementation of
profit/loss-sharing modes of financing in the Islamic banking system in
Malaysia with particular reference to Bank Islam (M) Berhad, the first Islamic
bank.
4. Chapter 4 analyses the concept of risk from Islamic and conventional perspec¬
tives. In this chapter, the comparison of risk and its management in Islamic and
conventional banks is also analysed.
5. Chapter 5 discusses the management of risk in the Islamic banking system in
Malaysia and in Bank Islam (M) Berhad, as well as the findings of the
interviews with Bank Islam (M) Berhad.
1 1
In the preparation of this thesis, I have benefited greatly from the following
earlier studies:
1. Shahrukh Rafi Khan, Profit and Loss Sharing: An Experiment in Finance and
Banking. The work was originally a PhD thesis completed at the University of
Michigan in the United States in 1987 and was published by the Oxford
University Press in 1987. In this work, the author has focused on the Pakistani
experiments in Islamic banking. He discusses very briefly the doctrine of
partnership as explained by the jurists and also examines the origin of the
Islamic banking movement, the institutional and ethical issues underlying it
and its adaptation of financial instruments, including profit/loss sharing.
2. Joni Tamkin Borhan, "The Doctrine and Application of Partnership in Islamic
Commercial Law with Special Reference to Malaysian Experiments in Islamic
Banking and Finance". This work is an unpublished PhD thesis from the Uni¬
versity of Edinburgh and the research focuses on Malaysia. Although the
author discusses thoroughly the doctrines of partnership in Islamic commercial
law, he only briefly analyses the application of profit/loss-sharing modes of
financing in the operations of Bank Islam (M) Berhad, Syarikat Takaful and
Tabling Haji in Malaysia. No attempt is made to discover the reasons why
those institutions have been slow to implement profit/loss-sharing modes of
financing.
Limitations of the Study
For the purposes of this research, the fieldwork was conducted in Malaysia.
Although it was very helpful, there was still some difficulty in acquiring certain
information, especially written documents. Bank Islam Malaysia (M) Berhad refused
12
to release their internal written documents, for they were strictly confidential. Only
the published material was available. This restriction therefore reduced my ability to
analyse the written documents used. Nevertheless, the Bank was very helpful in
enabling me to conduct interviews as well as giving me a vast amount of oral
information on the Islamic banking system, especially concerning risk management
in the Bank and in Malaysia. Since my return to Edinburgh, a new management in
Bank Islam has been appointed and the organization of the Bank restructured owing
to a huge loss in its banking operations. There have also been further developments
in the Islamic banking system generally. Information on these events has been
limited to newspaper reports and the Bank's Annual Report as well as the Annual
Report from Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Bank of Malaysia), although I have also
contacted senior members of the Bank's staff to validate my findings. I hope that my
comments will provide useful guidance for future studies.
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CHAPTER ONE
1 The Shari'a and the Prohibition of Riba
1.1 An Overview
Belief in the unity or oneness and indivisibility of God, which is the essence of
Islamic teachings, demands that every aspect of human life - political, social, moral,
spiritual and economic - is lived in compliance with the Shari'a. As a body of rules
and regulations derived from integrated sources, the Shari'a provides fully compre¬
hensive guidance for Muslims in every aspect of their lives in this world. As stated
by Schacht:
The sacred law of Islam (Shari'a) is an all-embracing body of religious duties,
the totality of Allah's commands that regulate the life of every Muslim in all its
aspects; it comprises on an equal footing ordinances regarding worship and
ritual, as well as political and (in the narrow sense) legal rules.1
As one component of the Shari'a, Islamic economics is designed to ensure the
achievement of equality and fairness for the good of society as a whole. The
prohibition of riba is one of the basic principles of Islamic economics as well as the
central tenet of the system. It represents the aim of the Shari'a to effect socio¬
economic justice in Islam. According to Iqbal:
Islam encourages the earning of profit but forbids the charging of interest,
because profits, determined ex post, symbolize successful entrepreneurship and
creation of additional wealth, whereas interest, determined ex ante, is a cost that
is accrued irrespective of the outcome of business operations and may not create
wealth if there is a business loss. Social justice demands that borrowers and
lenders share rewards as well as losses in an equitable fashion and that the
process of wealth accumulation and distribution in the economy be fair and
representative of true productivity.2
1
Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
1984), p. 1.
2 Zamir Iqbal, "Islamic Financial Systems", Finance and Development (June 1997), p.43.
On account of the direct relationship between the Shari'a and Islamic econo¬
mics, this chapter examines the content of the Shari'a and its sources. In addition,
there is a brief discussion of the main schools of legal thought (madhahib) in Islam,
which influence the diversity of Islamic banking. Since riba is the focus of the
argument, being one of the most important differences between Islamic and Western
economics, the chapter analyses its concept and the reasons for its prohibition. It
also looks briefly at an assessment of conventional banking practices and the classifi¬
cation of contracts in Islamic economics.
1.2 The Shari'a
1.2.1 Definition and Aim of the Shari'a
Shari'a is an Arabic word meaning a path to be followed, in particular, "the way to a
watering place".3 Muslims believe that this path was revealed by God, Who Alone,
as the Sovereign, has the right to ordain a path for the guidance of humankind
through His Messenger, Prophet Muhammad (SAW). Islam requires Muslims to
strive to implement the path, namely, the Shari'a, for this is the only way in which
human beings can be released from servitude to other than God.4 God is the Law¬
giver and the whole Umma (Muslim community) is His trustee. Doi outlines the
basic principles of the Shari'a as follows:
1. The greater interest of society takes precedence over the interest of the
individual.
2. Relieving hardship and promoting benefit are both prime objectives, the former
taking precedence over the latter.




3. A greater loss cannot be imposed to offset a smaller loss, nor can a greater
benefit be sacrificed for a smaller benefit. On the other hand, a smaller harm
can be inflicted to avoid a greater harm or a smaller benefit can be sacrificed
for a greater benefit.5
The Shari'a is a broader concept than human-made law, for it covers not only
faith and practice, but also personal behaviour and legal and social transactions.
Therefore, it governs one's whole way of life. The Shari'a is a divinely revealed law
and thus has a higher status, for it has not been created by men and women, who, as
human beings, are subject to weaknesses and bias. Owing to these characteristics, the
Shari'a enjoys a level of stability that does not exist in human-made law. It is a self-
contained system, acting as a blueprint for human conduct. Unlike human-made law,
its concept ofjustice is clearly defined and administered in the name of God. Justice
must be applied equally, without discriminating between rich and poor within the
Umma. As Doi points out:
Some people may be inclined to favour the rich, because they expect something
from them. Some people may be inclined to favour the poor, because they are
generally helpless. Partiality in either case is wrong. We are asked to be just,
without fear or favour. Both the rich and poor are under Allah's protection as
far as their legitimate interests are concerned, but they cannot expect to be
favoured at the expense of others. Allah can protect the interests of all, far better
than man.6
The Umma is responsible for administering the Shari'a. Islam is greatly aware
of the balance between understanding the rights of individuals within their society
and their obligations to their fellow human beings. Justice is the main concern of the
Shari'a, which means that everyone must respect the integrity of everyone else. It is,





her happiness. If this could be achieved, the result would be a peaceful and united
society.
The Shari'a consists of rules and regulations governing the affairs of human
beings and providing guidance in assessing their conduct according to the following
categories:
1. Wajib (imperative): the performance of an action is compulsory and its omis¬
sion is punishable.
2. Mandub (recommended): although it is not compulsory, its performance will
be rewarded. However, its omission is not punished.
3. Mubah (permissible): performance will not be rewarded, yet omission will not
be punished either.
4. Makruh (reprehensible): although performance carries religious disapproval, it
will not be punished.
5. Haram (forbidden): actions punishable by God.7
1.2.2 The Nature of the Shari'a
The Shari'a represents the system ofGod's commands for Muslim society. However,
since it is not provided ready-made, it needs human participation to interpret the
sources of law. Historically, the Shari'a has been developed by Muslims referring to
textual evidence in the Qur'an and Sunna rather than being guided by their intuition.
The Shari'a itself is not the law that is interpreted, but the sources of that law. The
divinity of the Shari'a is contained in the sources of law, which are the raw material
for qualified jurists to understand, interpret and apply as required. Both the Qur'an




ijtihad, in which a jurist derives or formulates a rule of law based on the evidence
found in the sources.
The end product of human understanding is known as fiqh, the Islamic positive
law, which differs markedly from the Shari'a. The word "Shari'a", which is com¬
monly translated into English as Islamic law or Islamic jurisprudence, has sometimes
been confused with the term fiqh, which means knowledge, intelligence and under¬
standing. Although the two terms are closely interrelated, they are different in that
the Shari'a is the divine law, whereas fiqh is the product of human understanding and
the use of intelligence in deducing the spirit and wisdom of the principal sources.8
The differences between the Shari'a and fiqh are between the divine law as it is and
the divine law as human beings understand it.9 Fiqh is the work of human beings and
is elaborated by them according to their own understanding and application of the
Shari'a to particular circumstances. It follows, therefore, that a jurist or faqih (plural
- fuqaha), who interprets the Shari'a, must be capable of making independent
judgements, since fiqh is the result of an independent exercise of the intellect in
deciding a point of law. Faruki also states:
The Qur'an contains the Shari'a of Muslims, but when Muslims seek to under¬
stand the Shari'a and apply understanding of the Shari'a to any particular
matter, regardless of how sincere and intelligent and powerful they may be,
their conclusions are no longer the same, flawless, immutable, pure Shari'a of
the Qur'an but have become, inevitably, the human interpretations of Shari'a,
namely, fiqh.10
8 Kamali stresses that fiqh is "knowledge of the practical rules of Shari'a acquired from the
detailed evidence in the sources. ...The knowledge of the rules offiqh, in other words, must
be acquired directly from the sources, a requirement which implies that thefaqih or jurist
must be in contact with the sources offiqh. Consequently, a person who learns thefiqh in
isolation from its sources is not afaqih. See, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of
Islamic Jurisprudence, 3rd edn (Cambridge, UK: The Islamic Texts Society, 2003), p.2.
9




In exercising human intellect and reasoning (ijtihad), it is to be expected that
differences of opinion will arise among the fuqaha. These differences existed even
among the Companions of the Prophet (pbuh) during his lifetime. They can be
ascribed to differences in interpreting the meaning of evidence provided by the
Qur'an, differences in the accessibility or acknowledgement of the Prophet's
Sayings, and differences in circumstances. The result was the emergence of several
schools of thought or madhahib, which differ in their methods of deducing principles
from the sources. The four main madhahib are described briefly in section 1.2.4.
1.2.3 Sources of the Shari'a
The sources of the Shari'a can be divided into primary (the Qur'an and Sunna -
Traditions of the Prophet) and secondary (,jma', qiyas and ijtihad)}1 These sources
are acknowledged as lawful by the four main madhahib}2
1.2.3.1 The Qur'an
The Qur'an (verbal noun of the root qara'a) means recitation or reading.13 The
Qur'an is regarded as the most important source of the Shari'a. It consists ofmanifest
revelation (wahy zahir), defined as the communication from God to Prophet
Muhammad via the angel Jibril over twenty-two years.'4 In Islamic teachings, the
Qur'an is the Word of God. Even Muslim jurists themselves have differed over the
legal significance of many Qur'anic verses, because the rules in the Holy Book are
1'
Doi, op. cit., p.64. Abdul Mannan states that the four basic sources of the Shari'a are the
Qur'an, Sunna, ijma' and qiyas and ijtihad. See, Muhammad Abdul Mannan, Islamic
Economics: Theory and Practice (Kent, UK: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986), p.28.
12
Abdul Mannan, op. cit., p.36.
13 Kamali, op. cit., p. 16.
14
According to Doi, op. cit., p. 51: "The Qur'an is not meant to be a book of law or a book
of history or sociology. It is, as a matter of fact, a book of guidance where Allah speaks to
his creatures to lead a decent and refined life. The Qur'an does not settle the question arising
from diverse categories, as systematic and moral theology, ritual civil and military law."
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revealed as general principles or a broad outline rather than specific details, and thus
designed to give eternal guidance.15 Nevertheless, there are verses that provide a
detailed ruling on certain matters.16 The fuqaha have unanimously agreed that the
authenticity of the entire text of the Quran has always been proved by universally
accepted (mutawatir) indications.17
1.2.3.2 The Sunna
The Sunna is the second primary source of the Shari'a and means a clear path or a
beaten track.18 Kamali states that according to the 'ulama' of Hadith, the Sunna refers
to "all that is narrated from the Prophet (peace be upon him), his acts, his sayings and
whatever he has tacitly approved plus all the reports which describe his physical
attributes and character."19
Therefore, the Sunna represents the practical aspects of the Qur'an, as demon¬
strated by the Prophet and generally accepted by Muslims. Not only was the Prophet
a perfect human being, but also, as the Messenger ofGod, he did not make any errors
in matters of religion or the Shari'a. The Hadith (Traditions) is the documented part
15
Kamali, op. cit., pp. 16-55.
16 Ibid. Kamali asserts: "The Qur'an also contains detailed rules on family matters, the
prohibited degrees of relationship in marriage, inheritance and specific punishments for
certain crimes. These rules have a devotional (ta 'abbudi) aspect and are part of the ibadat.
They are also associated with human nature and regulate the manner in which man's natural
needs may be fulfilled. The basic objectives of the law regarding these matters are
permanent. They are, however, matters that lead to disputes. The purpose of regulating them
in detail is to prevent conflict among people. The specific rulings of the Qur'an in these areas
also took into consideration the prevalence of certain entrenched social customs ofArabia,
which were overruled and abolished. Qur'anic reforms concerning the status ofwomen, and
its rules on just distribution of property within the family could, in view of such custom, only




Ibid., p. 58. Kamali states that the term has been used to refer to normal practice or an
established course of conduct. It may be a good or a bad example and it may be set by an
individual or a community. He also points out that in pre-Islamic Arabia, the Arabs used the




of the Sunna, and the literature is extensive, covering a far wider range of issues than
the legal verses in the Qur'an. It provides the practical aspect of much of the Shari'a.
The following six canonical collections of hadiths were compiled during the latter
halfof the third century ah and are recognized as authoritative:
• Sahih al-Bukhari (d. 256 ah/870 ac)
• Sahih Muslim (d. 261 All/875 AC)
• Sunan Ibn Majah (d. 273 ah/887 ac)
• Sunan Abu Daud (d. 275 ah/888 ac)
• Jami' al-Tirmidhi (d. 279 ah/892 ac)
• Sunan al-Nasa 'i (d. 303 AH/915 AC)20
1.2.3.3 ijma'
Ijma' is the verbal noun of the Arabic root ajmaa, which means both to determine
and to agree upon something.2' Technically, ijma' is defined as the unanimous agree¬
ment of the Umma's jurists at any time on any matter.22 In this way, ijma' ensures the
correct interpretation of the Qur'an, the clear understanding and accurate trans¬
mission of the Sunna, and the legitimate use of ijtihadr3 Unlike the Qur'an and
Sunna, ijma' is a rational proof, since it is not a part of divine revelation.
1.2.3.4 Qiyas and Ijtihad
Qiyas means the measurement or determination of the size, quantity or quality of an
item. It also means the comparison of one item to another, similar, item.24 In the
Shari'a, it is defined as analogical reasoning, in which the ruling applied to a parti-
20 Doi, op. cit., p.54.
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cular case is analysed and used for a new, similar case.25 Ijtihad, however, means the
exercise of one's intellect to reach a judgement.26 Technically, it means the use of
one's human intellect to explain and elaborate on the Shari'a.27
Doi defines qiyas as:
the legal principle introduced in order to derive [s/c] at a logical conclusion of a
certain law on a certain issue that has to do with the welfare of the Muslims. In
exercising this, however, it must be based on the Qur'an, Sunna and Ijma\2S
According to Kamali:
Qiyas has always been seen as the main vehicle of ijtihad, so much so that
Imam al-Shafi'i considered qiyas and ijtihad as two words with the same mean¬
ing. A substantive principle of usul al-fiqh, qiyas really ranks third among the
hierarchy of proofs next to the Qur'an and the Sunna. Ijma', although given
third place in the hierarchy of proofs, is basically a procedural, rather than sub¬
stantive, principle and, important as it is, it has no methodological juristic
corpus of its own.29
The use of one's reason and judgement to determine a course of action is called
ijtihad, and the decisions made in this way are known as ijma'. When making
decisions, it is important to take account of earlier discussions and opinions and the
reasons for the conclusions reached, as well as applying a general sense of justice.'0
Therefore, qiyas is the legal method of extending the law beyond what is stated in the
authoritative sources or it is an extension of a precedent. Nevertheless, it is not the
establishment of a fresh ruling.
Legal reasoning is indeed essential in instances where textual evidence is not
available. Apart from a small number of cases where the Qur'an and Sunna provide
25 Ibid.
26




Kamali, op. cit., p.298.
30
Mervyn K. Lewis and Latifa Algaoud, Islamic Banking (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar,
2001), p.23.
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clear legal rules, most branch cases are derived from legal reasoning.31 The justifi¬
cation for this approach is that written texts are limited, whereas the incidents of
daily life are unlimited. Abdul Mannan states:
In the early centuries of Islam, ra 'y (personal opinion) was the basic instrument
of ijtihad. But when the principles of law were systematically laid down, it was
replaced by qiyas. The Qur'an and Sunna, no doubt, provide us with the legal
rules with regard to the individual and social life of the Muslims. But human
life, living dynamics, requires law that ought to change with the changing
circumstances. Hence the necessity of ijtihad?1
Since qiyas is based on precedent, it requires the comparison of two cases, in
which one is evaluated in the light of the other. An example is that the use of
narcotics is haram (forbidden), the ban in this case being based on the same principle
as the ban on the consumption of alcohol. To reach a correct decision, scholars
access subsidiary sources such as qiyas (analogical reasoning), maslaha mursala
(unrestricted public interest) and 'urf (customary practice). Of these sources, qiyas is
the most important and workable instrument. However, although the majority of
scholars supported the application of qiyas, there were some jurists who opposed it,
such as Ibn Hazm.33
1.2.4 The Four Main Schools of Legal Thought (Madhahib)
The four main schools had emerged within the orthodox Sunni tradition by the tenth
century AC, whereas the Shi'a had established their own schools.34 These four
schools, each with its own system of theory and application of law, are as follows:
31 Abdul Mannan, op. cit., p.34.
32 Ibid.
3j
Kamali, op. cit., pp.268-301. He states that the argument against the use of qiyas was
advanced mainly by the Zahiri School and some Mu'tazilites, including their leader, Ibrahim
al-Nazzam. The leading Zahiri jurist, Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064), was the most outspoken
opponent.
,4
Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh
University Press, 2000), p.33. According to Lewis and Algaoud, "The most important
sectarian division in Islam is the one which separates Sunni and Shi'a believers, which arose
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1. Hanafi: founded by Abu Hanifah (80/699-150/767)
2. Maliki: founded by Malik Abu Anas (95/713-179/795)
3. Shafi'i: founded by Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi'i (150/767-204/820)
4. Hanbali: founded by Ahmad ibn Hanbal (169/780-241/855)
In addition, other fiqh schools were founded during the same period by scholars such
as Dawud ibn 'Ali, al-Awza'i, Sufyan al-Thawri and Abu Thawr.35 Warde describes
these schools as follows:
The legal methodologies of these schools differ, combining different propor¬
tions of textual authority and analogical reasoning: the Hanbalis tend to adhere
to literal interpretations of religious texts, while Malikis and Hanafis allow
wider discretion in the interpretations of such texts. On a specific issue, differ¬
ent schools may be clear, ambiguous or silent. They may also be lenient or
strict/6
As time went by, each of the four main schools gained preference in a parti¬
cular geographical area. Since the Hanafi School was once the official legal inter¬
preter for the Ottoman Empire, most of its adherents are found in the Eastern
Mediterranean countries such as Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. It
is also followed by the majority Sunni population of Indian Muslims, making it by
far the largest school of Islamic law.37 The Hanafi School is known for its endorse¬
ment of reason and logic as legitimate sources in the application of rules to the
in 661 CE on the question of the rightful leadership of the community. Shi'ism, which has
various school sub-sects, is predominant in Iran, and has significant numbers of followers in
Iraq, India and many Gulf States. There are considerable doctrinal differences between the
Shi'a and the four Sunni schools of Islamic law, in terms ofwho is permitted to interpret
Shari'a law. Shi'ites believe that living religious scholars, known as mujtahids, have an
equal right to interpret Divine Law as eminent jurists of the past, and their judgements
replace the Sunni source of deduction by analogy, qiyas." See, Lewis and Algaoud, op. cit.,
p.23.
35 Abdul Mannan, op. cit., p.37.
,6
Warde, op. cit., p.33.
37 Ibid.
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practical questions of life. It is also considered the most flexible and workable school
for commercial transactions.
The adherents of the Maliki School are concentrated in the western region of
the Muslim world, particularly in North and West Africa.18 The School was estab¬
lished as a result of the founder's legal doctrines bound by the practices of the
Madinans as well as analogical deduction to reach a ruling for cases not covered by
the Qur'an or the Sunna.
The adherents of the Shafi'i School are to be found mainly in Indonesia,
Malaysia, Yemen, Sri Lanka, East Africa and parts of Egypt. Imam Shafi'i had a
thorough knowledge of the doctrines of the Maliki and Hanafi Schools.39 Unlike the
Hanafi School, the Shafi'i School was not concerned with the flexible and worldly
areas of law. Indeed, Imam Shafi'i held the view that the Sunna of the Prophet
explained the meaning of the Qur'an.
The adherents of the Hanbali School can be found in Saudi Arabia.40 Its foun¬
der, Ibn Hanbal , compiled a work on the Sunna, which became the basis of juridical
decisions made by later Hanbali jurists.
Although the four main schools place different levels of emphasis on the
sources of law, yet they all agree on the requirement that the Shari'a be God-given,
not created by human beings. Therefore, the Qur'an and the Sunna are fully binding,





41 Lewis and Algaoud, op. cit., p.24.
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1.3 The Concept and Prohibition of Riba
From the perspective of Islamic scholars, riba is not only unethical but also distorts
community development. It erodes and destroys individual wealth, leading to unethi¬
cal behaviour and a class system within the community, ultimately creating conflict
within society. Furthermore, riba results in the rich becoming richer and the poor
becoming poorer in such a way that the poor will have to borrow from the rich, who
always have excess savings. The poor are penalized by the obligation to pay interest
on their loans, while the rich cream off the interest, and so the vicious circle con¬
tinues. In short, riba creates the unjustified enrichment of one party at the expense of
another.
It has been stated by Schacht that riba is a special case of unjustified enrich¬
ment or, in the words of the Qur'an, consuming (that is, appropriating for one's own
use) the property of others for no good reason, which is prohibited.42 Divine notes
that the theoretical grounds on which the prohibition of riba is based already existed
in earlier sources: Plato and Aristotle. He points out that the reasons for their
condemnation of usury were as follows:
(1) that as a form of "money-making" it was a degrading occupation, distorting
the true function of economic enterprise by seeking gain rather than the satis¬
faction of wants, making ofmoney an end in itself and so distracting the citizen
from the practice of virtue, which was his first duty; (2) that is was a parti¬
cularly degrading form of money-making, contrary to the liberality and genero¬
sity which the rich should practise towards the poor; and (3) that on this account
it was inimical to the welfare of the state, destroying peace and concord by
setting one class against the other. To these three, Aristotle added (4) that of its
very nature, it was a violation ofjustice.4"'
42
Schacht, op. cit., p. 145.
43 Thomas F, Divine, Interest: An Historical andAnalytical Study in Economics and Modern
Ethics (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1959), pp. 18-19.
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In Islam, justice is one of the most important factors influencing the ideal
Muslim society, for it covers every aspect of human interaction: social, economic
and political. Concerning economics and business transactions, Islam lays particular
emphasis on the establishment of justice44 and the elimination of exploitation. Thus,
it prohibits all forms of unjustified enrichment, of which riba represents one of the
main sources.45 A full understanding of the prohibition of riba is essential for the
appreciation of the true spirit of Islamic economics, for this rule represents the
endeavour of the Shari'a to achieve socio-economic justice in Muslim society.
The prohibition of riba is clearly stated in Islamic teachings from the Qur'an
and the Sunna, and it is generally accepted by the schools of thought in the Shari'a.46
Nevertheless, each school of legal thought has a different view of riba and it is one
of the topics most debated by the fuqaha and Islamic scholars.47
It should be noted that the prohibition of riba applies not only to Muslims, for,
historically, Jews and Christians were also prohibited from participating in any
aspect of interest. In Christianity, the Bible, the patristic writings, and the Church
44 Justice ('adl) is one of the fundamental principles of Islam, encompassing a compre¬
hensive system of accountability that is an important means of eradicating inequity,
exploitation and all other forms ofwrongdoing. See, Muhammad Umer Chapra, Towards a
Just Monetary System (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1985), pp.27-28.According
to Kamali, "'adl literally means putting something in its rightful place as well as giving
others equal treatment or reaching a state of equilibrium in transactions with them. He
explains further: "'Adl thus signifies moral rectitude and fairness since it means that things
should be where they belong. Justice is closely related to equality in that it aims for a state of
equilibrium in the distribution of rights and duties, and advantages and burdens in the
community. Justice and equality are, however, not identical in the sense that, under certain
circumstances, justice may only be achieved through inequality or an equal distribution of
wealth. Justice is, in many ways, a universal concept in that its basic meaning does not seem
to vary a great deal between the major legal traditions of the world." See, Mohammad
Hashim Kamali, Freedom, Equality and Justice in Islam (Cambridge, UK: The Islamic Texts
Society, 2002), p. 103.
45,Ibid„ p.55.
46 Nabil A. Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law: Riba', Gharar and
Islamic Banking (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 1-13.
47 Ibid.
27
Councils all prohibited usury historically.48 Indeed, the Christian Church considered
the practice of taking and giving usury a major sin. Noonan points out: "The usury
analysis would not have begun if the Church had not prohibited usury, and no other
intellectual or economic force exerted so strong a pressure on the formation of the
early theory."49
As a result of the expansion of trade and business during the twelfth century,
the Church itself began to examine interest more closely.50 In the eighteenth century,
more forms of credit were accepted by the Catholic Church. Between 1822 and 1836,
the Holy Christian Office in Rome declared that all forms of interest permitted by
civil law could be accepted by everyone. Finally, in 1950, Pope Pius XII approved
the banking system for the Roman Catholic Church, declaring that bankers "earn
their livelihood honestly".51
Concerning Jews, Saleh states: "Jews are prohibited by their religious law from
charging their co-religionists interest (Exodus XXII:25; Leviticus XXV:36, 37). This
prohibition does not apply to transactions with adherents of other religions."52 His
argument is similar to that of Diwany, who says that many Jews interpreted the
prohibition of usury as applying to loans made between Jews, not between a Jew and
48 John T. Noonan, Jr, The Scholastic Analysis ofUsury (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1957), p.l l.Vadillo also asserts that among the Romans, Seneca and Cicero
argued vehemently against usury, and among the early Fathers of the Christian Church,
Gregorius Nysennas, Juan Christostomos, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, were similarly
opposed. See, Umar Vadillo, The End ofEconomics (San Gregorio Alto, Granada: Madinah
Press, 1991), p. 14.
49 Ibid.
50
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51
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a Gentile, although the prohibition of usury appears in the Torah and the Bible.5'
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) stated the following about the prohibition of usury in
Judaism:
The Jews were forbidden to take usury from their brethren, i.e., from other
Jews. By this, we are given to understand that to take usury from any man is
simply evil, because we ought to treat every man as our neighbor and brothers,
especially in the state ofGospel, whereto all are called ....They were permitted,
however, to take usury from foreigners, not as though it were lawful, but in
order to avoid a greater evil, lest, to wit, through avarice, to which they were
prone, according to Is. Lvi : II, they should take usury from Jews, who were
worshippers of God.54
1.3.1 The History of Interest
The earliest known historical record of the giving and taking of interest is that of the
Sumerians in Mesopotamia (3000-1900 BC), a society in which trade played an
important part. According to Homer, barley was the medium of exchange for most
transactions, although copper and silver were also used.55 Money in the form of coins
came into existence only in the first millennium BC. The Sumerians already practised
systems of property ownership and credit. Under the credit system,56 loans of barley
were based on quantity and those of silver on weight. Interest charged on loans of
barley was 33'/3 per cent per annum, and on silver, 20 per cent per annum.57
The rates of interest introduced by the Sumerians were formally accepted and
legalized by the Code of Hammurabi - established by the King of Hammurabi c.
5j Tarik el-Diwany, The Problem with Interest (London: Ta Ha Publishers, 1997), p.26.
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1800 BC - during the Babylonian period. This system continued for more than 1,200
years.58 According to Homer, many of the financial customs practised by the Sume-
rians became established in this way.59 The taking and giving of interest continued
during the later empires of the Assyrians (732-625 BC), the Neo-Babylonians (625-
539 BC), Persians (539-333 BC), Greeks (500-100 BC) and Romans (500^100 BC).
Despite the Church's strong stand against usury, however, its prohibition was
largely ignored by business. Thus, the operations of the newly emerging modern
banks were based on interest, creating a banking system that has continued to this
day. The argument has been put forward that if interest were removed from the
banking system, then the whole economy would be paralyzed.60
1.3.2 The Meaning of Interest, Usury and Riba
It is important to clarify the differences in the meaning of the terms "interest",
"usury" and "riba". For example, Saleh points out: "Riba is generally translated into
English as 'usury' or 'interest', but in fact has a broader sense under Shari'a, as
already suggested by its dictionary meaning, which is 'increase' or 'gain'."61 Accord¬
ing to The Concise Oxford Dictionary (2004), interest is "money paid for the use of
money lent or for not requiring the repayment of a debt", while usury is "the practice
of lending money at unreasonably high rates of interest." The use of the terms
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1.3.2.1 Definitions of Interest
The Western concept and use of the term "interest" originate in Roman Law. Interest
here means money to be paid to the creditor as compensation for the loss incurred in
making the loan.62 According to Divine, id quod interest means the compensation for
damage or loss suffered by the creditor, owing to the debtor's failure to repay the
loan on the date specified in the contract.63 The payment of compensation might be
included as a clause in the original contract or it might be the subject of a claim after
the contract has expired.
Homer states that the modern term "interest" is derived from the Latin verb
intereo, which means "to be lost".64 He adds that a substantive form interisse, which
became standard around 1220, evolved into the modern term "interest".65 Homer
notes that the meaning of "damages" covered by interest could be sufficiently broad
to include the profit that the lender could have made with the money loaned.66
These findings confirm that interest always implied a loss rather than a profit,
that is, the loss incurred by the creditor as a result of lending the money to the debtor.
Historically, interest has been regarded as compensation paid by the debtor for fail¬
ing to fulfil the requirements of the contract. Therefore, interest is regarded not as
part of the repayment of a loan, but as a payment for damage or loss incurred by the
creditor.
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1.3.2.2 Definitions of Usury
The word "usury" is derived from the Latin usura, and there also exists the synonym
foenus. The Greek equivalent is tokos, which means "issue" or "produce".67 In the
historic context of a loan, usury meant the payment for the use of the money itself,
or, more broadly speaking, for the loan of any goods classified as mutuum (Latin),
that is, "fungible" (moveable or consumable) goods. However, since the majority of
loans were made in the form of money, usury acquired its present meaning of an
exorbitant charge or a charge higher than the legal rate for a monetary loan.68 When
Roman jurists referred to mutuum or foenus, they did not mean interest, for usura
was the term used to describe a payment above the principal.69
Among the early Christians who prohibited their followers from practising
usury was St Ambrose (d. 397). He wrote: "What exceeds the amount loaned is
usury, whether the loan is of money, of foods, of raiment or of any other types of
goods."70 St Jerome (d. 420) likewise defined usury as the acceptance of anything
more than the amount loaned (whether monetary or not).71 St Augustine (d. 371)
gave a similar definition: "The usurer is he who expects to receive more than he has
given, whether of money or of corn or of wine or of oil or of anything else."72 The
Nynweger capitulary 806, which contains the earliest known mention of usury from
medieval times, also defines usury as "where more is asked than is given".73
According to Noonan, the words of St Augustine, St Jerome and St Ambrose, as well
67
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as the Nynweger statute under the erroneous title of the Council of Agde, prove that
usury is "whatever is demanded beyond the principal".74
The early medieval campaign against usury reached its peak during the twelfth
century. Pope Alexander III (1159-1181) declared that credit sales that were higher
than the original cash price should be classified as usury.75 According to Noonan, this
was the earliest instance where the meaning of usury was extended to include certain
transactions that were not explicit loans. Pope Urban III (1185-1187) quoted the
words of Christ: "Lend freely, hoping nothing thereby" (Luke 6:35).76 This was the
first time in the whole history of Christianity that a specific command of Christ was
interpreted by a Pope as the authoritative prohibition of usury.77
1.3.2.3 Definitions of Riba
Schacht says that the literal meaning of riba is "increase". As a technical term, it is
translated into English as usury and interest, and, in general, any unjustified increase
of capital for which no compensation is given. Derivatives from the same root are
74
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used in other Semitic languages to describe interest.78 According to al-Zuhayli, the
lexical meaning of riba is an increase in number, amount, etc.79 Haque states that the
word riba is derived from the root rbw, meaning to increase, grow or augment.80 He
adds:
The fourth form (arba) means to make grow, increase or augment, i.e., a certain
person engaged in, took or practised riba. The verbal noun riba thus means
excess (ziyada), increase, augmentation, expansion or growth (nama). An ele¬
vated place or hill is called rabwa for its excessive increase in height over the
adjacent places. This increase (ziyada) originates either in the thing itself, or in
an exchange or sale (muqabala) of moneys or commodities, as the sale of one
dirham for two dirhams.8'
Haque concludes, therefore:
Riba occurs either in a thing, commodity or money, as the loan of a sum of
money or a commodity to be returned with an increase; or in an unjust or
inequitable sale/exchange when the exchange of one commodity against another
brings with it an increase in the commodity. In the technical/legal terminology
of the Shari'a, riba has therefore been defined as an increase or excess (fad!)
which, in an exchange or sale of commodity, accrues to the owner (lender)
without giving in return any equivalent counter-value, or recompense, 'iwad (to
the other party).82
The following are some definitions given by various scholars of the term riba.
Chapra says that according to the Shari'a, riba technically refers to the "premium"
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that must be paid by the borrower to the lender, together with the principal amount as
a condition for the loan or for an extension on its maturity.83 Schacht's formal defini¬
tion of riba is "a monetary advantage without a counter-value, which has been stipu¬
lated in favour of one of the two contracting parties in an exchange of two monetary
values."84 Saleh says:
Riba in its Shari'a context, can be defined, as generally agreed, as unlawful gain
derived from the quantitative inequality of the counter-values in any transaction
purporting to effect the exchange of two or more species which belong to the
same genus (jins) and are governed by the same efficient cause {'ilia, plural
'Hal). Deferred completion of the exchange of such species, or even of species
which belong to different genera but are governed by the same 'ilia, is also riba,
whether or not the deferment is accompanied by an increase in any one of the
exchanged counter values.85
Riba is defined by Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi (d. 1979) as the "predetermined
excess or surplus over and above the loan capital received by the creditor
conditionally in relation to a specified period".86 This definition contains the
following three elements:
1. Excess or surplus over and above the loan capital (that is, the principal).
2. Determination of this surplus in relation to time.
3. Bargain to be conditional on the payment of a predetermined surplus to the
creditor.
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1.3.3 The Differences between Riba and Trade (Bay1)
Riba is different from trade.87 The practice of giving a loan to increase capital
without any commodity exchange is considered unjust to the borrowers, for the
money is considered to increase its own value without being used in the economic
activity of a just sale or exchange.
Haque notes the differences as follows:
The jurists thus clearly hold that, unlike just bay', riba implies that money or a
commodity is loaned or exchanged for self-generating or self expanding value,
which is not a form of just sale because the increment over the exchanged or
loaned commodity or principal capital does not bring in return any equivalent
counter-value to the borrower. For them, this growth or increase (fadl) of
money or commodity in loans (as well as in "sales" and exchange in the broad
sense) is illegal and inequitable. In a bay', i.e., exchange of equal values, there
is a purchase and a sale, i.e., a permissible equal change, a just and lawful eco¬
nomic activity, a fair transaction, since something is exchanged for something,
an equal value for an equal value, as money for goods, or simply goods for
goods.88
However, profit cannot be eliminated from trade, for they are interrelated.
Homoud states that profit means growth by trading.89 In his interpretation of the
Qur'anic verse (Surat al-Baqarah 2:16), al-Tabari refers to trade and profit as
The merchant who receives a profit for the commodity of which he owned a
substitute, which is either more valuable than the commodity he owned, or
greater than the price which he sold it for. However, he who receives for his
commodity a substitute which is less than what he had before or lower than the
price for which he sold it is undoubtedly the loser in his commerce.90
As has been pointed out by Homoud, revenue that is surplus to the capital cannot be
called profit unless it is coupled with work, and unless the surplus is the result of an
87
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exchange that has transformed the capital from one state into another.91 However, if
the revenue is the result of using the financial commodity without any transforma¬
tion, then it is called a wage (rental fee). In the view of Islamic jurisprudence, profit
is a kind of growth of property resulting from the investment of the property in a
business activity.92
Therefore, the profit is due to the human effort made in gaining it. When
trading transactions take place, the money used is transformed into merchandise and
then converted back into money. The traders receive a larger sum ofmoney, which is
called profit, or a smaller sum, which is called loss. Trading is exposed to business
risk and the justification for this is that the property or capital concerned grows only
from investment. In the words of Homoud:
The view of Islam to capital, which is clearly revealed in the rules of juris¬
prudence, did not determine a right for money (coins) to obtain any profit,
unless it is joined, in a partnership, with work (human effort), regardless of
whether the result is profit or loss.9.
The Qur'an itself distinguishes between riba and trade, for trade brings
prosperity and blessings, whereas riba brings anger and destruction (Surat
al-Baqara, 2:275-276):
Those who devour usury will not stand except as stands one whom the evil one
by his touch has driven to madness. That is because they say: "Trade is like
usury", but God has permitted trade and forbidden usury. Those who, after
receiving direction from their Lord, desist, shall be pardoned for the past; their
case is for God [to judge]; But those who repeat [the offence] are companions
of the fire: they will abide therein [forever]. God will deprive usury of all bless¬
ing, but will give increase for deeds of charity: For He does not love creatures
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Ali stresses that these verses clearly condemn and prohibit usury.95 In his opinion,
usury is
undue profit made, not in the way of legitimate trade, out of loans of gold and
silver, and necessary articles of food such as wheat, barley, dates and salt
(according to the list mentioned by the Holy Apostle himself).96
In addition, he states that usury would include profiteering of all kinds, but exclude
economic credit, the creature of modern banking and finance. He also says:
While legitimate trade or industry increases the prosperity and stability of men
and nations, a dependence on usury would merely encourage a race of idlers,
cruel blood-suckers, and worthless fellows who do not know their own good
and are therefore akin to madmen.97
The Qur'anic verses 2:275-276 were revealed after the legitimacy of the
prohibition of riba was questioned by some of the Prophet's contemporaries.98 They
could not see the difference between a sale and a loan, stating that if the profit from a
loan was to be forbidden, then so too should the profit from a sale.99 The Qur'an
responds to this view with the verses 2:275-276. Saleh also clearly distinguishes
between trade and riba, stressing that not all profit and gain are unlawful in the
Shari'a. Only riba is prohibited according to the various schools of law.100 Therefore,
although riba has the meaning of an increase in the value of property, it works in a
different way. Concerning the riba in loans, Homoud says:
So long as the property is not transformed from currency (coins) into commo¬
dities or otherwise and vice versa and in the absence of any sale or purchase
operations, the increase received by either party is usury. A debt owing from a
debtor is neither transformed nor is it the subject of a sale or purchase (after
transformation); it begins a debt, which grows in accordance with the conditions








and whether it is of the same species as the principal sum of the debt or other¬
wise.101
Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi also suggests four fundamental differences bet¬
ween profit and riba:
1. In trade, exchanges between buyer and seller are based on equality. The buyer
fairly obtains the item that he has purchased, and the seller gains profit in con¬
sideration of the labour, time and brainpower he utilizes in obtaining that item
for the buyer. In the case of interest, there is no apportionment of profits bet¬
ween the two parties on the basis of impartiality. The creditor secures for
himself a fixed amount ofmoney, which he considers as his profit after giving
out a loan; the debtor only acquires the time in which to use the money, and
this time factor does not essentially acquire him profit.
2. In trade, however high the profit the seller might demand from the buyer, the
profit is only charged once. However, in the case of interest transaction, the
creditor continues to charge interest over an unsettled loan for as long as the
principal amount is not returned by the debtor.
3. In trade, when a commodity is exchanged for its selling price, the transaction
comes to an end. The purchaser does not give anything after that transaction to
the seller. In hire transactions, whether of house, land, furniture or other mat¬
erial, the original remains unharmed and is later returned to the owner. In the
case of interest, however, the debtor is obliged to spend the amount borrowed
from the creditor, which he has to reproduce and return with the interest owed.
4. In professions relating to trade, such as craftsmanship, the individual receives
the outcomes after undergoing labour, hardship, or by his skill or art. In interest
101
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transactions, he only lends out his money or the capital and becomes, without
any personal labour or hardship, a foremost partner in the earnings of his
debtor.102
The above discussions clearly show the difference between trade and riba. The
Qur'an, too, distinguishes one from the other, allowing trade but prohibiting riba. It
is also understood that traders/merchants are exposed to business risk, for they bear
all the gains and losses, whereas the opposite is true of riba transactions, in which the
customer gains nothing.
1.3.4 The Prohibition of Riba
In the Shari'a, the prohibition of riba is derived from three sources: the Qur'anic
Revelation, the Traditions (Sunna) of the Prophet (pbuh), and consensus (ijma').m
The concept of riba in the Qur'an and Sunna is general and has a broad connotation.
Therefore, since the death of the Prophet (pbuh), Muslim jurists have been making
every effort to give a precise interpretation of riba, and the fiqhi interpretation or
technical meaning continues to be debated.
1.3.4.1 The Prohibition of Riba in the Qur'an
The prohibition of riba appears in four separate revelations in the Qur'an.104 The first
verse was revealed in Makka and the remainder in Madina. According to Muslim
scholars, there are four stages, beginning with a judgement of value, followed by an
implicit prohibition, a limited prohibition, and finally, a total prohibition.105 The
introduction of the prohibition was gradual, so as to prepare Muslims for their
102
Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, Towards Understanding the Qur'an, vol.1, Surahs 1-3
(Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1988), pp.215-216.
10j
Al-Zuhayli, op. cit., p.310.
104 For example, see, Chapra, op. cit., p.56; Doi, op. cit., p.108; Saleh, op. cit., p.33;
Homoud, op. cit., p.65.
105
Saleh, op. cit., p.33.
40
willing compliance with the final injunction. This approach was similar to that taken
with the prohibition of intoxicants, the consumption of which was widespread among
the Arabs during the early years of Islam. Al-Zuhayli comments as follows:
It is well known that one of the characteristics of religious law is gradual prohi¬
bition of unacceptable conduct. For instance, the prohibition of wine proceeded
in four stages, culminating in the verses (5:90-91); and the prohibition of adul¬
tery similarly progressed in two steps, first through the incarceration of women
and punishment of men (5:15-16), and then through the punishment of flagel¬
lation in (24:2). Following the same gradual process, the prohibition of riba
came in four stages.106
The revelations comprise the following four stages:
The First Stage
That which you lay out for increase through the property of [other] people, will
have no increase with Allah; but that which you lay out for charity, seeking the
countenance of Allah [will increase]; it is these who will receive a recompense
multiplied (Surat al-Rum 30:39).107
This verse appears to have been revealed during the early years of Prophet
Muhammad's mission in Makka, possibly about 614 or 615 AC or even earlier.108
This date is based on the internal evidence of the Qur'an.109
The verse compares those who give money to earn an increase {riba) with
those who give alms to please Allah. The Qur'an promotes the giving of alms, while
discouraging loans based on interest. Homoud states that since this was a Makkan
verse, it was directed at people in the early stages of Islam, encouraging them to
abolish loans based on interest (riba),uo and to give alms and charity instead. He
adds that the aim of the verse was the "awakening of the live souls", addressing the
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people who, so far, had not realized that the gain from usury was to be banned.111
Homoud points out that usury is of no value to Allah, whereas alms are bound to
grow and multiply.112 Ali's comment on this verse is that the Qur'an condemns all
unlawful grasping of wealth at other people's expense, for it clearly states that profit
should be earned only by one's own efforts and at one's own expense, not by
exploiting others.113 Riba is an increase in income by unlawful means, such as usury,
bribery, profiteering, fraudulent trading and so on.114
However, several early commentators on the Qur'an argue that the meaning of
riba in this verse is "gift". Some lexicographers like Azhari (d. 370/980) and Ibn
Manzur (d. 711/1311) stated that there were two types of riba, one prohibited and the
other lawful.115 According to Ibn Manzur, the Qur'anic verse (30:39) refers to lawful
riba. He explained that lawful riba means "giving a person something in anticipation
of getting something better at a later time."116 Nevertheless, Saeed does not agree
with this interpretation:
All usages of the term riba in the Qur'an appear to have the same meaning, that
is, a charge imposed on a needy debtor due to inability to repay a debt on time.
The term riba in the sense of gift does not appear to have been used in pre-
Islamic or post-Islamic times. Neither Azhari nor Ibn Manzur provides any
example of such usage. It could, therefore, be argued that the concept of a law¬
ful riba and unlawful riba was most probably a later invention due to the diffi¬
culty the commentators had in interpreting the rather unusual wording of the
verse (30:39) in which the term is used. The Qur'an here appears to be con¬
demning the practice of riba and the resulting exploitation of the disadvantaged
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For the iniquity of the Jews, We made unlawful for them certain [foods], good
and wholesome, which had been lawful for them, in that they hindered man
from Allah's way; that they took usury, though they were forbidden; and that
they devoured men's substance wrongfully; We have prepared for those among
them who reject faith a grievous punishment (Surat al-Nisa' 4:160—161).'18
These verses were revealed during the early Madinan period and strongly condemned
the practice by the Jews (People of the Book) of taking riba. Verse 161 states clearly
that those who continue this practice will be severely punished by Allah.119 In these
verses, a strong word has been used to indicate the beginning of prohibition, that is,
"take" instead of "give", which had been used in the earlier verse (30:39).120
Al-Qurtubi's interpretation of these verses contains two different views of the
ban on usury. Firstly, he says: "God did not intend it to be the usury of the Shari'a,
which was banned to us, but His intention was directed to the illegitimate property."
Then he comments: "that the laws of the prophets who preceded us contain a ban is
noted and mentioned in the Book ofGod, which also spoke about the Jews."121
The interpretation of these verses resulted in a misunderstanding among scho¬
lars over whether riba was prohibited only to the Muslims or the Jews in Madina.
Philip K. Hitti, one of the great modern historians, believes that the prohibition was
applied to the Madinan Jews when Prophet Muhammad needed financial support and
the Jews insisted on charging interest.122 Schacht also comments on these verses as
follows:
The fact that the principal passages against interest belong to the Medinan
period and that the Jews are reproached with breaking the prohibition, suggests
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that the Muslim prohibition of riba owes less to conditions in Mecca than to the
Prophet's closer acquaintance with Jewish doctrine and practice in Medina. In
the later development of the teaching on the subject as we find it in tradition,
Jewish influence is in any case undeniable.123
However, although Saleh respects the opinion of Hitti and Schacht, he does not
agree with them for two reasons. Firstly, discontent with riba arose while Prophet
Muhammad was still in Makka (Sural al-Rum 30:39), where there were very few
Jews and, in any case, they had little contact with him.124 Secondly, at that time, the
Jews in Madina were engaged in agriculture rather than commerce. According to
Saleh, it was the Muhajirun (Makkans who migrated with the Prophet to Madina)
and the Ansar (Madinan Muslims) who commonly practised riba}15 Saleh refers to
two statements by Abu Hurayra and 'Abdullah ibn Salam, Companions of the
Prophet, in support of his opinion. Abu Hurayra said: "I was a poor man serving the
Messenger of Allah with all of my heart while the Muhajirun and the Ansar were
busy in the market caring for their fortune." 'Abdullah ibn Salam is reported to have
said: "Riba was widespread throughout Medina, and that was interpreted as being the
case after Muhammad's death and after the ejection of the Jews."126
In his interpretation of these verses, al-Tabari said:
The order of heaven is one and the same; that the usury which was banned to
the Jews is the same usury which is banned to the people of Islam; that the
canonical laws confirm one another, as each of them originates from God.127
He adds that the usury that was banned for the Jews was similar to pre-Islamic usury,
for both consisted in taking what was surplus to the capital in consideration for an
extension of the term after maturity.128
123 Schacht (1995), op. cit., p.491.
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Third Stage
O you who have believed! Do not devour usury doubled and multiplied; but fear
Allah, that you may [really] prosper (Surah Ali 'Imran 3:130).129
This verse was revealed in Madina, immediately after the Battle of Uhud (3/625) and
almost eleven years after the first condemnation of riba in Makka.130 Saeed states:
The verse is in the context of a reminder to Muslims of what went wrong in the
battle of Uhud, when a potential victory was turned to [s/c] a grave defeat,
resulting in the death of seventy Muslim men, who left behind orphans, widows,
and aged parents in need of financial support and assistance.1 jl
In these circumstances, those in need required financial support in the form of cha¬
rity, not a loan based on riba. Therefore, following the prohibition of riba trans¬
actions for Muslims, the Qur'an commands them to be God-conscious, to fear Hell,
to obey God and the Prophet, and to hasten to ask for God's forgiveness. It describes
the God-conscious as those "who spend in prosperity and adversity" to relieve the
suffering of the needy".132 In his interpretation of the verse (3:130), Ali says:
Usury is the opposite extreme of charity, unselfishness, striving, and giving of
ourselves in the service of God and of our fellow man. Real prosperity consists
not in greed but in living, giving ourselves and of our substance in the cause of
God and God's truth and in the service ofGod's creatures.Ij3
The words "doubled" and "multiplied" caused confusion among the Islamic
scholars who interpreted this verse. Some understood it to mean that the prohibition
applied only to the riba that literally doubled and multiplied. However, the majority
of leading Islamic scholars agreed that the prohibition applied to all forms of riba
128 Ibid.
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and that the amount itself was not a criterion.134 Al-Tabari explained the meaning of
the term in this context:
Do not consume riba after having professed Islam as you have been consuming
it before Islam. The way pre-Islamic Arabs used to consume riba was that one
of them would have a debt repayable on a specific date. When that date came,
the creditor would demand repayment from the debtor. The latter would say,
"Defer the repayment of my debt; I will add to your wealth." This is the riba
which was doubled and redoubled.115
Clearly, this verse bans every type of riba, though this was not yet the formal
revelation finalizing the law, which was to come in the fourth stage.
The Fourth Stage
Those who devour usury will not stand except as stands one whom the evil one
by his touch has driven to madness. That is because they say: "Trade is like
usury, but Allah has permitted trade and forbidden usury." Those who, after
receiving direction from their Lord, desist, shall be pardoned for the past, their
case is for Allah [to judge]; but those who repeat [the offence] are companions
of the Fire: they will abide therein [forever], Allah will deprive usury of all
blessings, but will give increase for deeds of charity: for He does not love
ungrateful and wicked creatures. Those who believe, and do deeds of righteous¬
ness and establish regular prayers and regular charity, will have their reward
with their Lord: on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve. O you who
believe! Fear Allah and give up what remains of your demand for usury if you
are indeed believers. If you do not, take notice of war from Allah and His
Messenger: but if you turn back, you shall have your capital sums: do not deal
unjustly, and you shall not be dealt with unjustly. If the debtor is in a difficulty,
grant him time till it easy for him to repay. But if you remit it by way of charity,
that is best for you if you only knew. And fear the Day when you shall be
brought back to Allah. Then shall be every soul be paid what it earned, and
none shall be dealt with unjustly (Swat al-Baqara 2:275-281,136
These verses were revealed towards the end of the Prophet's mission, around
8/630 or later,137 and they finally established a clear distinction between trade and
riba. Muslims were now commanded to cancel all outstanding riba and take only the
principal amount. They should even forgo the principal if the borrower was suffering
lj4
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hardship.138 The verses are a clear confirmation of the ban on usury already imposed
in the earlier verse (Surat Al 'Imran 3:130) and Muslims are again given a firm
reminder of the consequences of disobedience in both this world and the next. The
text also implies that the prohibited riba can be defined as any increment to the
principal.139 Therefore, any extraneous addition, however small, is considered to be
riba, and the lender should be repaid only the principal.140
1.3.4.2 The Prohibition of Riba in the Sunna
According to al-Zuhayli, evidence of the prohibition of riba can be found in num¬
erous hadiths of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).141 The specific details of these hadiths
reinforce the general ruling stated in the Qur'an. Haque explains as follows:
The r/ba-hadiths logically seek to amplify the Qur'anic definition of riba (an
increase of capital in loan) to cover all such increases of capital and commo¬
dities in the sector of sales/exchanges....generally termed as ribawi or
usurious/speculative economic transactions which involve undue and unjustified
profit derived from the other party, individual, group or class.142
Saleh also comments:
The Qur'anic prohibition of riba is [sic] limited to loan agreements, but soon it
was to be extended by several hadiths to the exchange of currencies and deno¬
minated articles, which became property susceptible of [s/c] riba (mal ribawi).
These hadiths are reported in numerous accounts with slight differences, the one
reproduced hereafter is representative of the rule that the Prophet intended to
convey although it has a concise form: "[Exchange] gold for gold, silver for
silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, salt for salt, measure
for measure and hand to hand. If the [exchanged] articles belong to different
138
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narrated by Muslim on the authority of Abu Hurayra). The author also states that al-Hakim
narrated on the authority of Ibn Mas'ud that the Prophet (pbuh) said: "There are seventy-
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genera, the exchange is without restraint provided it takes place in a hand-to-
hand transaction."143
The literature on riba indicates that the hadiths distinguish between two types
of this practice: riba al-nasi'a and riba al-fadl.U4 Al-Zuhayli elaborates as follows:
1. Riba al-nasi'a, which is the only type known to pre-lslamic Arabia. This is
the riba collected in compensation for deferring a due debt to a new term of
deferment. This definition applies regardless of the sources of the due debt:
whether it resulted from a loan, or a deferred price in a sale.
2. Riba al-buyu (sales) for six goods (gold, silver, wheat, barley, salt, and
dates). This is also known as riba al-fadl, which was forbidden to prevent
potential circumvention of the prohibition of riba al-nasi'a, which can be
effected by selling gold with a deferred price, which he later pays with increase
containing riba disguised through a payment in silver.145
Al-Zuhayli explains further that it is riba al-nasi'a that is forbidden by the Qur'an,
for it is al-riba al-jahiliyya. The prohibition of riba al-fadl was established in the
Sunna by analogy to riba al-nasi'a, that is, an increase without due compensation.146
He states that the Sunna also added the prohibition of a third type of riba: a
deferment sale, in which the two compensations are different and one of them is
deferred.147 Saleh advocates that riba should be divided into three categories: pre-
lslamic riba (riba al-jahiliyya), which was regarded as the type described in the
Quran, and riba al-fadl and riba al-nasi'a, both of which are described in the
Hadith.148
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1.3.4.3 Riba in Fiqh
Although the Qur'an does not distinguish between different types of riba, the
Shari'a, however, refers to it in two senses: riba al-nasi'a and riba al-fadl.w
Riba al-nasi 'a comes into effect when a specified increase is added to a loan in
return for the postponement of repayment.'50 All the schools of Islamic jurisprudence
are in solid agreement that riba al-nasi'a is prohibited. It is indeed one of the major
sins, clearly banned by indisputable texts of the Shari'a. Hence, "the Prophet
prohibited the taking of even a small gift, service or favour as a condition for the
loan, in addition to the principal."151 Clearly, the advance fixing of a positive return
on a loan is not permitted under the Shari'a, nor does the waiting period of the
repayment of a loan promise a positive return. However, if the return on the principal
could be either positive or negative, depending on the final outcome of the business,
which is not known in advance, it is allowed, provided that it is shared in accordance
with the principles of justice laid down in the Shari'a.152 Al-Zuhayli gives the
following general reasons for the prohibition of riba al-nasi 'a:
It is conducive to exploitation of the poor by the rich, and putting undue finan¬
cial burdens on the needy. Moreover, permission of riba al-nasi 'a would lead to
dire economic consequences, since the resulting commodification ofmoney and
trading it in different quantities, would cause an imbalance by preventing
money from serving the role of a stable numeraire. Also, in the case of food¬
stuffs, if profits can be made by deferment, foodstuffs may become unavailable
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Riba al-fadlx54 occurs where, in an on-the-spot (hand-to-hand) transaction,
there is an excess of one of the counter-values belonging to the same genus (jins).155
According to Chapra, riba al-fadl does not have much influence on transactions
because it occurs so rarely. Clearly, people do not aim to buy or sell an item in
exchange for the same item, unless there is something extra from which each of the
parties could benefit. Nevertheless, riba al-fadl has been prohibited because it might
be used to deceive the less educated.'56
Riba al-fadl was unfamiliar to the Arabs, unlike riba al-nasi'a, which had been
widespread among them during the pre-Islamic era. Even the Companions were
reported to hold different views of the prohibition of riba al-fadl. Although this type
of riba is said to have been allowed by some of the Companions, such as 'Abdallah
ibn 'Abbas,157 he reportedly withdrew his judgement later and referred to the prohibi¬
tion of riba al-fadlf* It is also prohibited by the four main legal schools of thought,
despite their differing interpretations of its details and scope. However, they are in
agreement on the general rulings concerning riba al-fadl as follows:
1. Exchange of goods of the same group and kind, such as gold for gold or dates
for dates, must be equal and on the spot.
2. Exchange of goods of the same group but different in kind, such as gold for
silver or wheat for barley, must be on the spot.
154 Riba al-fadl is also known as riba al-buyu, riba al-ghayr, al-mubashir or riba al-khafi.
(See, Chapra, op. cit., p.65.)
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3. Exchange of goods of different groups and kinds, such as gold for wheat or
silver for dates, is not subject to equality or promptness (on the spot).
Saleh has simplified the position of the four main schools of legal thought on
riba al-nasi'a and riba al-fadl as presented in Table 1.1.159
Table 1.1 Position of the four main schools (madhahib) on
riba al-nasi'a and riba al-fadl
Hanafi Maliki Shafi'i Hanbali
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whether in a hand-











whether in a hand-
to-hand or a de¬
ferred transaction.
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The exchanged One of the ex¬ The exchanged
counter-values are changed counter- counter-values
neither measurable values is currency, belong to different
nor weighable and, the other is not, genera and are
furthermore, belong whether or not food¬ governed by
to different genera, stuffs; examples are different'ilal; for
such as the sale of the sale of rice for example, one is
pomegranates for silver or iron for measurable (wheat),
quinces. gold. and the other is
weighable (meat).
Gain permissible, Gain permissible,
whether in a hand- whether in a hand- Gain permissible in












example is the sale
of a riding animal.
Gain permissible,
whether in a hand-
to-hand or deferred
transaction.
1.4 The Islamic Financial System
The above discussion clearly shows that riba is prohibited in the Shari'a. If a bank is
to conform to the Shari'a, then riba is one of the principal elements that must be
eliminated from its system, and with it, all exploitation. Lenders are now required to
share effort or risk with the entrepreneurs, who are now assured of a positive return
according to their level of effort and skill in management. This is the social justice
envisaged by Islamic economists.
The Islamic economic system is governed by Islamic commercial law (fiqh
al-mu'amalat), comprising a set of contracts and instruments, without which trans-
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actions are legally void. Below is a description of Islamic contracts, including an
assessment of Islamic and conventional banking practices.
1.4.1 Assessment of Islamic and Conventional Banking Practices
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries AC, the rise in Islamic revivalism
encouraged many 'ulama' to reject the interest-based banks and their services.'60
Some well-known individuals such as Muhammad 'Abduh (d. 1905), the Grand
Mufti of Egypt, and his disciple, Muhammad Rashid Rida' (d. 1935) tried to accom¬
modate some forms of interest.161 However, Hassan al-Banna (d. 1949), the founder
of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966), its ideologue, and Abu
al-A'la Mawdudi (d. 1979), the Pakistani scholar who founded Jama'at-e-lslami, are
among the scholars who condemned interest and the banking system based on it.162 In
December 1985 (1406 ah), the Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFI) of OIC
supported the restrictive interpretation of the early jurists by condemning all interest-
bearing transactions as void. In their third resolution, the Academy invited the
governments of all the Muslim countries to encourage and enable the financial
institutions to operate in accordance with the principles of the Shari'a. The aim was
to respond to the needs of Muslims so that they would not be forced to live in
contradiction between the demands of their faith and the realities of life.163
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Al-Zuhayli also points out that modern Islamic scholars differ over whether
banking interest is unlawful. Dr 'Abd al-Mu'nim al-Nimr published an article in June
1989, containing a religious ruling permitting banking interest. In July and
November 1989, Dr Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi (then the Mufti of Egypt) issued
several fatwas permitting interest for investment certificates and limited banks. In
1991, he issued a fatwa permitting all banking interest throughout the world.164
However, in 1992, the federal Shari'a Court of Pakistan dismissed that fatwa as the
"solitary opinion of Shaikh Tantawi of Egypt."165 Finally, in 1999, the Shari'a
Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan gave its landmark decision,
banning interest in all forms and "by whatever name it may be called."l66Al-Zuhayli
also concludes that banking interest is the riba prohibited in the Qur'an and the
Sunna, as well as by the consensus of the Companions of the Prophet (pbuh) and the
later nation.167 Concerning Islamic financial institutions, al-Zuhayli gives further
clarification as follows:
164
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Thus, since the transactions of Islamic financial institutions are far from the
forbidden riba, and they provide useful economic tools to meet the economic
needs of Muslims, they are permissible. In this regard, Islam does not forbid
anyone from making reasonable profit (up to 20% or 33%). While some
people doubt that certain types of profits made from Islamic banks may seem
familiar to riba, we note that as long as the means used to obtain those profits
are permissible, the transactions are permissible. Thus, while some may argue
that the increase in price for deferment (say, in instalment payments of an item
purchased through murabaha), we say that the Muslim jurists permitted such
transactions to meet the economic needs of Muslims. Such contract are not
exploitative, on the contrary, they help the consumer to obtain goods that he
would not otherwise be able to consume. Similarly, commission and fees that
Islamic financial institutions charge for their services may be thought by some
to be forbidden riba. However, most of the activities of those institutions take
the form of rental (e.g. in maintaining such space, or preparing paperwork for
transactions), or agency in exchange for a fee. All such fees and commissions
are permissible and should not be confused for the forbidden riba. 168
1.4.2 Islamic Economics: Contracts
Coulson describes a contract in the Shari'a as a legally recognized undertaking.169
The Arabic word 'aqd (pi. 'uqud) means "tie" or "bond". 'Uqud can be translated as
"contracts", because the term in the Western sense is applied to legal transactions
that are concluded with an offer by one party and acceptance by the other. However,
in Islamic jurisprudence, an 'aqd or contract is applied to a legal undertaking that is
very different from "the binding promise" constituting a contract in Western legal
systems.170
Udovitch stipulates the following four rules applicable to all commercial trans¬
actions: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) legal competence of the contract¬
ing parties; (3) a subject matter; and (4) a consideration. Should evidence be required
in later litigation, a fifth rule ought to be added: the presence of qualified wit-
168 Ibid., p.342.
169




nesses.171 A contract is not required to include a special formula or to follow a
particular format. However, Udovitch points out that the Arabic papyri contain hun¬
dreds of examples of sale contracts, tax receipts, etc., all duly witnessed and the
names of the witnesses recorded. According to the standards of current practice,
these documents were considered to have the status of evidence.172 Although from
the historical point of view, not every business transaction needs to be in writing, for
important transactions, a written document must be included as evidence for future
reference. Udovitch supports this advice:
The numerous contracts and other business records preserved in the Cairo
Geniza bear eloquent testimony to the importance attached to written docu¬
ments in the commerce of the medieval Islamic world. For purposes of refer¬
ence, records of business transactions were preserved for long periods and often
accompanied the merchants in their travels from India to Tunis. The elaborate
care taken of written contracts is exemplified by the fact that, in several
instances, copies of the same contract were dispatched by two or three different
routes in order to ensure the safe arrival of at least one at the desired
destination.17-1
1.4.2.1 Classification of Contracts
Coulson defines the system of 'uqud as based on four contracts covering two primary
criteria: (1) whether the transfer is of the corpus or the usufruct; and (2) whether it is
for the sake of consideration.174 The types of contract under this system are as
follows:
171 Abraham L. Udovitch, Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1970), p.86.
172 Ibid. Udovitch states: "A written agreement per se does not give rise to any obligation,
nor does it constitute competent evidence in the event of litigation. Theoretically, a written
document can acquire legal force only through the verification of its contents by oral
testimony of qualified witnesses. It is the oral testimony which is the decisive factor in
determining the existence and nature of obligation. The existence of documentary evidence
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1. Bay' or sale: the transfer of the corpus for a consideration (tamlik 'ain bi
'iwad);
2. Hiba or gift: the transfer of the corpus without a consideration (tamlik 'ain bila
'iwad)',
3. Ijara or hire: the transfer of the usufruct for a consideration (tamlik manfa 'a bi
'iwad);
4. 'Ariya or loan: the transfer of the usufruct without a consideration (tamlik
manfa'a bila 'iwad) f5
Although there are many types of contract that do not fall into this group, these four,
headed by the contract of sale, are the most important according to the legal
manuals.176 Haque also states that the contract of bay' forms the core of the Islamic
law of obligations.177
Bakar classifies contracts under two main headings: unilateral and bilateral.
Unilateral contracts consist of transactions that are gratuitous and do not require the
consent of the recipient. They include:
1. Gift {hiba);
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Bilateral contracts consist of all remaining transactions, which are subject to stricter
rulings and guidelines, requiring the consent of both parties to the contract under one
of the six following classifications:
1. Contracts of exchange ('uqud al-mu'awadat);
2. Contracts of security ('uqud al-tawthiqat);
3. Contracts of partnership (shirka);
4. Contracts of safe custody (wadi'a);
5. Contracts of the utilization ofusufruct ('uqud al-manfa 'a);
6. Contracts of the carrying out ofwork (for example, wakala and ja 'aid).
Bakar states that most contracts are those of exchange (bay') and utilization of
usufruct (ijara). These two contracts cover the main commercial activities and are
the basis of other types of contracts.178
Below is a more detailed description of the types of contract, following
Coulson's classification.
Sale (Bay)
Bay' means a "transaction", to include both sale and purchase. In the Shari'a, it is
used to mean mubadala or a simple exchange of commodities, that is, an exchange to
which both parties have consented.179 With reference to sales contracts, Haque states
that both senses of the words bay' and mubadala imply a contract or agreement
(safqa, mubaya'a, mu'ahada), when, in the original sense, the purchaser slaps the
178 Mohd Daud Bakar, "Contracts in Islamic Commercial and Their Application in Modern
Islamic Financial Systems". Teaching material used at the Centre for Research and Training,
Kuala Lumpur, 2002, p.7.
179
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palm of the seller to indicate acceptance (qabul) of the offer (ijab).m Coulson
explains that bay '(contract of sale) is the unconditional and immediate transfer of the
ownership of an existing and determined object of legal value, capable of delivery,
for a fixed price.181 To avoid any speculation, risk or uncertainty, the price may be
paid immediately, or deferred until a specific time, or paid in instalments over a fixed
period.182 This is an ideal procedure according to the Shari'a, because it eliminates an
unforeseeable profit for one party.
Bay' covers not only the exchange of a commodity for money (sale), but also
that of a commodity for another commodity (barter), or that of money for money
(sarf). The last two transactions are similar to barter and currency exchange (sarj),
but different from an exchange of a commodity for money. Since these transactions
are open to riba, they are subject to stricter Islamic principles to guarantee their
legality and to prevent the influence of riba al-fadl and riba al-nasi'a respectively.




These transactions are governed by different rules from those of the basic bay' as
follows:
1. The transfer of ownership is unconditional.
2. The sale item exists.
180 Ibid.
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3. Delivery is immediate.183
Hire
Ijara means "lease" and "hire". It is the transfer of usufruct (man/a'a) by corporeal
property or personal service for a consideration. The consideration can be rent (ujra)
for the hire of an object, or wages (ajr) for the hire of a person or people.184
Corporeal property can be any of the following three forms:
1. Immoveable property, such as land and premises.
2. Merchandise, such as furniture, machinery, etc.
3. Animals.
Concerning the legal aspect of ijara, Coulson notes that there is no distinction
between immoveable property of land or houses and moveable goods, chattels and
animals.185 However, when hiring people, there is a distinction between a "private
employee" or servant (ajir khass), who agrees to gives his services exclusively to the
employer during the period of the contract, and an independent contractor or "public
employee" (ajir mushtarak), who is hired to perform a specific task or service.186
According to Coulson, these ijara contracts are the basic form, to which the three
fundamental principles apply. The manfa'a must be precisely defined; the consider¬
ation (rent or wages) must be of fixed value, and the period of hire must be clearly
stated.187 However, when a "hire-type" agreement does not conform to these three






rules.188 These contracts include agricultural tenancies, trading ventures (mudaraba)
and reward (Ja 'aid).
Gift
A transaction is defined as a "gift" (hiba) where the gratuity is one of corpus ('ain).
If the transfer is only of usufruct (manfa'a), then it is called 'ariya, though, strictly
speaking, 'ariya refers to the loan of a particular and identifiable chattel or piece of
property. The loan ofmoney or any fungible good is termed qard.xw
Other Contractual Institutions
Although, strictly speaking, the other institutions do not fit into the four types of con¬
tract or the associated exceptions, nevertheless, they complement and reinforce the
basic system and are therefore integrated into it.190 These institutions include partner¬
ship, assignment of debt (hiwala), guarantee (kafala), pledge (rahn), deposit (wadi 'a)
and agency (wakala).
Despite the differences in the classification of contracts, as shown in the above
discussions, each of these classifications consists of different yet interrelated trans¬
actions to form a complete system of mu 'amalat. These differences are tailored to
suit the needs of people in a wide range of circumstances, and they also ensure




1.4.2.2 Contracts in the Contemporary Islamic Financial System
Al-Hawary et al. of the World Bank classify contracts of economic activities into
transactions and intermediation.191 Transaction contracts include exchange, trade and
the financing of economic activities, whereas intermediation contracts facilitate an
efficient and transparent implementation of transaction contracts. The authors state
that the combination of these two types of contract offer a set of instruments with
varying purposes, maturities and degrees of risk to satisfy diverse groups of
economic agents.192 Intermediation contracts include mudaraba, kafala/aqd-daman,
ammana, takaful, wakala and ja'ala. Transaction contracts are divided into three
groups: (1) miscellaneous; (2) asset-based securities; and (3) equity participants. The
contract of qard hasana is classified as miscellaneous, and musharakah as equity
participation. Asset-based securities are divided into trade financing and collaterized
securities. Murabaha, Bay' salam and bay' mu 'ajjal are contracts classified as trade
financing. Collaterized securities include ijara and istisna'.
191 Dahlia A. el-Hawary, Wafiq Grais, and Zamir Iqbal, "Regulating Islamic Financial
Institutions: The Nature of the Regulated". Paper presented at the International Conference
on Islamic Banking: Risk Management, Regulation and Supervision, held in Jakarta, 30
September - 2 October 2003, p.7.
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CHAPTER TWO




Islamic banking is a subset of Islamic economics and forms part of mu'amalat
(relationships between human beings) with particular reference to commercial and
trading activities, in which the application of the Shari'a is the basic code of conduct.
Islamic banking is a new phenomenon compared with the interest-based financial
system, which has dominated the world for centuries. Although there is evidence of a
widespread practice similar to Islamic banking among Eastern traders throughout the
Middle Ages and even before the birth of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), the Muslim
world gave way to a riba-based financial system when the economic system came
under the control of Western imperialism. Muslims themselves are also responsible
for this situation, having neglected the true teachings of Islam. These teachings need
to be applied to all aspects of Muslim life, to the social, economic and political
arenas as well as to personal matters such as family affairs and acts ofworship.
The existence of Islamic banking is also closely related to the rise and fall of
Islamic civilization. As stated by Chapra:
Due to a number of historical circumstances, the Muslim world lost its techno¬
logical and economic vitality. Hence, a number of Islamic institutions, including
the Islamic system of financial intermediation, became displaced by Western
institutions. However, the independence of Muslim countries has led to the
revival of Islam and there is a longing to gradually reinstate most of the lost
institutions, the Islamic financial system being one of them.'
Scharf also asserts:
Contrary to what Westerners often think, interest-free banking should not be
considered as merely a concessionary or subsidised financial practised. Viewed
in its historic context, Islamic law on interest was above all practical. The
economy of the Arabian peninsula in the 7th century was that of trading city-
states living in a hostile environment. In economic terms, the constraints were
illiquidity and scarcity and the results were usury and hoarding. Islamic precepts
aimed to control such undesirable social phenomena. If interest rates imposed
on long-distance traders were too high, this either discouraged trade or
substantially increased the cost of commodities for investors as well as
consumers, resulting in a net loss to the community.2
According to Zaher and Hassan in the earlier references, commercial or mercantile
activities that complied with Islamic principles were classified under the "umbrella"
of "interest-free" or Islamic banking. ' However, the term "Islamic financial system"
appeared only in the mid-1980s, when it was realized that the Islamic financial
system was not limited to banking but also included financial instruments, financial
markets and all types of financial intermediation. Indeed, it complies with an existing
system that prohibits interest and speculation, advocates the sharing of risk by all the
relevant parties, regards money as potential capital, upholds the sanctity of contracts
and promotes engagement in activities complying with the Shari'a.
Today, the Islamic financial system has come into existence to satisfy the
needs of believing Muslims, whose global population constitutes more than 1.2
billion. Akacem and Gilliam explain that this situation has been due to two main
1 M. Umer Chapra and Tariqullah Khan, Regulation and Supervision ofIslamic Banks,
(Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Research and Training Institute: Islamic Development Bank,
2000), p.3.
2 Traute Wohlers-Scharf, Arab and Islamic Banks: New Business Partners for Developing
Countries (Paris: Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development [OECD], 1983), p.75.
3 Tarek S. Zaher and M. Kabir Hassan, "A Comparative Literature Survey of Islamic Finance
and Banking", Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, vol.10, no.4 (2001), p.155.
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factors.4 The first was the oil price shocks of the 1970s, which led to an increase in
the per capita income of oil-producing countries. The second was the establishment
of an Islamic republic in Iran in 1979, under the Khomeini government, together with
further oil price shocks. The result has been the revival of Islam and the Shari'a in its
entirety, the increasing awareness of which has encouraged Muslims all over the
world to conduct their lives according to the true teachings of Islam, and therefore to
seek an alternative to conventional banking, one which is consistent with Islamic
teachings. Zaher and Hassan support this view in stating that the main impetus to
establish Islamic banks was the desire of Muslims to reorganize their financial
activities to comply with the principles of the Shari'a, thus enabling them to conduct
financial transactions without engaging in riba.5
It appears that the enormous expansion of Islamic banking since the 1980s has
been reflected in growth opportunities in related industries, such as the Islamic
capital market, takafuf businesses, and Islamic stock broking among others. This has
also encouraged the entrance of new players into the industry,7 product innovation,
and the penetration of new markets. Nevertheless, although the current achievement
in Islamic banking is very encouraging, it has also attracted criticism.
This chapter discusses the basic principles of Islamic economics and how they
are viewed by some Islamic scholars. It examines the need for financial intermedi¬
aries to cater for the Muslim population as well as the historical evidence of deposits
4 Mohammed Akacem and Lynde Gilliam, "Principles of Islamic Banking: Debt versus
Equity Financing", Middle East Policy, vol.9, no.l (2002), p.124.
5 Zaher and Hassan, op. cit., p. 156.
6
Takaful is an Arabic word meaning "guaranteeing each other" and is a form of an Islamic
insurance.
7
To capitalize on the potential market, a number of global financial institutions, including
Citibank, Goldman Sachs, BNP-Paris-Bas, and UBS, have established Islamic banking
services compatible with the Shari'a in several countries.
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and financing activities from pre-Islamic times to the Middle Ages. There is also a
brief look at the critiques of Islamic economics.
2.2 Concepts of Ownership and the Distribution of Income
and Wealth in Islam
Islamic teachings place a strong emphasis on economic activities. Indeed, the stabi¬
lity of a whole nation is heavily dependent on its economic position. The richest
states with a strong economy have power over other countries in the world. This
explains why the economy holds a special position in the Islamic social framework.
Islamic economics cannot be isolated from other basic elements of Islam such
as 'aqida (creed), 'ibada (worship) and akhlaq (morality). Islam considers the life of
a human being as an indivisible entity. In Islam, individuals need and complement
one another in society. Therefore, a human being must be an individual and a
communal being at the same time. Islam, as an all-encompassing way of life, pro¬
vides for every aspect of a person's existence, and seeks an order based on a network
that inter-relates with the concepts of God, humanity, humankind's relationship to
God, a human being's position and role in the universe, and his/her relationship to
his/her fellow human beings.
Since trade and economics play a crucial role in the lives of individuals and
society as a whole, Islam has laid down rules covering every aspect of commercial
activities. Fiqh al-mu 'amalat (Islamic commercial law) regulates all trade and econo¬
mic relationships. It is a comprehensive law that guides and governs all aspects of
human conduct in trade-related economics, such as relations between contracting
parties, lawful and unlawful means of earning an income, and lawful and unlawful
products and services. Since the economic system is subject to modernization and
innovation owing to technological advances, modern business and commercial prac-
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tices have also been transformed. According to Siddiqi, as far as the economic
aspects of a person's life are concerned, the Qur'an does not hold any brief for a
feudal, capitalist or socialist structure of society, or for any particular structure, for
that matter. It gives clearly defined values for an economic policy that conforms to
an Islamic way of life, irrespective of time and place.8 Accordingly, the scholars
(fuqaha) today are obliged to take responsibility for resolving specific economic
problems within the limits set by the Qur'an and Sunna.
2.2.1 What is Economics?
The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines the term "economics" as meaning strictly the
art of applying money (or wealth) wisely, and it has commonly come to mean the art
of saving money, or spending as little as possible.9 Economics is also the science of
investigating how nations or other larger or smaller communities and their popula¬
tions obtain food, clothing, shelter and whatever else is considered desirable or
necessary for the maintenance of and improvement in the condition of life.
From these definitions, economics is a study of people's behaviour as agents of
consumption and production. The system of values that they practise or to which
they subscribe will determine their behaviour in the system. Thus, economics is a
social rather than a natural science. It is a discipline in which there is always room
for change and improvement. In natural science, on the other hand, the laws of nature
are fixed and unavoidable; humans have to obey the laws of natural science, which
are determined by God Himself.
8 Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Some Aspects ofthe Islamic Economy (Delhi: Markazi
Maktaba Islami, 1972), pp. 135—137.
9 William Albert Samuel Hewins, "Economics", in Encyclopaedia Britannica (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1910-1911), p.899.
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2.2.2 Basic Principles of Islamic Economics
As has been stated by Scharf, the concept of Islamic economics differs from that of
capitalism in its resistance to excessive accumulation of wealth. It also conflicts with
socialism in its protection of the right to own property, including the means of
production.10 Chapra supports this concept by stating that since the very foundation
of the Islamic system is different from that of capitalism and socialism, which are
both earth-bound and not oriented to spiritual values, the super-structure must
necessarily be different." He adds that any attempt to show the similarity of Islam to
either capitalism or socialism can only demonstrate a lack of understanding of the
basic characteristics of the three systems.12 According to Abdul Mannan, Islamic
economics is the study of humankind, not of an isolated individual but a social
individual having faith in the Islamic values of life. A Muslim engaged in the
production of wealth is, consequently, engaged in a fundamental act of worship to
Allah, or 'ibada.'3
The spirit of the establishment of the Islamic banking system is to create socio¬
economic justice.14 Therefore, Islamic banking is more than banking procedures and
10
Scharf, op. cit., p.74.
11 Muhammad Umer Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge, Islamic Economics Series
17 (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation 1992), p.6.
12 Ibid., pp.342-353.
Muhammad Abdul Mannan, Islamic Economics: Theory and Practice (Kent, UK: Hodder
and Stoughton, 1986), pp. 18-19.
14
According to Kamali "Social justice subsumes economic justice but the two are not
identical. Both are concerned with the equitable distribution of wealth in society, which
implies that economic justice is, however, an essential component of social justice. Eco¬
nomic justice is possible to achieve without social justice, but not vice versa. Social justice
will not, for instance, accept a situation in which political powers and liberties are unjustly
distributed, yet this would not be a problem for economic justice. Social justice is thus a
broader concept as it refers to the structure and policies of a society, and to its political,
legal, economic and social institutions. See, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom, Equality
and Justice in Islam (Cambridge, UK: The Islamic Texts Society, 2002), pp. 105—106.
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mechanisms; its purpose is also to provide fair dealing for both banks and customers.
Socio-economic justice implies that the elimination of poverty is a major objective.
People must work hard to meet their own needs and those of their dependants. Thus,
society must be supportive, making economic opportunities available to individuals
so that they can use them as a means of harnessing their creative abilities. It is a basic
fact that all human beings want to live better lives, and they are willing to make the
effort to improve their condition as long as they believe that there is enough justice in
the system to reward them. Indeed, once individuals acquire wealth, they must use it
to create more economic activities. This provides a way for individuals to contribute
to society in line with social justice. A peaceful and well-organized society can be
achieved when the wealth is fairly distributed for the good of all its members.
Before continuing this study in greater depth, it is necessary to discuss the
basic principles of Islamic economics as the foundation of an Islamic banking sys¬
tem. The aim is to clarify the basic principles governing Islamic economics, which
distinguish it from modern economics. According to the literature on Islamic econo¬
mics, there are a number of differences between the two systems. The principles of
Islamic economics can be summarized as follows.
2.2.2.1 Belief in Divine Guidance
Islam is an Arabic word that connotes submission, surrender and obedience.15 The
foremost belief in Islam is that the whole universe has been created and is controlled
15 Shaikh Mahmud Ahmad, Economics ofIslam (A Comparative Study), 3rd edn (Lahore,
Pakistan: Ashraf Press, 1958), p.2. "Another literal meaning of the world 'Islam' is 'Peace'
and this signifies that one can achieve real peace of body and ofmind only through
submission and obedience to Allah"
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by the One God.16 Allah created everything on this earth for human beings to utilize.
Human beings, as part of the creation, have been appointed as caliphs or vicegerents
on the earth to obey Allah's Command and fulfil certain objectives. This is not res¬
tricted to worship in the form of religious rituals, for it also includes obedience in
one's social responsibilities towards the community.
2.2.2.2 Ownership of Property
Ownership means having the authority and power of possession.17 Human beings
acknowledge that Allah has complete possession of this universe and absolute power
over it, whereas their own power and authority are limited. Therefore, the ownership
of property given to human beings should thus be viewed as a trust (Qur'an 2:29-
30). Human beings do not have the right to possess as much as they desire or to
obtain material wealth in any way they choose. All resources and the acquisition,
ownership and utilization of property are subject to limits fixed by Allah. Therefore,
the right to property is not absolute, but is restricted and qualified.
Islam encourages everyone to increase his or her wealth by working hard and
using all possible fair means for this purpose. The concept of private ownership is
not totally overlooked. Private ownership is regarded as the foundation of the Islamic
socio-economic order, serving as the basis of other economic as well as social
injunctions. Indeed, every owner of property has the right to use it to earn more
money by engaging in commerce, services, mining, construction etc. However, this
must be practised according to a certain code of conduct. It is an obligation for each
16
Qur'an (20:6): "To Him belongs what is in the heaven and on earth, and all between them,
and all beneath the soil."
17
Seyyed Muhammad Taleqani, Islam and Ownership, trans. Ahmad Jabbari and Farhang
Rajaee (Lexington, Kentucky, US: Mazda Publishers, 1983), p.88.
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Muslim to contribute his/her excess income to those in need by payment of zakat as
well as by providing voluntary assistance to society.
The system of zakat is an Islamic concept of equity whereby, having accumu¬
lated a certain amount of wealth and rather than seeking one's own personal plea¬
sure, through greed, in wasteful consumption and other negative activities, one uses
the money to help others. In this way, Islam aims to achieve a balance between the
right of individual ownership and the safeguarding of the wider interests of society as
a whole. In Islam, zakat is not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end, namely,
to allow the needy and the poor to become self-sufficient by helping them in the
initial stages of establishing a business, for example, so as to give them a head start.
Zakat is there to help those who are in need of it to support them until they can stand
on their own feet. Under an Islamic economic system, there would be a balance in
the moral and social order by ensuring the equal availability of opportunities and
resources, resulting in the development of a peaceful and caring society. The system
of zakat also aims to protect the self-respect of individuals, who are then able to
obtain the means of earning a living from their own efforts, rather than from begging
or depending on charity to support them for their entire lives.
From the discussion above, it is clear that the ideal of Islamic economics
promises to have a positive impact on economic activities, which are, in turn, an
important part of human life. In Islam, the stability of the whole society is believed to
be subject to both the material and spiritual well being of humankind. Both aspects
are integrated into every act and requirement of human beings. The ideal of Islamic
economics stands in opposition to the secular system, under which material domi¬
nance is the ultimate objective of human society.
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2.2.3 Profit Maximization from an Islamic Perspective
Since profit and price are closely inter-related, the discussion begins with the Islamic
view of this aspect of economics. In conventional economic theory, a firm is said to
be rational if its sole objective is profit maximization. Profit indicates the status,
power and size of a business. According to Keown et al., "In microeconomics, profit
maximization functions largely as a theoretical goal, with economists using it to
prove how firms behave rationally to increase profit."18 The authors state that the
preferred goal of the firm should be the maximization of shareholder wealth. There¬
fore, by maximizing the price of common stock, all the effects of financial decisions
are included. Investors react to poor investment or unacceptable dividend decisions
by causing the total value of the firm's stock to fall, and they react to acceptable
decisions by pushing up the price of the stock; in the end, price equals value.19
Although the viewpoint is different, the goal is the same. For the firm to maximize
the common stock price, it has to ensure that it has earned the maximum profit. If the
firm has made losses, current or potential investors will not invest and, at the same
time, the total value of the firm's stock will be pulled down.
Economists have defined a rational firm as one that maximizes profit, whether
it is operating in perfect competition or a monopoly. For example, in perfect
competition, the firm is assumed to have no influence on the market price of the
goods that it sells. Therefore, the firm has to consider the price as given to it. The
firm devises an efficient production plan so that it can produce goods as efficiently as
possible. This means that the firm is trying to reduce its per unit or average cost,
18 Arthur Keown, John D. Martin, William Petty and J.R. David F. Scott, Financial
Management: Principles and Applications, 10th edn (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson
Prentice Hall, 2005), p.4.
19 Ibid.
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while at the same time obtaining the maximum possible revenue. Another example is
a monopoly, in which the price is not stipulated, and the firm determines the price
that it wants to charge for its product. It is also able to determine the level of pro¬
duction. Therefore, the firm can manipulate prices by producing less, so that when
consumers demand that particular product, it imposes a higher price.
2.2.3.1 The Islamic View of Profit
Muslims are urged to do well in this life, for the time spent on this earth is only a
passing phase of a life that extends into the Hereafter. Islam insists that believers
should actively take part in the search for almost every material gain, with particular
reference to trade and ethical profit.20 Islam instructs people to be moderate in the
pursuit of profit, that is, to behave in the prescribed way21 and acquire only the lawful
amount, not the maximum. If conflict arises between wealth and virtue, one should
be content with what is lawful, even if it is less.22 In the words of Ibn Taymiyyah (d.
728/1328):
God not only ordains the Friday congregation and other communal prayers, He
also exacts truthful report and the discharge of trusts. He proscribes such abomi-
20 For example, 'Abdullah Yusuf'Ali, The Holy Quran, Text, Translation and Commentary
(Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf Kashmiri Bazar, 1937), p.79, comments on the Qur'anic
verse (2:198): "Legitimate trade is allowed, in the interests both of the honest trader, who
can thus meet his own expenses, and of the generality of pilgrims, who would otherwise be
greatly inconvenienced for the necessaries of life. But the profit must be sought as from the
'bounty of God'. There should be no profiteering, or trade 'tricks'. Good, honest trade is a
form of service to the community, and therefore to God."
21 Islam forbids fraudulent practices, trading in impure items such as intoxicants, pig
products and animals that are not properly slaughtered; public goods such as water, fire,
grass. It insists on correct weights and measures. For example, the Qur'anic verse (17:35)
states: "Give full measures when you measure, and weigh with a balance that is accurate:
That is the most fitting and the most advantageous in the final determination" (7:35). 'Ali
(ibid., p.537) comments on this verse as follows: "Giving just measure and weight is not
only right in itself but is ultimately to the best spiritual and material advantage of the person
who gives it."
22 The Qur'an says: "Not equal are things that are bad and things that are good, even though
the abundance of the bad may dazzle you. So fear God, O you that understand, so that you
may prosper" (5:103).
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nations as lying and deceit, including the giving of small measure and weight,
and fraudulent practices in industry, commerce, religious matters, etc.2"'
Righteous behaviour in economics receives a reward called baraka. In Islam,
the concept of baraka is an important; for it gives people a strong incentive to behave
well.24 There are hidden substantive blessings given to those who conduct themselves
decently in every aspect of life, including economics.25 Baraka is an "invisible
material", the level of which varies according to the level of an individual's behavi¬
our and thus it motivates believers to perform righteous acts to please Allah. The
more righteous acts performed, the higher the level of baraka. The principle of
baraka can be best explained as expanding one's wealth "in the name of Allah".26
Therefore, one should not expect a high return from the entrepreneur directly, since
the provider of the funds will experience no shrinking but rather an expansion of
his/her wealth from Allah. What is unacceptable in Islam is unrighteous conduct in
economics, that is, the wrongful possession or disposing of wealth, which deprives
its holder of his/her baraka. This principle applies not only to the individual but also
to organizations and to the community as a whole. The concept implies a positive
relationship between the management of the system and prosperity. It is understood
that society will flourish if its economic activities conform to the rules of the Shari'a,
23
Al-Shaykh al-Imam Ibn Taymiyyah, Public Duties in Islam: The Institution of the Hisba,
trans. Mukhtar Holland (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1982), p. 30. Ibn
Taymiyyah also cited the following Qur'anic verses: "God Exalted said: 'Woe to the
niggardly who exact full measure from other people, but give short weight and measure
themselves'" (83:1); "Give full measure and do not be one of those who measure short
weight with the true balance and do not deprive people of their due. Do not go about causing
mischief' (26:182); "The Exalted One said: 'God does not love a sinful traitor'" (4:107);
"God does not guide the wiles of the deceitful" (12:52).
24
According to Khan and Mirakhor, the important factor in the incentive system of Islam is
the concept of baraka, which serves as a material inducement for the individual to practise
proper conduct. See, Mohsin S. Khan and Abbas Mirakhor, "Islam and the Economic
System", Review ofIslamic Economics, vol.2, no.l (1992), p.10.
25 Ibid. See, for example, Qur'an 8:60.
26
Qur'an 2:261 and 7:96.
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whereas its prosperity will disappear if morals decline and its members no longer
comply with the rules of the Shari'a.27 Therefore, the concept of baraka is a strong
incentive to obey Allah.
2.2.3.2 Ibn Taymiyyah's View of Profit Maximization
It is important in this study to analyse Ibn Taymiyyah's view of profit maximization,
for he was one of the leading medieval scholars to give special attention to fair pric¬
ing, although this principle had existed in Islamic jurisprudence since earlier times.28
Islahi states: "Ibn Taymiyyah, while elaborating upon its application to particular
contexts like hoarding (ihtikar) and obligatory sale, etc., generalized the idea to cover
wages and profits along with the prices of commodities."29
Ibn Taymiyyah acknowledges the idea of profit and the seller's right to it, and
suggests that the sellers can "earn profit in the commonly accepted manner without
destroying their interest and the interest of the consumers." In analysing Ibn
Taymiyyah's writing, Islahi defines a just profit or the "profit of the equivalent" as
"the normal profit which is generally earned in that particular type of trade, without
harming others."30 Islahi also notes that Ibn Taymiyyah regarded profit as the joint
creation of labour and capital. For this reason, the owners of both factors of pro¬
duction were entitled to a share in the profits: "The profit is to be divided according
27 Khan and Mirakhor, op. cit., p. 10, state that the concept of baraka applies not only to
individual behaviour but also to the whole community. The authors cite Fazlur Rahman's
comment: "A society prospers if it preserves a keen perception of the Message (acts
according to its rules); its prosperity departs if its morality declines (acts against the rules of
the Shari'ah)."
28 Abdul Azim Islahi, Economic Concepts ofIbn Taimiyyah (Leicester, UK: The Islamic
Foundation, 1988), pp.80-81. Islahi discusses in detail the concept of "just or fair price"





to commonly accepted fashion between the two partners - the one who invested his
labour and the other who invested the money."
Ibn Taymiyyah had a clear understanding of how prices are determined by the
forces of supply and demand in a free market, for he said:
Rise and fall in prices is [sic] not always due to an injustice (zulm) by certain
individuals. Sometimes, the reason for it is deficiency in production or decline
in import of the goods in demand. Thus if desire for the good increases while its
availability decreases, its price rises. On the other hand, if availability of the
good increases and desire for it decreases, the price comes down. This scarcity
or abundance may not be caused by the action of any individuals; it may be due
to a cause not involving any injustice, or sometimes it may have a cause that
does involve injustice. It is Almighty God who creates desires in the hearts of
people/1
Clearly, prices can be influenced by factors beyond the control of the sellers.
Nevertheless, sellers who intentionally raise prices are considered to be causing an
injustice (zulm) to society. Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyyah describes how supply and
demand in the market have an impact on the prices of goods:
If people are selling their goods in the commonly accepted manner without any
injustice on their part and the price rises in consequence of decrease in the
commodity (qillat al-shay') or increase in population (katrah al-khalq), then
this is due to Allah. '2
In analysing this statement, Islahi says that Ibn Taymiyyah ascribes price rises
to either "a decrease in commodity" or an "increase in population". A "decrease in
commodity" is the cause of a fall in the supply of the goods, whereas an "increase in
population" is more likely to cause an increase in demand, so this can be reinter¬
preted as a rise in demand. '2
In a free competitive market, Ibn Taymiyyah does not favour price control. He
recommends price regulation only in a monopoly and where there is an imperfection
33 Ibid.'
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in the market.34 Some imperfections in the market, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, are
(1) the practice of intercepting goods; (2) exploitation of situations where people are
ignorant of market conditions; and (3) the hoarding of necessities. Ibn Taymiyyah
does not support the practice of "interrupting" goods before they have been seen by
other customers in the market.35 He cited that this was forbidden by Prophet
Muhammad (pbuh) because of the risk to the seller. Since he does not know the
regular price of his goods, they might be purchased for less than their value. Neither
does Ibn Taymiyyah endorse an abnormal rate of profit, exploitative of a situation
where people are ignorant of market conditions (mustarsil). He supports his view
with the hadith: "To cheat the easy-going customer constitutes illicit gain (riba)." Ibn
Taymiyyah adds that this falls into the same category as the interception of goods, or
the newcomer's ignorance of the regular price.36 A similar form of cheating is the
hoarding of necessities.37 The hoarders will buy food that people need and store it
with the intention of creating a scarcity and thus raising the price.
2.2.3.3 Modern Muslim Scholars' View of Profit Maximization
Since the conventional theory and practice of the maximization of profit differs from
the Islamic principle, it is useful to examine the views of modern Muslim scholars
concerning this aspect of economics. Siddiqi suggests that large corporations should
j4 As he said: "If people's wants are satisfied, the sellers are producing in a quantity enough
for the public and are dealing in their products at normal prices (al-thaman al-ma 'ruf), and
no price regulation is needed. But if the people's wants are not satisfied without resorting to
just pricing (al-tas 'ir al- 'adiX), then the prices must be regulated justly without any excess or
harm (la wakis wa la shatat) to anybody." Cited by Islahi, op. cit., p. 102.
35 Ibn Taymiyyah, op. cit., pp.31-32. As he said, "Another improper practice is the
intercepting of goods before they reach the market."
36 For this very reason, the Prophet (pbuh) forbade the townspeople to sell to the nomads,
saying: "Leave people alone and God will see that they provide for one another" (Ibn
Taimiyyah, op. cit., pp.31-32).
,7 Ibid. Ibn Taymiyyah states that Muslim in his Sahih reports on the authority ofMa'mar
ibn 'Abd Allah that the Prophet (pbuh) said: "Only the misguided hoard."
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replace profit maximization as the norm of business policy with stability, security,
continuity, good reputation in the eyes of the community, and so on.'8 He also
suggests that Muslim businesses should operate within their limits to maximize
profit: "Full compliance with the Islamic idea of social justice" and "take the welfare
of others into consideration" have been cited by Siddiqi as Iimitations.39Siddiqi
asserts that the basis of entrepreneurial behaviour in Islamic society comprises the
objectives of a satisfactory profit, a social service and co-operation. He then defines a
"satisfactory" profit as any profit between the upper and lower limits.40 Mirakhor
lists three components of Islamic justice in a Muslim society, one ofwhich is "justice
in exchange".41 He states that the Shari'a has provided a network of ethical and moral
values that cover, in minute detail, the behaviour of all the participants in the market.
It requires that these rules be studied and followed by all the participants before their
entrance into the market. The market organized along these lines is intended to
eliminate all factors opposed to "justice in exchange" and, instead, to promote "fair"
and "just" prices for goods and services.
According to Mirakhor, the Islamic concept of a fair price - unlike the
scholastic concept of a "just price", which lacks an operational definition - refers to a
price established as a result of the interaction of economic forces operating in a
'8 Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Economic Enterprise in Islam (Delhi: Markazi Maktaba
Islami, 1972, pp. 102—106.
39 Ibid., p.103.
40
Ibid., p. 107. The upper limit is the highest profit permitted by the circumstances (without
violating the legally binding part of the Islamic code of conduct). The lower limit is that
level of profit which would afford the producers a reasonable standard of living plus a
surplus to average out losses.
41 Ahmad Mirakhor, "General Characteristics of an Islamic Economic System", in Anthology
ofIslamic Banking (London: Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance, 2000), p.25.
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market in which all the rules of behaviour specified by the Shari'a are observed by
all the participants.42
2.3 The Nature of Financial Intermediaries
The Islamic banking system based on the values discussed above should contribute
significantly to the achievement of the major socio-economic goals of Islam. This
section examines the position of intermediaries in the Islamic financial system and
the need for them in the pre-Islamic era, after the birth of Islam and during the
medieval period as business increased.
Financial systems are crucial for the efficient allocation of resources in a
modern economy. Their structure is determined by the nature of financial intermedi¬
ation, that is, how intermediation is performed and who intermediates between the
suppliers and users of the funds. The acquisition and processing of information about
economic entities, the packaging and repackaging of financial claims, and financial
contracting are common elements in the activities that differentiate financial inter¬
mediation from other economic activities.43 Gup defines the financial intermediary as
an economic unit,44 whose principal function is to manage the financial assets of
other economic units.45 Gup then explains that without intermediation, financial
intermediaries could not exist.46 However, the main functions of a financial
42 Ibid.
43 Dahlia A. El-Hawary, Wafik Grais and Zamir Iqbal, "Regulating Islamic Financial
Institutions: The Nature of the Regulated". Paper presented at the International Conference
on Islamic Banking: Risk Management, Regulation and Supervision, held in Jakarta, 30
September - 2 October 2003), p.5.
44 In economic terminology, the economic unit may be an individual, household or firm. The
economic activity may be production or consumption.
45 Benson E. Gup, Financial Intermediaries: An Introduction (Boston, MA: Houghton
Mifflin, 1976), p.3.
46
Ibid., p.4. Intermediation is the investing of funds by businesses and individuals in
financial intermediaries.
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intermediary cover more than this. As stated by Cobham, traditional analyses of
banks have focused on their role and ability as specialized intermediaries. However,
the modern theory of economics defines the bank as a mechanism needed by small
companies and individuals in the absence of a secondary market.47
For complex economies and large populations, financial systems acting as
intermediaries are necessary to allocate resources efficiently from the surplus side
(household savings) to the deficit side (firm or corporate). The inefficiency and
wastefulness of direct finance have rightly been compared to that of bartering.48 In
the modern economy, financial intermediaries remove the inefficiency of mis¬
matched requirements by small depositors and entrepreneurs. At the same time, they
contribute to financial development and prosperity by pooling deposits from small
deposit holders and making them available as larger funds to be used efficiently by
the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs usually need a longer time to use the funds provided
by individual savers, which does not suit the needs of the latter. However, financial
intermediaries smooth the procedures of placing savings or investments, and of
borrowing and lending. In the words of Siddiqi:
If fund owners have to seek out fund users and fund users have to search for
fund owners, the net return to the fund owners would be substantially lower
than the gross cost of funds to users. Fund owners will subtract search costs
together with any risk premiums due to uncertainty about the fund users'
trustworthiness. Lower returns on funds will discourage saving. High cost of
funds will discourage investment. The overall consequences for the economy
will be a smaller volume of production, fewer jobs, lower incomes and a weaker
economy as compared to what is achievable through financial intermediation.
Intermediation is rightly regarded to be welfare enhancing.49
47 David Cobham, Islamic Banking: Perspectives from the Theory ofFinancial
Intermediation (St Andrews, UK: University of St Andrews, Dept of Economics, 1992), p.6.
48




Financial intermediaries also act as risk-takers between entrepreneurs and indi¬
vidual savers. Entrepreneurs and individual savers have different preferences for risk
taking. Individual or small depositors usually avoid risk, preferring to keep their
savings in safer places, whereas entrepreneurs tend to use funds to finance projects
considered very risky. These mismatches prove again that financial intermediation
plays a crucial role, for intermediaries are better placed than individual savers to
acquire information and put their funds with safer and more successful investors,
while at the same time making funds available to entrepreneurs. Hence, although
financial intermediaries expose themselves to risk, their expertise, derived from their
ability to gather information from various sources, enables them to reduce the risk
markedly by engaging in proper risk management. As has been noted by Allen and
Gale, financial intermediaries not only channel resources from capital surplus agents
(generally household) to capital deficit (the corporate sector), but they also enable the
inter-temporal smoothing of households' consumption and business expenditure, and
therefore allow both firms and households to share the risk.50
2.3.1 Islamic Financial Intermediation
Financial intermediation in an Islamic economy is essential in the competitive global
economy of the twenty-first century. A fast-growing modern economy is unimagin¬
able in a society without financial intermediaries. The fate of a society that elimi¬
nated financial intermediation would resemble that of a society that sought to abolish
the use ofmoney.51
50
Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, Comparing Financial Systems (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2000), pp.3-4.
51
Siddiqi, op. cit., p.4.
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Before Islamic banks were established, Muslim traders, producers and business
people had to deal with conventional banking. Since they were managing and ex¬
panding businesses, they needed funds; without an alternative, they had to deal with
an interest-based system. Looking at the role of financial intermediaries as discussed
above, it can be said that without a system in place, the Muslim community will
grow weak. The present domination of the interest-based economy will continue to
have direct consequences on the financial and monetary systems ofMuslim societies.
As stated by Siddiqi, financial intermediation is a necessity (darura) in the full
technical sense of the Shari'a term. He also says that without financial inter¬
mediaries, there cannot be a sound and healthy economy. Therefore, it is the duty of
Muslim society to create a sound economy so that people's basic needs are fulfilled,
and the community can defend itself against "internal deviation" and "external
aggression".52
2.3.2 Historical Evidence
Over the centuries, Islamic financial intermediation has made a considerable contri¬
bution to economic prosperity and development. From the very early years of Islamic
history, Muslims recognized a financial system without interest.53 This section exa¬
mines the need for financial intermediation and its contribution in pre-Islamic times,
after the birth of the Islamic state and during the medieval period.
It has been stated by Wilson that in the Middle East, during the era of the barter
system, landlords acted as financiers or moneylenders, providing their tenants with
52
See, Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Role ofthe State in the Economy: An Islamic
Perspective (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1996), Chapters 1 and 2.
5j
See, for example, Chapra and Khan, op. cit., p.l; and Murat Cizakca, "Historical
Background", in Encyclopaedia ofIslamic Banking and Insurance (London: Institute of
Islamic Banking and Insurance, 1995), p. 10.
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commodities as credit.54 Usually, financiers were people who had surplus money,
precious metals, or any type of monetary instrument that could be used for trans¬
actions. As soon as the barter system was replaced with a monetary system, there
was an increasing need for financial institutions in the Middle East, for three
reasons.55 Firstly, there was the security risk as well as the cost of protecting the
precious items held by individuals or businesses, payments and receipts not being
immediately available. Secondly, moneylenders needed skill and expertise to orga¬
nize funds effectively. Although landlords had acted as moneylenders, their role was
actually different from that of moneylenders. In those days, landlords were more
concerned with the technique ofmanaging resources to produce crops, and they were
unwilling or unable to enter the new profession.56 Thirdly, transactions were
normally carried out using different types of precious metals, which, as monetary
instruments, would require specialist knowledge to assess their quality and value.
Moneychangers also had to ensure that they held sufficient assets to meet the finan¬
cial demand. This required an ability to predict or anticipate the requirements of the
market. It would obviously be unprofitable for landlords simply to put aside their
assets, and yet there might not be a demand for them. As noted by Wilson, both
occupations - those of moneychanger and moneylender - could have been practised
by the same group of people, for they required similar financial skills and aptitudes.57
Since Makka was the trading centre, it provided merchants holding surplus assets
with the opportunity to offer moneylending facilities and thus indirectly increased the
54






need for moneychanging facilities. Merchants who came from different regions and
from other countries brought with them different types of monetary items, which
could be changed into local monetary instruments. This situation also increased the
need for financial intermediation.
In pre-Islamic Arabia, economic activities were of a mixed nature. Nomadism,
pastoralism, agriculture and commerce were the ways of life at that time in the
Peninsula, although trade was the main activity of the population.58 In an active
economy, where the volume of economic transactions was high, the need for finance
was of the utmost importance. Since there was no banking system or financial inter¬
mediation in pre-Islamic Makkan society, two methods of using money, or types of
finance, were employed:
1. Partnership (mudaraba) was the main feature of business at that time.
Normally, the demand for an entrepreneur's services depended upon his/her
skill and ability to make profits or avoid losses and on his/her reputation
among fellow traders.
2. Lending based upon usury was a common practice at that time among the
Arabs and between the Arabs and the Jews, the latter currently being resident
in the Arabian Peninsula.59
When placing deposits, people entrusted their money and valuables to repu¬
table depositors to minimize certain risks. Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), long before
he became a prophet, was acknowledged to be a trustworthy person. It is believed
that before he migrated from Makka to Madina, he held certain deposits on behalf of
58





their owners for a while and then assigned his cousin, 'Ali (ra), to return them on his
departure.
After the emergence of the Islamic state in 610 AC, the nomadic way of life of
earlier years declined significantly and was replaced with trade, agriculture and
crafts.60 Partnership or business on a profit/loss-sharing basis was the only pre-
Islamic method of financing business to survive, though it was different in its scale
rather than its principles.61 A type of deposit for safekeeping, returned in exactly the
same amount to the depositors when required, was introduced.62 It is also reported
that al-Zubayr ibn al-Awwam, one of the great Companions of the Prophet (pbuh),
was entrusted with the safekeeping of money by the traders during the pilgrimage
season. However, he refused to use the money as a deposit, preferring to regard it as
a loan. According to his son, 'Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr, al-Zubayr did so because he
was afraid that the money might be lost. Homoud says that the reason for al-Zubayr's
action was to achieve two objectives:
1. "He reserved his right to dispose of the money, considering it a loan not a
deposit.
2. It represents a secure guarantee to the owner, because where money remains a




Ibid., pp. 16-17. According to El-Ashker, the partnership was expanded to attain a larger
number of suppliers of funds as well as entrepreneurs, although the concept of the
partnership - the sharing of risk and returns between the partners concerned - remained the
same. The capital was divided into small shares and the degree of risk and return was small
compared with the earlier system of partnership during the pre-Islamic period. This method
of financing also helped investors to invest within their financial capability. El-Ashker
asserts that with the expansion of the state and its economic activities, the partnership came
to resemble a joint-stock enterprise and there was perhaps an over-the-counter financial
market, although there are no data to confirm its size or even its existence.
62 Sami Homoud, Islamic Banking: The Adaptation ofBanking Practice to Conform with
Islamic Law (London: Arabic Information, 1985), p. 19.
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deposit becomes a loan, it would be secure as the borrower remains liable for
it."63
After al-Zubayr died, there remained a sum of money that had not been col¬
lected by the depositors. His son, 'Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr, refused to divide the
inheritance with his brothers, even after he had paid all the debts owed by his father.
He made an announcement about the surplus during the pilgrimage season for four
consecutive years, after which he divided the remainder of the inheritance amounting
to about "thirty-five thousand thousand and two hundred thousand dirhams", that is,
35,200,000 dirhams.64
Money changing was not the only financial activity in Makkah. Transfers were
also carried out, the procedures of which were similar to those of modern times. It is
reported that
Ibn al-'Abbas used to take the warik (i.e., silver minted into dirhams) in Mecca
and write the acknowledgement thereof to al-Kufa,65 [just as] 'Abd Allah ibn
al-Zubayr used to take dirhams from people in Mecca and then write the
acknowledgement thereof to his brother, Mis'ab ibn al-Zubayr in Iraq, where
they used to cash it.66
These practices continued throughout the medieval Islamic era from the end of
the reign of the fourth caliph, 'Ali, in 660 AC to 1918 AC, covering the Umayyad,
6"'
Ibid., p.20. Homoud adds that much information can be deduced from the behaviour of a
respectable Companion of the Prophet (pbuh). Most importantly (1) this behaviour demon¬
strates a change in the concept of a deposit from that of a trust to that of a loan, which is the
"exceptional or inchoate deposit" developed by modern banking until eventually it became
defined in many modern laws; and (2) the amounts deposited were not owned by any
particular number of people, although it seems that they belonged to several people, thus
indicating the widespread reputation of al-Zubayr as a trustworthy user of this kind of
deposit. (An "exception or inchoate deposit" is an idea advocated by some French jurists to
explain the difference between a deposit according to the concepts of civil law and a bank
deposit, on the assumption that a depository in the former case does not own the deposit but
keeps it in custody, whereas a depository in the latter case owns the money deposited.)
64 Ibid.
65
Ibid., p.21. (Homoud cites Shams el-'A'ima al-Sarkhasi, Mabsut, Part 14).
66 Ibid. (Homoud cites Ibn Qudama, Part IV.)
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Abbasid and Mamluk dynasties and the Ottoman Empire. Financial activities such as
transfers and moneychanging were developed into professional practices by money¬
changers. Duri indicates that in early Islamic history, a financing system was
established by sarrafs67 and djahbadhs6S in Baghdad.69 This development was a great
incentive to commerce and industry, especially during the Abbasid dynasty, when
Baghdad became a leading centre of commerce. Markets became an essential feature
of its life, whereby each trade had its market, for example, the fruit market, the cloth
market, the cotton market, sheep market, etc. The sarrafs had their own markets and
primarily served the public, whereas the djahbadhs served the government and its
officials.70 Chapra and Khan define sarrafs as "something akin to Wall Street in New
York and Lombard Street in London", for their operations fulfilled most of the bank¬
ing needs of commerce, industry and agriculture within the contemporary techno¬
logical limits.71 Udovitch also says that although he has encountered bankers and
extensive and ramified banking activities in medieval Islamic literary or documen¬
tary sources, there has been no mention of banks. Therefore, he prefers to call this
system "bankers without banks".72
67
Sarrafmeans moneychanger. According to Chapra and Khan, op. cit., p.2, moneychangers
were also called sayarifah (sing, sayraf).
68
Djahbadh is of Persian origin, perhaps derived from agahbadh in the Sassanid
Administration, It is used in the sense of a financial clerk, an expert in matters of coins,
skilled money examiner, treasury receiver, government cashier, moneychanger or collector.
See, Walter J. Fischel, "Djahbadh", in Encyclopedia ofIslam, new edn, vol.2, ed. B.Lewis,
C.H. Pellat and J. Schacht (Leiden, The Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1965), pp.382-383.
69
A.A. Duri, "Baghdad", in Encyclopedia ofIslam, new edn, vol.1, ed. A.R. Gibb, J.H.




Chapra and Khan, op. cit., p.2.
72 Abraham L. Udovitch, "Bankers without Banks: Commerce, Banking, and Society in the
Islamic World of the Middle Ages", in Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies,
University of California, Los Angeles, Dawn ofModern Banking (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1979), p.257.
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The fourth/tenth-century Arabic sources indicate that it was traditional for
viziers to have their own djahbadhs, with whom they deposited large (legally or ille¬
gally acquired) sums of money, for they saw this as the safest method of securing
their fortune.73 However, during the Abbasid Caliphate of al-Muqtadir (295-320
ah/908-32 ac), the djahbadh emerged as a banker in the modern sense. This posi¬
tion was in addition to his functions as an administrator of deposits and a remitter of
funds from place to place by means of the sakk74 and, in particular, the suftaja^. The
suftadja was then a widely used instrument of the credit economy, and was called
upon to advance huge sums to the Caliph, the viziers, and other court officials on
credit terms, with interest rates and securities.76
73
Fischel, op. cit., p.382.
74
According to Nathif J. Adam and Abdulkader Thomas, Islamic Bonds: Your Guide to
Issuing, Structuring and Investing in Sukuk (London: Euromoney Books, 2004), p.43, the
term sakk is "derived from striking one's seal on a document or tablet representing a contract
or conveyance of rights, obligations and or monies". In a modem concept, sakk is a financial
security that carries with it specific property rights and obligations including some form of
asset ownership.
75
According to M.Y. Izzi Dien, "Suftadja", in Encyclopedia ofIslam, new edn, vol.9, ed.
C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs and G. Lecomte (Leiden, The Netherlands:
E.J. Brill, 1997), pp.769-770, uSuftaja is a financial term referring to a negotiable instrument
in the form of a written bill of credit. Suftadja was used in medieval Islam to facilitate the
speedy transfer ofmoney over distances or to expedite the exploitation of assignments of
taxation in an age when movements of actual cash were hazardous. The suftadja thus
enabled money to be instantly available in another land through what was in effect a letter of
credit. The modus operandi was that (A) normally a broker would issue a bill for (B) to
collect his money somewhere else from (C), who is an agent for (A). The suftadja would
only transfer money in order to avoid risk in transport. The debt does not only really exist
between the broker (A) and his agent (C). This is due to the fact that (C), the agent, is only
an extension of (A), in the same way as are the branches of the bank." Dien also states: "The
Hanafi and Shafii schools consider the practice of suftadja to be reprehensible because of
debt should be repaid without any form ofprofit to the owner which results from the
avoidance of risk (i.e. involved in an actual cash transfer). The Malikis only allow it on the
grounds of necessity, while the Hanbalis permit the practice so long it is done without any
material gain, such as commission, accruing to the person repaying the debt. Ibn Taymiyyah
and Ibn Qudama permit the practice without reservation, since both the debtor and indebted
benefit."
76
Fischel, op. cit., p.382.
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Adam and Thomas state that documentary evidence for the term sakk appears
in the early Islamic caliphates and it developed into the Latin-voiced trade
terminology of Europe as "check" or "cheque".77 The authors add that sakk was used
to represent financial obligations during the emergence of trade, lending and
mudaraba activities and was interchangeable with the term suftadja in international
trade in the Muslim world.78 Homoud also states that around 400 AH/1010 AC,
Muslim ships and caravans used to travel across various countries and seas for
business purposes, yet at least the luxury goods for the whole world were controlled
by Alexandria and Baghdad.79 An efficient and effective payment system was
necessary and so, for commercial purposes, the use of cheques became common in
the city of Basrah and rules and procedures were established.80
Chapra and Khan state that the profit/loss-sharing modes of financing along
with deferred trading and interest-free loans (qard hasan) were used for raising
money to finance production in the medieval Islamic period.81 These modes of
77 Adam and Thomas, op. cit., p.44. They also say that the earliest evidence of the term sakk
found by the Western researchers is during the first century AH, within a hundred years of
the Prophet's (pbuh) migration to Makka to Madina. They add that a sakk or cheque referred
to a payment obligation transferred between trustworthy parties on behalf of the primary
counterparties to a long-distance trade transaction, often crossing borders and cultures which
were hostile to one another in the emerging trade patterns of the later Middle Ages.
78 Ibid.
79
Homoud, op. cit., p.21.
80 ibid. Homoud cites Ahmad Amin's narration in Part 1 of his book, Zuhr al-Islam, that
rules had to be established to regulate transfers. In the middle of the fourth century AH, Sa'id
al-Dawla, Amir ofAleppo, visited Baghdad with the intention of exploring the city without
being recognized by anyone. He visited the house of Bani Khaqan to listen to the
conversation and have a drink. When the time came to leave the place, he asked for the
inkpot and wrote on a slip of paper that the sum of one thousand dinars could be collected
from a certain moneychanger, and left the paper in the pot. The people of Bani Khaqan
presented the paper to the moneychanger, were paid, and were also told that it was Sa'id
al-Dawla ibn Hamadan who had written the paper. However, it is true that modern
commercial transactions and dealing with cheques can take place only if there exist a surety,
strong confidence, trust etc.
81
Chapra and Khan, op. cit., p. 1.
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financing, according to Udovitch, helped mobilize the "entire reservoir of monetary
resources of the medieval Islamic world" to support agriculture, crafts, manufactur¬
ing and long-distance trade of not only the Muslims but also the Jews and Christians.
During this period, interest-bearing loans and other overtly usurious practices were
not in common use.82 Other commercial techniques, such as credit arrangements,
transfer of debts, and letters of credit were preferred over loans. All these forms of
investment and credit were used, since they were allowed by religious doctrine, were
held sacred by long practice, and were a socially more congenial and effective means
of economic connection.8' It has been emphasized by Goitein that during an examin¬
ation of an unusually large number of Geniza documents dealing with credit, a
breach of the Jewish, Christian and Islamic laws against interest was found "only
once in the record of a judgement".84
The fall of Rome at the end of the fourth century AC, together with the Dark
Ages in Europe between the fifth and tenth centuries AC, had a marked impact on
business worldwide, and particularly on development and trade activities in the Mus¬
lim world. When the West awakened to its new dawn in the twelfth century AC, it
also began to develop its own banking system. Again, circumstances influenced the
expansion of the banking system in the Muslim countries. In the words of Homoud,
The East submitted, like prisoners of war who had surrendered, to the West,
which was awakening to its new dawn. The weak people of the East imagined
that the world was previously barren and that civilization had never given birth
82




Chapra, op. cit., p.l. Chapra quoted that Schatzmiller concluded that financial capital was
developed during the early period of Islamic history by numerous owners ofmonetary funds
and precious metals, without the supposed interdiction of riba (usury) hampering it in any
way.
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to neither regulations nor [s/c] thoughts on the subject, except that which
emerged from the womb of the European new era.85
However, the practice of mudarabci in the westward trade between Egypt and
Tunisia, and musharaka in the north-south trade between Egypt and Syria as well as
between Egypt and Jeddah during the eleventh century has been documented by
Goitein.86 Goitein also found 315 documents in the Geniza archives dealing specifi¬
cally with trade in the Indian Ocean. Udovitch also highlights evidence that in the
thirteenth century AC, similar techniques that had been practised in the Muslim world
from the earliest medieval period were adopted in Europe.87 In addition, in Asia at
the end of the fifteenth century AC, shipping in the Indian Ocean was organized
according to a mudaraba contract. Under this arrangement, each member of the crew
was a mudarib with a share in the profits. The investors provided the capital and
shared the profits according to a pre-determined ratio.88
Meanwhile, the function of the sarrafs became more significant during the
Ottoman Empire, for they were also moneylenders, brokers, and pawnbrokers. Even¬
tually, many sarrafs became large financiers with well-recognized international
85
Homoud, op. cit., p.24.
86
Cizakca, op. cit., p.l 1.
87
Udovitch, op. cit., p.257. It has also been reported by Chapra and Khan, op. cit., p.3, that
the extensive mobilization of savings and their accessibility to business people provided a
substantial boost to the growth of output and trade from Morocco and Spain in the West, to
India and China in the East, Central Asia in the North, and Africa in the South. Evidence of
this exists in historical documents, and also in the discovery of Muslim coins of the seventh
to eleventh centuries in parts of Russia, Finland, Sweden, Norway, the British Isles and
Iceland, countries which were on the outskirts of the contemporary Muslim world.
88
It is stated in Meilink-Roelofsz, "Trade and Islam in the Malays-Indonesian Archipelago
Prior to the Arrival of the Europeans", in Islam and the Trade ofAsia, ed. D.S. Richards,
(Oxford: Cassirer, 1970), pp. 151-152: "One thing is clear, in Asia at the end of the 15th
century; ship-owning was not yet distinct from trade. The ship-owner was not yet in an
independent position, and the cost of the transport was not yet entirely his responsibility. The
captain did not receive a salary from the people who commissioned his service; instead he
shared in the profits. Nor were the members of the crew employed by the owner of the ship
paid salaries and they too had a share in the trade. On occasion, the captain could also be the
owner of the ship."
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connections and they exerted a strong influence on the economy and politics of the
Empire. Those practising the profession included Greek Christians, Jews, Armenian
Christians and Muslims. With the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 857
AH/1453 AC, Italian prominence in finance in that city ended, to be replaced with that
of Ottoman non-Muslim subjects, particularly Greeks.89 During the reign of
Mehemmed II, the Caliph favoured the Greeks, who played an active role in Ottoman
finance and taxation by means of tax-farming and politics.90 From the mid-
tenth/sixteenth century, Jewish bankers {sarrafs) and tax farmers challenged the
Greek dominance of finance and long-distance trade, for many of them participated
in large-scale banking operations, international trade, and investment in tax farms.
Later, the role of the Jews declined and it was taken over by the Armenians. It is
reported that until the tenth/sixteenth century AC, the sarrafs, functioned in an
atmosphere of expanding trade both inside and outside the Empire and that the
stereotypical view of sarrafs is that they were, on the whole, non-Muslims.91
However, Muslims appear to have been operating in all aspects of sarraf business,
including tax-farming, currency exchange, money lending and international trade.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century AC, the Muslim role in sarraf business
was radically curtailed by the increasing importance of non-Muslim sarraf families
and the emergence of banks established largely by Europeans and Armenian and
Greek sarrafsf
89 Abdullah Saeed, "Sarraf', in The Encyclopedia ofIslam: Supplement 2004, ed. P.J.
Bearman, T.H. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs (Leiden, The





2.4 Critiques of Islamic Economics by Modern Scholars
There has never been a blueprint for Islamic economics, even for the period during
which the Qur'an was revealed. Thus, Muslim intellectuals and economists face the
challenge of constructing a suitable economic system for their own era. One of the
main problems confronting them is that the guidance provided in the Qur'an and
Sunna for a workable economic system is, admittedly, limited. Although the guid¬
ance given in these sources is universal and eternal, its details are more relevant to
Arabian society in the early stages of Islamic history.9. Furthermore, Muslim econo¬
mists set too easy and too inappropriate an application for present day usage when
they try to extract a blueprint for an Islamic economic system from the fuqaha wri¬
tings of the past.94
As stated in Chapter 1, only the fuqaha are entitled to derive an analogy or
certain kinds of consensus from the Qur'an and Sunna. However, Timur Kuran, one
of the leading critics of modern Islamic economic literature, emphasizes that all the
understanding of the Revelation that depends on human reason, subject to differences
of opinion and changing circumstances, presents problems. He adds that there are
two basic methodological flaws stemming from unrealistic assumptions, contra¬
dictory proposals, and fallacious inferences about the ideal system of economic and
distributive justice, which have permeated modern Islamic literature.95 One is the
failure to recognize the anxiety that comes from trying to derive an entire economic
93 William R. Roff, Review of Islamic Economic Alternatives:Critical Perspectives and
New Directions by K.S. Jomo (ed.) in Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER).
94 Shamim Ahmad Siddiqi, "A Suggested Methodology for the Political Economy of Islam",
Islamic Econ., no. 13 (2001), pp.3-27.
95 Timur Kuran, "The Economic System in Contemporary Islamic Thought", in K.S. Jomo,
Islamic Economic Alternatives: Critical Perspectives andNew Directions (Basingstoke, UK:
Macmillan, 1992), p.40.
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blueprint from the Qur'an and Sunna, owing to the realization that these sources do
not offer a comprehensive framework. The other is the failure to recognize that the
Islamic past itself demonstrates considerably more flexibility and innovation than is
now permitted.96
As Siddiqi states, as far as methodological issues are concerned, Islamic eco¬
nomists have generally focused on the two areas where differences in opinion have
provided the basis for different schools of thought in economics:97
[The first is] related to basic assumptions made by different schools of thought
about behavioural norms of individual economic agents such as rationality, uti¬
lity and profit maximization, self-interest vs. altruism, subjectivity or objectivity
of knowledge, etc. [The second deals] with the scope of economics: whether it
is or should be positive or normative; is it pure science or social science or an
art; can it be separated from other disciplines such as psychology, sociology,
politics and anthropology: And it is also related to the issue of how the eco¬
nomy works.98
Having covered the ideal concept of Islamic economics together with some
historical evidence, this chapter now examines another important aspect of Islamic
economics. It evaluates some of the criticism made by modern scholars, particularly
Timur Kuran, of the methodology of Islamic economics adopted by Muslim econo¬
mists, though without ignoring the relevance of an Islamic economic system. The
discussion will include the critical part played by behavioural norms in Islamic
economics and other issues put forward by Kuran, together with a brief look at the
views of Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi and Ziaul Haque concerning the application of
mudaraba and musharaka principles to the Islamic banking system. The critiques of
Islamic economics are very important to Islamic economists since they can be used
96 Ibid.
97
Siddiqi, op. cit., p.5.
98 Ibid.
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to clarify problems and help in finding solutions. This section aims to give a clearer
picture of the current state of Islamic economics.
2.4.1 Behavioural Norms in Islamic Economics
Among the critics of Islamic economics, some confusion has emerged over the
behavioural norms under this system, norms that are assured to be attained by an
Islamic education. However, the basic assumptions of neoclassical economics" have
been criticized by Muslim economists, who believe that the behaviour of Muslim
economic agents is different from what is assumed by their neoclassical counterparts.
Arif believes that since a Muslim society is significantly different from both capital¬
ist and socialist societies in its moral values, institutional arrangements and objec¬
tives in life, the behaviour of its economic agents is, consequently, different.100 He
adds that a clear understanding of economic behaviour is important because Islamic
society has to make vital decisions about the alternative uses of resources.101 Arif
states that the microfoundations of Islamic economics are based on the following
facts:
1. Economics is a decision science.
2. It is a social science.
99
As stated in Muhammad Akram Khan, "Methodology of Islamic Economics", in Readings
in the Concept and Methodology ofIslamic Economics, ed. Aidit Ghazali and Syed Omar,
(Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 1989), p.50, there are three basic
assumptions by neoclassical economists of the behaviour of economic agents that have
been criticized by Muslim economists: (a) that man is selfish by nature and he behaves
naturally; (b) that material progress is a supreme goal; (c) that every person has an inherent
tendency to maximize his material welfare, and he also has the knowledge and ability to
decide what is good for him.
100 Muhammad Arif, "Towards Establishing the Microfoundations of Islamic Economics :
The Basis of the Basics", in Aidit Ghazali and Syed Omar (eds), Readings in the Concept
andMethodology ofIslamic Economics (Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Pelanduk Publications (M)




3. The individuals who make the decisions are members of the society and their
behaviour is determined by the norms, moral values and institutions; and the
objectives of the society to which they belong.
4. If the norms, moral values and institutions of one society are different from that
of others, it is very likely that the economic decisions made by the members of
that society will also be different from those of other societies.102
However, in his argument, Kuran has highlighted the flaw in the view of some
Muslim economists, who assert that Islamic norms provide a practical solution to
modern economic problems.103 He states:
The primary role of the norms is to make the individual member of Islamic
society, homo islamicus, just, socially responsible, and altruistic. Unlike the
incorrigibly selfish and acquisitive homo economicus of neoclassical econo¬
mics, homo islamicus voluntarily foregoes [s/c] temptations of immediate gain
when by doing so he can protect and promote the interests of his fellows.104
Kuran adds:
The Islamic norms can be grouped in two categories: production norms, which
also include norms involving trade activities, and consumption norms. Regard¬
ing the former category, proponents of the Islamic system are careful to point
out that Islamic man is free to produce and trade for personal profit. They move
on, however, to state that in exercising his freedom, he is required to avoid
causing harm to others. He is also obliged to refrain from the earning more than
his efforts justify. This means that he must pay "fair" wages, charge "reason¬
able" prices and be content with "normal" profits. It means, moreover, that he
must not engage in speculation and monopolization, or make deals, like
insurance contracts, that allegedly involve gambling, uncertainty, and exploita¬
tion. In his consumption activities, the Muslim is bound by three sets of norms.
First, he must not devote resources to activities, like adultery, or commodities
like wine, which are deemed illegitimate. Second, he is required to show mode¬
ration in consumption, and therefore, to refrain from "displaying pomp and
grandeur". One side-effect of moderation in consumption, it is argued, is the
elimination of the scarcity problem through a lowering of aggregate demand;
another is the prevention of demand-pull inflation. Finally, the Muslim must
make voluntary donations to less fortunate members of the Islamic community.








give others from surplus....of income over expenses but even to sacrifice and
forego [s/c] one's own share if the need of others is more urgent."105
Kuran questions the effectiveness of Islamic norms for two reasons.106 The
first, he says, is that "the implications of these norms are ambiguous in most of the
contexts where they are expected to operate." Kuran focuses on wages and price
rates in Islamic economics, and argues that after all, the devout Muslim who eagerly
wants to follow Islamic norms may be confused in his actions, since he is unclear or
unsure about these norms. For example, he might not know what wage is "just" and
what profit rate is "normal". Kuran then explains that a devout Muslim who may be
unclear about the meaning of "moderation" in consumption would also be unsure
about the practical implications of the restriction in Islam about causing harm to
others in productive activities. His uncertainty may lead to actions where he may be
taken advantage of by other individuals who happened to evaluate and interpret the
norms in different ways. Kuran warns these circumstances would provoke threats
and reduce people's interest in adhering to the norms. He suggests that modifications
could be incorporated by either "self-serving persons or by altruistic individuals
trying to strengthen the norms through clarification and systematization". Kuran also
stresses:
The ambiguity problem is, of course, very general, arising as it does in the day-
to-day interpretation of any social principle. In all existing social systems, well-
intentioned people who subscribe to the same principles of justice and effi¬
ciency often clash over the application of these principles.107
The second reason why Kuran questions Islamic norms is the opposing rela¬




Kuran explains that this argument is supported by various studies by sociologists and
economists, which show that "in a small community or tribe, where people live in
fairly continuous contact and share similar experiences and preferences, individual
members tend to display considerable altruism toward the community at large."
Therefore, the members of small communities can trust one another and they tend to
rely on one another in their daily lives.108 However, in wider society, people's per¬
ceptions differ markedly:
A factor reinforcing the arguments that norms of altruism are relatively ineffec¬
tive ... is that, unlike the member of a small society, a person living in a large
one cannot expect to influence the general welfare perceptibly through personal
acts of altruism.109
The economic and social objectives of a Muslim society differ from those of a
non-Muslim society in that Muslims are required to obey the commandments of
Allah and to help one another to live according to the teachings of Islam. The
underlying ideology is that during their short lives on earth, people are faced with
tests and their knowledge of Islam enables them to differentiate between good and
bad conduct. Nevertheless, this knowledge does not guarantee that they will behave
as required by Islam.
On the other hand, Siddiqi states:
This is not to refute that if all people in an Islamic country change their norms
and behavior according to the teachings of Islam, most economic problems of
the society would be solved. The point is rather that we cannot and should not
base and develop a system which takes this prescribed behavior as given. It
would simply be a wrong assumption. But, on the other hand, the critics of
Islamic economics should also recognize the fact that a person can behave
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From Siddiqi's proposition, it is clear that it is incorrect to assume that an
Islamic economic system can be established and developed simply by accepting that
Islamic norms provide a solution to economic problems. Nevertheless, one can as¬
sume that individuals might behave differently under a different system and different
rules. For example, with an Islamic education and moral influence, individuals in a
Muslim society will behave according to their own desire. However, this is not the
only way to ensure the behaviour required. As Siddiqi states: "The major parts of the
efforts should be centred around devising appropriate rules of the economic game
and a structure of material and other social incentives which may help and influence
people to act in a desirable way."111
Siddiqi points out another important factor overlooked by Timur Kuran and
others, which has not been given due emphasis by Islamic economists. The differ¬
ences in attitude, behaviour and levels ofmorality among individuals have not been
recognized.112 Although it is true that many individuals in modern Muslim society are
untrustworthy, a point that has been criticized in Islamic economics, there do also
exist devout Muslims who are honest and trustworthy. It is unfair to deny them their
place in society by assuming that everyone behaves in the same manner. Siddiqi sug¬
gests that a mechanism should be devised to find the trustworthy individuals and
encourage them to come forward to make their contribution towards establishing an
economic system based on the precepts of Islam."3 He also emphasizes that the
notion of behavioural norms among the members of a society and the possibility of





economy is viable.114 Although his suggestion may be seen by some people as too
ambitious, it could be realistic. However, establishing the mechanism itself could
create further problems.
2.4.2 Other Related Issues
Timur Kuran states that Islamic economics did not emerge from a drive to correct
imbalances, injustice or inequalities in society.115 He adds that the Indian Muslims
who launched Islamic economics in the 1940s were motivated by a desire to defend
Islamic civilization against foreign cultural influences.116 In justification of his state¬
ment, Kuran says that according to Sayyid 'Abd al-A'la Mawdudi, "This new
approach to economics was to be a vehicle for establishing, or re-establishing, Isla¬
mic authority in a domain where Muslims were falling increasingly under the
influence of Western ideas."117 Kuran adds that by "replacing Western economic
approaches with an Islamic one, Mawdudi hoped to restore the Muslim community's
self-respect and improve its cohesion." Kuran points out that Islamic economics did
not have to meet scientific standards of coherence, precision or realism. It needed
only to differentiate itself from the intellectual traditions that it was aiming to dis¬
place, since Islamic economics was developed to serve cultural and political ends.118
Chapra rebuts Kuran's statement that "Islamic economics did not emerge from
a drive to correct economic imbalances, injustices, or inequalities", stating that it
conflicts with the underlying principle of Islam, which is the establishment of jus-
114 Ibid.
115 Timur Kuran, "Islamic Economics and the Islamic Subeconomy", Journal ofEconomic
Perspectives, vol.9, no.4 (1995), p.l 56.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid. According to Kuran, Mawdudi was the Pakistani ideologist whose voluminous




tice.119 Chapra adds that Kuran's contention that the fulfilment ofjustice is not even a
goal is "grossly unfair", since the desire for a just socio-economic order has existed
throughout Muslim history, and Islamic economics is only an indication of this
emphasis on justice.120 He also firmly rejects Kuran's statement that Indian Muslims
launched Islamic economics and Mawdudi popularized it, setting the tone for later
contributions to the literature. In Chapra's view:
One may get this impression if one were to look at only some of the literature
available in English; however, if one were to look at the literature available in
other languages, particularly Arabic, one would have a different perspective on
the launching and popularization of Islamic economics. 121
Indeed, Hasan al-Banna, Mustafa al-Siba'i, Muhammad Abu Zahra, Sayyid
Qutb and M. Baqir al-Sadr are among the twentieth-century Arab scholars named by
Chapra as contributing to the development of Islamic economics.122 Therefore, this
area has not been developed or popularized by just one person or nation. Chapra also
says that although he cannot identify exactly when the term al-iqtisad al-islami, or
Islamic economics, originated, it has "its roots deep in the historical writings of
Qur'an commentators, jurists, historians and social, political and moral philoso¬
phers".
Kuran states that "Islamic economics does not offer a comprehensive frame¬
work for a modern economy."123 Chapra rejects his view: "This statement would be
true only if the market system were itself not a comprehensive framework for a
119
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modern economy."124 According to Chapra, Islam does not wish to eliminate the
market system, rather to remove the limitations of conventional economics by put¬
ting "a greater emphasis on justice, brotherhood and socioeconomic health and by
combining moral, historical, social and political factors emphasized by past Muslim
scholars".125 Chapra concludes with the following statement:
How far the implementation of reform programs based on Islamic economics
will be able to help Muslim countries in realizing development with justice is
something only time will tell. It may be hazardous to pass judgment on these
programs in their preliminary stage of implementation on the basis of the
incomplete and inaccurate data now available. To whatever extent such reforms
succeed, they can help improve the operation of the market in terms of both
efficiency and equity.126
2.4.3 Critiques by Other Modern Scholars
The above discussion shows that in the view of scholars of Islamic economics, jus¬
tice, brotherhood and socio-economics should be incorporated into the system to
remove the limitations of modern economics. It also has been mentioned in the
Introduction that the application of profit/loss sharing to the Islamic banking system
has been seen as the most genuine and promising Islamic contract. However, some
scholars argue that this form of contract could be adopted by conventional
economics. This section examines the views put forward by Naqvi127 and Haque128 in
this debate.
Naqvi says that although it is true that the system of profit/loss sharing
(.mudaraba) is lawful according to the Shari'a, it does not necessarily mean that it is
124
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125 Ibid.
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the best principle on which an Islamic economy should be based.129 He also main¬
tains that since mudaraba is based on the custom of the pre-Islamic Arabs, not on the
Qur'an and Hadith, there is nothing sacred about the system. He suggests that the
system should be tested on an economy-wide basis before any possible significant
evaluation of it can be made:
It will require all the savers to become risk-takers, something that does not
happen when this system is one of the many possibilities open to investors, the
option to invest in interest-bearing deposits being not ruled out. The risk-takers
may take this form of investment, while the risk-averters will not opt for it. In
that case, the preference structure of the investors remains intact while it does
not when the system is adopted on an economy-wide basis.130
Haque points out:
Some Muslim ruling elites have ingeniously devised an "Islamic" ideology to
conserve and justify social and economics relationships based on a decadent
status quo of feudalism and/or capitalism. Knowing that all Muslims have a
great love for the Holy Prophet and Qur'anic Islam, the ruling classes are
exploiting the fair name of Islam and have turned Qur'anic concepts into
institutions which are in fact the citadels of vested interests.131
Haque maintains that mudaraba is being "re-interpreted and projected as a sacred
religious principle to justify the maximisation of profits under capitalism."132
Haque remarks that in the pre-capitalist medieval Muslim society, the two
common dominant modes of commercial capital were the business organizations of
mudaraba and musharaka.m However, here he is in accord with Naqvi, for he
maintains that the commercial capital was the product of the specific economic
conditions of the times because of the explicit ban on interest-bearing capital. He
also says: "Mudaraba existed when there were no modern banking, financial and
Naqvi, op. cit., p.135.
130
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corporate institutions; and actually mudaraba and money-lenders' capital evolved
because there were no other categories of capital where people could invest their
wealth."134
Based on his knowledge and ideological perspectives, Haque rejects adopting
mudaraba as an instrument for modern banking and finance for several reasons. In
his view, the mudaraba contract is very risky and dangerous, for the success of the
system depends on the thoroughly trustworthy conduct of the agent.135 Thus, under a
mudaraba contract in which the agent is not held liable for the loss of people's
investments, this would cause serious difficulty to the investors, for the business
demands a high level of responsibility, honesty and integrity.136 In fact, the Prophet
(pbuh) was well known as al-Amin (the trustworthy person) for his management of
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which the entire structure of equity within the commenda contracts rests." See, Abraham L.
Udovitch, Partnership andProfit in Medieval Islam (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1970), p.240.
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p.l 1, states that the Prophet entered more than once into commenda agreements, where he
acted as the agent-manager.
105
CHAPTER THREE
3 The Development of Islamic Banking
(Case Study: Malaysia)
3.1 An Overview
Chapter 3 discusses the development of Islamic banking around the world and
includes a more detailed analysis of Malaysia as a case study. It also looks at the
implementation of the profit/loss-sharing modes of financing in Malaysia with the
particular focus on Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB).'
3.2 The Development of Islamic Banking
Wilson states that the first attempt to introduce an Islamic financial system was in
Pakistan in the late 1950s, with the establishment of a local bank in a rural area,
though it did not have a lasting impact.2 This bank was initiated by religious land¬
lords, who deposited funds without interest to be used by small landowners. Bor¬
rowers had to pay only a small charge, lower than that of an interest rate, to cover the
operating cost. However, it appears that there was difficulty in recruiting bank staff
owing to a shortage of funds, and this caused the bank to collapse.'1 According to
Ashker, two reasons contributed to its failure to survive: (1) the deposits were too
small to cover the credit demands since the money was paid as a single sum with no
1 The name Bank Islam Malaysia and its abbreviation BIMB are interchangeable throughout
this thesis.
2
Rodney Wilson, Banking and Finance in the Arab Middle East (Basingstoke, UK:
Macmillan, 1983), p.75.
3 Ibid.
further additions; and (2) the bank staff did not have full independent control of the
bank's operations, for the depositors were interested in how the money was used.4
The second attempt to establish an Islamic bank was made in Mit Ghamr,5 in
the Nile Delta of Egypt, between 1963 and 1967. This model was adapted by its
founder, Ahmed al-Najjar, from the concept of the German savings bank.6 Dr
al-Najjar had graduated from a German university. Since he was familiar with the
German savings bank model, he decided to adapt the system to the rural environment
of Egypt - which was a developing country - when he returned home in the early
1960s.7 In this model, the bank participated as the joint owner in equity participation
and sharing of the profit with the entrepreneur in proportion to the amount of capital
invested. However, in this case, the bank held a title deed to the enterprise.8 Dr
al-Najjar managed to establish the bank, helped by a German grant and with the
support of the Director of the Egyptian State Intelligence Agency (al-Mukhabarat),
who introduced him to the Minister of Economics in Egypt.9
Scharf states that the mobilization of these savings was very impressive. Prev¬
iously, capital formation in that area had been impaired, for the majority of the popu-
4 Ahmed Abdel-Fattah el-Ashker, The Islamic Business Enterprise (London: Croom Helm,
1987), p.32.
5
Much of the literature on Islamic banks identifies Mit Ghamr as the first Islamic bank in
Egypt and in the world. See, for example, Traute Wohlers Scharf, Arab and Islamic Banks:
New Business Partners for Developing Countries (Paris: Organization for Economic Co¬
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lation had never had dealings with financial institutions.10 He adds that as rural and
religious people, they were suspicious ofWestern styles and, furthermore, there were
only a few branches of banks within their reach." As a result, the idle capital of their
excess income could not be used for productive investment.12 According to Wilson,
the success of the bank was also distinguished by the fact that the problems of rural
debt were reduced, for people no longer had to depend on moneylenders, who
usually charged a high rate of interest.13 The success of the bank in attracting deposi¬
tors was shown in the Mit Ghamr Local Savings Bank Annual Reports 1963-67. The
number of depositors increased from 17,560, with deposits worth £E41,000 between
1963 and 1964, to 251,000, with deposits worth £E1.8 million between 1966 and
1967.14 The bank was also praised by the Ford Foundation in June 1967 for winning
the personal support of a large number of farmers and villagers, who regarded the
organization as their own.15
However, according to Soliman, al-Najjar never made any reference to Islam in
the early stages of the bank's operation, lest his project be rejected, for it was also
reported that al-Najjar received a German grant of DM780,000 and an Egyptian
government grant of £E60,000.16 Soliman states that al-Najjar had to operate the Mit
10
Scharf, op. cit., pp.79-80.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Wilson, op. cit., p.76.
14 El-Ashker (1990), op. cit., p.61.
15
Wilson, op. cit., p.76.
16
Soliman, op. cit., p. 267. Monzer Kahf states that al-Najjar had no political affiliation or
aspirations whatsoever. However, his religious background, and possibly his interest in
economics as well, were influenced by his maternal uncle, the late Mohammad Abdullah
al-'Arabi, the first Arab economist to write about the principles of Islamic economics. See,
Monzer Kahf, "Islamic Banks: The Rise of a New Power Alliance ofWealth and Shari'a
Scholarship", In The Politics ofIslamic Finance, ed. Clement M. Henry and Rodney Wilson
(Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), p. 19.
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Ghamr Bank under the guise of a savings banks and incorporate the name of a
European country so as to claim a place among the conventional banks based on
usury. That was the situation in an era when hostility towards Islamic organizations
was at its peak.17 It was not until the late 1970s, when Islamic banking became
legally possible, that al-Najjar declared Mit Ghamr to be the first Islamic bank in
history. It is believed that its approval by the Egyptian government was based on
socio-economic reasons: to encourage the rural population to put its excess income
into savings and to mobilize economic resources.18
The experiment of the Mit Ghamr Local Savings Bank came to an end for
political reasons in the second half of 1967, when its management was taken over by
the National Bank of Egypt and the Central Bank. As a result of the takeover, opera¬
tional policies were changed: interest-free banking was abandoned and the bank was
then operated on an interest basis. Nevertheless, the Mit Ghamr experiment opened
the way for the establishment of the Nasser Social Bank in 1971, which was a kind of
revival. Furthermore, the closure of the Mit Ghamr led to a decline in the number of
depositors, causing a public debate that was finally aired in the Egyptian Assembly.
Despite its short life, the Mit Ghamr experiment was studied by many Muslim
countries and it was the pioneer for the establishment of the Islamic Development
Bank in 1975 and other Islamic banks later.19
The Nasser Social Bank was also an interest-free bank, with wider functions
than the Mit Ghamr Local Savings Bank and a broad range of equity participation,
though foreign exchanges dealings were limited. Its social responsibility was empha-
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 El-Ashker (1990), op. cit., p.62.
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sized in its Act of Establishment.20 The Nasser Social Bank was initially supervised
and financed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. Accord¬
ing to Scharf, the Bank received 2 per cent of the net profits of public enterprises to
finance its services.21 Kahf notes that its Act of Establishment required public com¬
panies to donate 2.5 per cent (a rate selected because of its compatibility with the
level of zakat), of their profits to the Bank to enable it to create and accumulate its
capital and reserves.22 The Bank itself was charged with the responsibility of receiv¬
ing this zakat.
Kahf rebuts the assertion that either the Mit Ghamr Local Savings Bank or the
Nasser Social Bank was the pioneer of the Islamic banking system:
While these writings prepared the Muslim public to see the merits of Islamic
banks and later to celebrate their founders as religious heroes, the actual estab¬
lishment of the Islamic bank unexpectedly came in two areas of the Muslim
world far away from each other. Islamic banks were concurrently established in
the countryside of Lower Egypt and in metropolitan Kuala Lumpur in
Malaysia.23
In the mid-1970s, in addition to savings and social welfare institutions, com¬
mercial Islamic banks were established. The first Islamic bank to emerge on private
initiative was the Dubai Islamic Bank in Dubai in 1975. The governments of the
United Arab Emirates and Kuwait had contributed 20 per cent and 10 per cent of the
20 Ibid. Soliman, op. cit., p.269, states that although the Nasser Social Bank was created as an
interest-free bank, the law relating to its establishment did not base its system on any
religious references, but in his opinion, the jargon ofArab socialism. Since Islam is not the
only ideology hostile to interest, a version of socialism can also take the same view. The
Nasser Social Bank was under the authority of the Ministry of Social Affairs, which does not
have any religious competence.
21
Scharf, op. cit., p. 80.
22
Kahf, op. cit., p. 19.
2'' Ibid. According to Kahf, the existence of Tabung Haji was recognized by Middle Eastern
Islamic economists and bankers only in 1981, when it was presented to the Islamic
Development Bank during the negotiations to establish the Islamic Bank ofMalaysia.
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capital respectively.24 However, the most important stage in the history of Islamic
banking was the establishment of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia in 1975. (The development of Islamic financial institutions and banking
can be summarized in seven phases, as shown in Table 3.1).25
Although the expansion of Islamic banking in the early years of the twenty-first
century is very impressive, its establishment was not an easy task and the procedure
varied from one country to another As pointed out by Haron, Islamic banks were
mostly initiated not by governments of particular countries, but by individuals.26 The
Nasser Social Bank is one example of government participation in this project. It is
true that a bank is in a strong position if it has the necessary financial support of the
government. However, in that situation, the bank also puts itself under government
control. Unless the government adheres to an Islamic ideology, the clients might lose
their trust in the bank, for they might have doubts about its operation and intentions.27
Khan also highlights the lack of government support at the initial stage of the
establishment of Islamic banking, as described below:
An important difference between attempts at establishing Islamic banking prior
to the formal launching of the Islamic banking movement (in the mid seventies)
and those that came in the wake of the movement was the presence or absence
of government backing. The success of the early spontaneous and decentralized
24
Munawar Iqbal and Philip Molyneux, Thirty Years ofIslamic Banking: History,
Performance and Prospects (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp.66-71.
25 The establishment of the IDB was the result of a declaration of intent issued by the finance
ministers of 23 member countries of the OIC at a conference held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in
December 1973. In August 1974, the Article of Agreement to establish the IDB was adopted
at a second conference, also held in Jeddah. Following the inaugural meeting of its Board of
Governors in Riyadh in July 1975, the IDB went into operation in October of that year.
26 Sudin Haron, Sistern Kewangan Dan Perbankan Islam (Kuala Lumpur: Kuala Lumpur
Business School Sdn Bhd, 2005), p.60. Scharf also asserts that the vast majority of Islamic




experiment (the Egyptian venture) may have made it the ideal prototype, but the
lack of government support probably caused its ultimate failure.28
According to Saeed, the rapid expansion of Islamic banks at national and
international levels occurred after the oil price rises of 1973 and 1974. However, he
agrees that the earliest experiments in Islamic banking, for example, the Mit Ghamr
Savings Bank and the Nasser Social Bank, cannot be linked to Arab oil wealth.29 He
states:
The oil revenue which began to flow into Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and Bahrain was an important determinant in the
development of Islamic banks, although in the literature one finds an uneasiness
on the part of some proponents of Islamic banking in acknowledging this fact.30
He adds:
Almost all Islamic banks established in the 1970s in the Middle East were
partly, and in some cases totally, funded by oil-linked wealth. The Islamic
Development Bank, whose capital is approximately US$2 billion, has a
majority shareholding, that is, more than 60 per cent, by the oil-producing Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Libya. The Dubai Islamic
Bank, the Kuwait Finance House, the Bahrain Islamic Bank, the Qatar Islamic
Bank, the Faisal Islamic Banks of Bahrain, Niger and Senegal, banks of the
Al-Baraka group of Shaykh Saleh Kamil, and Dar al-Mal al-Islami (DMI) of the
Saudi Prince Muhammad al-Faisal are totally funded by oil wealth, while the
Faisal Islamic Banks of Egypt and of Sudan, and most other Islamic banks in
non oil-exporting countries, are partly funded by oil wealth.31
28 Shahrukh Rafi Khan, Profit and Loss Sharing: An Islamic Experiment in Finance and
Banking (Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.58.
29 Abdullah Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest: A Study ofProhibition o/Riba and Its




Table 3.1 Islamic financial industry: phases of development
1930s Critiques of interest from Islamic
perspective.
1950s Suggestions by Muslim economists
and scholars for interest-free
banking to replace interest-based
banking.
Two-tier model of Islamic bank proposed
1960s Development of financing based on
Islamic principles.
Definition of operating mechanism
for Islamic financial institutions.
Tabung Haji (Pilgrims Savings Fund)
established.
Mit Ghamr Local Savings Bank established
1963, collapsed 1967.
1970s Establishment of Islamic banks and
non-banking Islamic institutions.
Development of new modes of
Islamic finance (murabaha).




Dubai Islamic Bank established 1975.
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) established
1975.
First International Islamic Economic
Conference held in Mecca 1976.
Centre of Islamic Economic Research
established in Jeddah.
Pakistan resolves to Islamize its entire
financial system.
1980s Continued development of new
modes of financing.
Interest shown by Western
academics and financial experts.
Conventional banks, including
major international banks offer
Islamic products/windows
Development of Islamic indices
and trust fund.
Islamic banking industries grow rapidly to
over $100 million.
Iran and Sudan declare their intention to
Islamize their entire financial systems.
IMF and World Bank participate in
producing papers, articles, research and
publications re Islamic banking.
Academic institutions around the world begin
to teach Islamic finance.
Islamic unit trust fund established.
1990s Development of asset-based
Islamic financial products.
Development of Islamic products/
windows among conventional and
major international banks.
Islamic indices established at Dow Jones and
Financial Times.
Existing Islamic banks expanded and new
ones established.
Several support institutions established.
Accounting standards set for Islamic banks
(AAOIFI).
Islamic secondary market initiated.
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Early Continuing development of Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB)
2000s financial architecture. established in Malaysia.
Greater attention given to risk First Islamic Rating Agency established in
management, accounting regulation Bahrain.
and corporate control.
Increased mobilization, based on
Islamic principles, of public sector
resources.
Source: Based on Ahmad Mohamed Ali, "The Emerging Islamic Financial Architecture: The
Way Ahead". Paper presented at the Fifth Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance,
Science Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 6-7 April 2002.
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3.3 The Development of Islamic Banking in Malaysia
The establishment of Islamic banking in Malaysia in 1983 was in response to the
domestic public demand. However, no one could have predicted that within two
decades, Malaysia would be in the forefront of Islamic financial development.
During the 1970s, there was a global movement towards the commercialization of
the Islamic banking system, spanning countries from Europe and the Middle East to
South Asia. Nevertheless, its progress was slow over the following ten years owing
to the lack of support and the challenge of competition from the fast-paced conven¬
tional banking system. It appears that the introduction of Islamic banking in Malaysia
gave the industry the required impetus to attract global interest in this untapped field.
Today, in the early years of the twenty-first century, Malaysia, as a multi-racial
country,32 operates a dual banking system, in which both Islamic and conventional
banking services are offered to customers, who can then choose whatever suits their
needs. The emergence of Islamic banking in Malaysia encouraged an enormous
development of the system.3j Since the Malaysian government envisaged establishing
the country as the global hub of Islamic finance,34 it has implemented the appropriate
programmes to expedite its progress in that direction.
,2
Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2000 Population and Housing Census-.
http://www.statistics.gov.mv (cited 20 February 2006). As revealed in the 2000 Census,
Malaysia is a pluralist society. Its estimated population of 21 million comprises 61% Malays
and other indigenous people (together, they are described as the Bumiputra community),
30% Chinese, 8% Indians, and 1% others. Malaysia is also a multi-religious society, with
62.8% practising Islam, 19.2% Buddhism, 9.1% Christianity, 6.3% Hinduism, and 2.6%
Confucianism/Taoism and other traditional Chinese religions.
33
Bhupinder Singh in "Banking on Islamic Finance", Malaysian Business (16 May 2004),
p.31, states that 10% of banking transactions in Malaysia are based on Islamic principles.
This is impressive, considering that in 1998, the proportion was only 5%.
34 Bank Negara Malaysia, Financial Sector Stability (Kuala Lumpur: Bank Negara Malaysia,
2001), pp. 148-150.
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3.3.1 The Banking System in Malaysia
The financial system in Malaysia can be divided into financial institutions and the
financial market. Financial institutions can be sub-divided into the banking system
and non-bank financial intermediaries.35 Since this study focuses on Islamic banking,
the discussion of the general banking system in Malaysia will be brief.
The main component of the financial system is the banking system. It com¬
prises the Central Bank ofMalaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia or BNM)36, the banking
institutions, and other financial institutions, namely, discount houses and the repre¬
sentative offices of foreign banks and offshore banks in the International Offshore
Financial Centre in Labuan (Labuan IOFC). The banking institutions comprise com¬
mercial banks, which include Islamic banks, finance companies and merchant banks.
To complete the entire system, the banking system encompasses the money and
foreign exchange brokers, both of which are supervised by Bank Negara Malaysia,
since they complement the operations of the primary banking institutions.
Bank Negara Malaysia is the sole currency-issuing authority in the country,
and commercial banks are the only institutions allowed to operate current accounts.
The banking institutions are supervised and regulated by BNM in accordance with
the Banking and Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA) 1989. BNM, as the central bank,
is at the top of the banking pyramid and is invested with necessary powers as laid
down in the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 195 8.37 The commercial and merchant
banks were regulated by the provisions of the Banking Act 1973 and the finance
j5 Bank Negara Malaysia, The Central Bank and the Financial System in Malaysia: A
Decade ofChange (Kuala Lumpur: Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999), pp.66-99.
j6 The name Bank Negara Malaysia and its abbreviation BNM are interchangeable
throughout this thesis.
37 Bank Negara Malaysia (1999), op. cit., pp.243-253.
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companies by the Finance Companies Act 1969, while other Financial brokers were
covered by guidelines issued by BNM. However, the comprehensive codification of
BAFIA 1989 brought all financial institutions under one supervisory and regulatory
authority.38
Islamic banks are not affected by BAFIA 1989. Although they are under the
authority of BNM like other licensed banks, the Islamic banks are also governed by
the provisions of the Islamic Banking Act 1983. The IBA was passed as a separate
law to exist side by side with the law covering conventional banking.
3.3.2 Historical Development of Islamic Banking in Malaysia
Before and during the early years of independence (1957) in Malaysia, Muslims -
particularly the Malays - traditionally lived in the rural areas.39 Since life was hard at
that time, it was impossible for them to think beyond daily survival. Although there
was a conventional banking system, it was concentrated in the cities, where the
intense economic activity was dominated by the Chinese.40 The Malays depended on
38 Ibid.
39 The Malays were mainly farmers and fishermen in the rural areas, while in the towns and
cities, the Chinese dominated the commercial sector. Most of the Indians - largely Tamil -
were labourers on the rubber estates. Firdaus Abdullah, "Affirmative Action Policy in
Malaysia: To Restructure Society, to Eradicate Poverty",
http://www.ices.ik/publications/est/articles iu!97/Est-Abdullah (cited 20 January 2006).
Hirschman concludes that the "racial division" among the multi-ethnic population of
Malaysia was mostly a product of colonial practices: Charles Hirschman, "The Making of
Race in Colonial Malaya: Political Economy and Racial Ideology", Sociology Forum, vol.1,
no.2 (1986), pp.330-361.
40
Banking in Malaysia can be traced back to 1859, when the first commercial bank in
Malaysia, the Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London and China, was established.
Although the first domestic bank was incorporated in 1913, a comprehensive financial sector
emerged only after the establishment of the Central Bank ofMalaysia in 1959. See, Janice
C.Y. How, Melina Abdul Karim, and Peter Verhoeven, "Islamic Financing and Bank Risks:
The Case ofMalaysia", Thunderbird International Business Review, vol.47, no.l (2005),
p.76.
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pawnshops as the main informal type of institution to finance their needs.41
Nevertheless, according to Borhan, Muslims in Malaysia have developed their own
transactions out of prudence and to avoid riba-based transactions.42 One of these
customary transactions is jual janji (conditional sale), which was prevalent among
the Malays in the pre-colonial period, and has survived until now.43
In Malaysia, Islamic banking was officially established in 1983, the road to this
destination having been paved since 1963 by the establishment of the Pilgrims Sav¬
ings Corporation, currently known as the Pilgrimage Fund Board (Lembaga Tabung
Haji).44 At that time, its initial purpose was to mobilize the small-scale savings of
Malay smallholders according to Islamic principles and thus both to benefit the
Malay economy and to facilitate the performance of the Hajj.45 Its success in both
respects led to the widening of its functions, which included the administration and
41 Abdul Ghafar Ismail and Nor Zakiah Ahmad, "Pawnshops as Instruments of
Microenterprise Credit in Malaysia", International Journal ofSocial Economics, vol.24,
no.l 1 (1997), pp. 1343-1352. They also state that pawnshops had been very important in
earlier years, especially for the low-income groups (<RM500) and the less-educated
(secondary level) groups, whose credit risk excluded them from the formal financial markets.
According to F.J.A. Bouman and R. Houtman in "Pawn broking as an Instrument of Rural
Banking in the Third World", Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol.37, no. 1
(October 1988), pp.69-89, rural economies in the developing countries still rely on this
informal financial intermediation.
42 Joni Tamkin Borhan, "The Doctrine and Application of Partnership in Islamic Commercial
Law with Special Reference to Malaysian Experiments in Islamic Banking and Finance".
Unpublished PhD thesis (Edinburgh University, 1997), p.149.
4j Ibid. The origin ofjual janji is the transaction known as bay' bi al-wafa', which is a sale
with an option to repurchase. Under this system, a landowner could sell his land to obtain a
credit facility at an agreed price. The agreement contained a condition specifying that within
a certain period, the seller would have the right to repurchase the land at the same price,
although meanwhile, the buyer had the right of occupation and usufruct. If, after the period
stated had expired, the seller had failed to repurchase the land, its ownership would be finally
transferred to the buyer.
44
Latarbelakang Tabung Haji, www.tabunghaii.gov.mv (cited 10 January 2007). The
Pilgrims Management and Fund Board (PMBF) or Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji
changed its name to Pilgrims Fund Board on 28 August 1997, when the new Pilgrims Fund
Board Act (1995) was implemented.
45 William R. Roff, Patterns of Islamization in Malaysia, 1890s - 1990s: Exemplars,
Institutions, and Vectors", Journal ofIslamic Studies, vol.9, no.2 (1998), pp.210-212.
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organization of Hajj activities for Malaysians according to the Lembaga Urusan dan
Tabung Haji (Pilgrims Management and Fund Board) Act 1969.46
Following the establishment of Tabung Haji, there was continual pressure
during the 1970s from certain individuals, groups and agencies to help establish an
Islamic bank.47 This awakening coincided with the rise in the number of Muslim
intellectuals.48 Emphasis was placed on important aspects of Islamic economics,
similar to those of other countries that had adopted Islamic banking.49 During the
Bumiputera Economic Congress in 1980, a resolution was passed, urging the Malay¬
sian government to allow Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH) to establish an
Islamic bank. Similar resolutions were passed in the same year at various seminars
held at state level. In March 1981, at the National Seminar on the Concept of
Development in Islam, organized by the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (National
University of Malaysia), yet another resolution was passed. It urged the government
to pass special legislation immediately as the first step towards establishing Islamic
banks and financial institutions based on Islamic principles.50 At the seminar, it was
www.tabunahaii.aov.mv.
47
As a non-banking financial institution, Tabung Haji can offer only limited services. Before
the establishment of Bank Islam, Tabung Haji also had to deal with conventional banks for
its safekeeping and other banking services.
48 For further details, see Roff, op. cit., pp.218-222.
49 Mohamed Ariff, "Islamic Banking: A Southeast Asian Perspective", in Islamic Banking in
SoutheastAsia, ed. Mohamed Ariff (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988),
pp. 194-212. He states that in the 1980s, secular forces were quite strong in Malaysia, for
non-Muslims, who constituted 45% of the population, did not subscribe to the Islamic
ideology. However, later in the 1980s, there were visible signs of growing conformity to
Islamic codes in Malaysia. Muslim scholars showed renewed interest in Islamic teachings
and Muslim social scientists, in particular, were looking for Islamic solutions to current
problems.
50 Bank Islam (M) Berhad, Annual Report, 1984, pp.22-24. See also, Zakariya Man, "Islamic
Banking: The Malaysian Experience", in Islamic Banking in Southeast Asia, ed. Mohamed
Ariff, op. cit., pp.67-102. Borhan, op. cit., pp. 151-152, states that the implementation of this
resolution was begun in 1981 under Dr Mahathir, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia. Dr
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also agreed that LUTH should be responsible for initiating the project. The Muslim
Welfare Organization ofMalaysia (PERKIM), LUTH and the Development Bank of
Malaysia Berhad made independent efforts to study the various aspects of Islamic
banking and its implementation in Malaysia.
Therefore, on 30 July 1981, the Malaysian government formed the National
Steering Committee of Islamic Banks, comprising twenty members headed by Raja
Tan Sri Mohar.51 The Committee was then co-ordinated at national level with gov¬
ernment acceptance of LUTH's proposal to establish an Islamic bank. The National
Steering Committee, consisting of three technical committees for the Religious,
Legal and Banking Operations, were supplied with reference material, information,
and a document - "Model Islamic Bank" - prepared by the International Association
of Islamic Banks.52 The operation of the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan and the Faisal
Islamic Bank of Egypt was studied by the committees and used as a reference for the
establishment of the first Islamic bank in Malaysia.53
Mahathir invited prominent international Islamic scholars to Malaysia and accepted their
recommendations for the Islamization of the country's administration by establishing Islamic
institutions such as banks and universities. At the same time, the then Prime Minister
announced the establishment of an Islamic Research Group and a special enforcement group,
whose task would be to conduct research into all aspects of an Islamic economic system as
well as assisting the government's development projects by ensuring that they conformed to
Islamic principles. According to Tan Sri Nor Mohamed Yakcop (in 2007 the Deputy Finance
Minister ofMalaysia), Dr Mahathir was, without doubt, the primary force in the
implementation of Islamic Banking in Malaysia: "To put his decision in context, Islamic
banking at that time [1983] was considered exotic. Most OIC governments were wary of
Islamic banking and didn't want to take the plunge. But Dr. Mahathir took the risk and the





Man, op. cit., p.70. See also, Haron, op. cit., pp.74-75.
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The following are the three major principles outlined by the National Steering
Committee on 5 July 1982, on which the operation of the first Islamic bank was to be
based:54
1. The prohibition of riba and the sharing of profit and loss. Profit/loss-
sharing is the basis of all economic activity covering money, wealth and labour
in Islam. This concept should replace interest as an important mechanism in the
present banking system.
2. The management of Islamic transactions (mu'amalat). The success of Isla¬
mic banks is largely dependent on the management's understanding and imple¬
mentation of the Islamic principles of transactions. Therefore, Islamic banks
must ensure that their activities do not conflict with the Shari'a.
3. The avoidance of activities contradictory to the interests of the Muslim
Umma. Any activity that is not in keeping with the interests of the Umma is
equivalent to the misuse and abuse of the wealth entrusted to humankind by
God.
The National Steering Committee also proposed the following recommendations
concerning the legal framework and control:
1. An Islamic bank that operates according to the principles of the Shari'a should
be established.
2. The bank should be incorporated as a limited company under the Companies
Act (1965).
3. An Islamic Banking Act should be legislated for and some consequential
amendments should be made to other existing related Acts.
54
Man, op. cit., p.71; Haron, op. cit., p.74.
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4. Bank Negara Malaysia should administer the Islamic Banking Act (1983).
5. The bank should set up a Religious Supervisory Council to ensure that the
operations of the bank comply with Shari'a principles.55
It could be said that the Muslims in Malaysia have had to wait more than
twenty years for the government to introduce Islamic banking. Its decision was
influenced by not only the increase in the number of Muslim intellectuals in the
country, but also the growing prominence of Islam in Malaysian politics, particularly
since the 1980s.56 The Malay political party UMNO, the main component of the
Barisan Nasional,57 the ruling coalition, was motivated to implement Islamic prin¬
ciples to stay in power. This was largely due to the Islamic challenge from Parti
Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS).58 PAS has openly supported the Islamization of the
country's economy and the establishment of an Islamic state.59 It is also said that the
55 Nik Norzrul Thani, Mohamed Ridza Mohamed Abdullah and Megat Hizaini Hassan, Law
and Practice ofIslamic Banking and Finance (Kuala Lumpur: Sweet and Maxwell Asia,
2003), pp. 16-17.
56
Ariff, op. cit., p. 197.
57 Barisan Nasional consists of three parties: UMNO (Malays), MCA (Chinese) and MIC
(Indians).
58
Ariff, op. cit., p. 197.
59
On the other hand, UMNO has favoured a selective and gradual Islamization by first
incorporating Islamic principles into the government. For example, in 1986, the Islamic
Values Guide has stressed important values, such as trust, responsibility, sincerity,
dedication, moderation, diligence, purity (incorruptibility), discipline, co-operation, integrity
and gratitude. It shows that if these values were inculcated, then the country could have an
effective, strong, just and progressive administration. According to Haneef, planned Islamic
reforms in Malaysia began in 1981, when Dr Mahathir Mohammad, came to power. He
states: "Unlike its predecessors, and relating to demands of the time, the Mahathir
administration decided to utilize Islam as a positive ingredient in the development of nation
and its peoples, especially that of Malays. The role of Islam, at the state level, went beyond
ceremonial purposes." See, Mohamed Aslam Haneef, "The Development and Impact of
Islamic Economic Institutions: The Malaysian Experience" in Islam in SoutheastAsia:
Political, Social and Strategic Challengesfor the 21s' Century, ed. K.S. Nathan and
Mohammad Hashim Kamali (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), pp.82-
99.
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establishment of an Islamic bank and the International Islamic University60 was a
government strategy to steal the thunder from PAS.61 Although the Islamic resur¬
gence in Malaysia is said to be the consequence of ethnic-based policy-making,62
individuals and organizations were, in turn, influenced by the global Islamic resur¬
gence during the 1970s. Ariff concludes that the political climate was just right for
the emergence of an Islamic bank in Malaysia.63 He also comments as follows:
In addition to providing conventional banking services in a halal manner
through riba-free financial transactions, the BIMB has been contributing to the
economic development of the Muslim community in particular and that of the
country in general. Its main contribution has been in the form of mobilizing
savings that would have been otherwise kept idle and undertaking investments
that would not otherwise have taken place. There are many Muslims in the
country who would not place their money in deposits with conventional banks
as it would involve interest payments or would not accept interest payments at
all even if their savings are deposited in conventional banks. Although it is hard
to ascertain the magnitude of the amount involved, it appears that a sizeable
proportion of savings in the rural areas have been kept out of the system
because of lack of halal outlets.64
However, Muzaffar writes that although the Islamic bank might abolish interest, yet,
given the capitalist structure of the economy, it will, like other commercial banks,
continue to mobilize the savings of the general public for investment.65 In the
author's opinion, the profit generated by the banks will almost always benefit those
in the middle and upper echelons of society.66 As a result, the abolition of interest in
60 In the early 1980s, a number of Islamic institutions came into existence - or were
reorganized or reactivated - in education, health, industry and commerce. Examples of these
are the Islamic pawnshops (al-rahnu), Baitulmal, and the Islamic Economic Development
Foundation ofMalaysia (YPEIM).
61
Ariff, op. cit., p.200.
62
Haneef, op. cit., p.85.
63 Ariff, op. cit., p.200.
64 Ibid.




a capitalist economy without other fundamental changes can lead only to greater
injustice and inequalities.67
In the development of Islamic banking, the Malaysian government adopted an
approach that acknowledged the right of Muslims to have a banking system con¬
forming to their faith. The government also accepted that Malaysia's financial net¬
works, both conventional and Islamic, must serve the needs of the twenty-first
century. Without government support, the establishment of an Islamic banking
system in Malaysia would not have been possible. The lengthy period required for
the system to be operational was due to the high expectations of the general Muslim
public. Every aspect of the first Islamic bank, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB),
had to be carefully examined and developed before implementation. Since it was
carrying the name of Islam, any failure on its part would not have been acceptable,
for it would have reverberated throughout the whole system.68 When discussing
BIMB's profit for the first and second year of its operation, Ariff comments:
Not all the Muslim depositors are motivated by Islamic considerations, as there
seem to be many who would stay with the BIMB only if profits declared by it
are competitive with the rate of interest offered by conventional banks. It is
extremely important that the BIMB makes adequate profits not only to give fair
dividends to its shareholders and a reasonable rate of return to the depositors,
but also to prove that Islamic banks are commercially viable and that they can
be an efficient alternative to conventional banks.69
67 Ibid.
68
Man, op. cit., p.68. Man also mentions: "A failure would imply not just the failure of the
BIMB per se, but to Muslims, it would be a failure of the Islamic system in general, which
would hardly be acceptable to them.
69 Ariff, op. cit., p.201.
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3.3.3 Early Functioning of the Islamic Banking System in Malaysia
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) began its operations with an authorized capital
of RM500 million, the initial paid-up capital being RM80 million. Its shareholders
were as follows:70
1. Government ofMalaysia (Ministry of Finance): RM30 million;
2. Tabung Haji: RM10 million;
3. Muslim Welfare Organization ofMalaysia (PERKIM): RM5 million;
4. State Religious Council: RM20 million;
5. State Religious Agencies: RM3 million;
6. Federal Agencies: RM12 million.
On 1 March 1983, BIMB was incorporated as a limited company under the
Companies Act 1965. In the Memorandum of Association of the BIMB preamble, it
is stated: "All business of the company will be transacted in accordance with Islamic
principles, rules and practices."71 The Government Investment Act was passed at the
same time to allow the Malaysian government to offer Government Investment
Issues (Gil) based on Islamic principles. The introduction ofGil enabled the Islamic
bank to meet its liquidity requirements as well as acting as an instrument to absorb
idle funds in the short term.
In accordance with the Islamic Banking Act (IBA) (1983), BIMB conducts
banking business similar to that of other commercial banks, although applying
Shari'a principles under the supervision of the Shari'a Advisory Council. Like
conventional banks in Malaysia, on the prudential side, BIMB must abide by certain
70 Bank Islam (M) Berhad (1984), op. cit., pp.22-24.
71 www.bankislam.com.mv accessed on 20 February 2007.
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rules, such as the minimum risk-weighted capital ratio and the maintenance of a
statutory reserve account with Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM). The only difference
lies in the liquidity requirement, whereby the Islamic bank observes a two-tier liquid
asset ratio. The first liquid asset ratio relates to its eligible liabilities, excluding those
of the investment accounts, which are covered by the second liquid asset ratio.72
Initially, the Bank provided deposit-taking products, such as current and savings
deposits, based on the concept of wadiah (guaranteed custody), and investment
deposits, based on the concept of mudharabah (profit-sharing). The Bank provides
financing facilities, such as working capital financing under murabahah (cost-plus),
house financing under bai' bithamcm ajil (deferred payment sale), leasing under
ijarah (leasing) and project financing under musyarakah (profit/loss-sharing).73
The Malaysian government decided to give B1MB a "running-in" period of ten
years to enable it to focus fully on the development of Islamic banking before
another Islamic bank was established.74 This ample period allowed BIMB to create as
many products as possible so as to provide Malaysians, particularly Muslims, with
adequate Islamic banking facilities and services. Among the long-term objectives of
BNM is the development of a comprehensive and vibrant Islamic banking system
operating alongside its conventional counterpart.
However, the BIMB could not meet all the needs of the population, for its
operations were constrained by the small number of branches and limited resources.
Furthermore, a single Islamic bank does not constitute a banking system, which
would require numerous dynamic and proactive participants, a wide range of pro-
72 Bank Negara Malaysia (1999), op. cit., p.243.
7j Bank Islam (M) Berhad (1984), op. cit., pp.22-24.
74 Bank Negara Malaysia (1999), op. cit., p.244.
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ducts and innovative instruments, and an active Islamic money market.75 To attain
these objectives, the Interest-Free Banking Scheme {Skim Perbankan Tanpa
Faedah)76 was launched as a pilot project in March 1993. The project allowed three
conventional banks to offer Islamic banking products and services, using their
existing infrastructure, including staff and branches. In July 1993, following specific
guidelines,77 the BNM expanded the scheme to the commercial banks, finance
companies and merchant banks. In 1994, after careful consideration, an Islamic
money market was established to link the institutions with the instruments, and thus
complete a comprehensive Islamic banking system in Malaysia. The financial disclo¬
sure (GP8) was introduced in 1996 to ensure the transparency of Islamic banking
operations, followed by the establishment of fully-fledged Islamic banking branches
(instead of Islamic banking "windows" offered by the conventional banks) and the
National Shari'a Advisory Council (NSAC).
The Malaysian government's gradual approach to Islamic banking has been in
marked contrast to the revolutionary attitude taken by Iran, Pakistan and Sudan.
Malaysia, with its multi-racial population and a particular historical background, has
75
Ibid., pp.244-245.
76 The term "Interest-Free Banking Scheme" has been replaced with "Islamic Banking
Scheme" (IBS) or Skim Perbankan Islam (SPI), for it did not indicate the Islamic basis of the
banks' operations.
77 Bank Negara Malaysia (1999), op. cit., p.245: Although the scheme was run on a
voluntary basis, the participants (conventional banks) had to abide by the requirements of the
scheme, such as establishing an Islamic Banking Unit (IBU) to be headed by a senior
Muslim banker, creating an Islamic Banking Fund (IBF) with a minimum allocation of RM1
million, opening separate current/clearing accounts for Islamic banking operations with
BNM, registering as Indirect Members under the wholesale payments system, SPEEDS
(now RENTAS) and observing a separate cheque clearing system for Islamic banking. The
bank is also required to maintain a separate general ledger for its Islamic banking operations
to ensure that the bank does not co-mingle the funds freely without proper internal controls.
The bank is also encouraged to appoint at least one Shari'a consultant to advise on the day-
to-day operations of its Islamic banking divisions.
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adopted a "dual banking" system to avoid offending any of its citizens. This system
has been accepted by both Muslims and non-Muslims. Non-Muslims do not appear
to object to it, provided that no one is forced to patronize the Islamic banks or the
IBS banks' counters.78 The introduction of Islamic banking alongside conventional
banking in capitalist economies, where an interest-based system persists, is one
approach to the successful Islamization of the economy.79 This approach is based on
the premise that under existing political, social and technical constraints, Islamiza¬
tion should be gradual so as to avoid any sudden changes that might cause serious
upset in the economy.80 It is hoped that over time, the Islamic banking model will
allow interest-based banking to be phased out without any adverse effects on the
economy.81 Instead of legislation prohibiting interest, an alternative system, such as
78
Haneef, op. cit., p.89. Tan Sri Nor Mohamed Yakcop says: "Bank Islam was an immediate
success when introduced. Many Muslims were just waiting and wanting to benefit from a
modern financial system and not get involved in interest, which was haram. The commercial
banks did not object because they knew the intention was good. They were supportive and
did not see a threat from Islamic banking because there was only one bank." See, Sidhu, op.
cit.
79
Man, op. cit., p.67.
80 Ibid. According to Tarek S. Zaher and M. Kabir Hassan, "A Comparative Literature
Survey of Islamic Finance and Banking", in Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments,
vol.10, no.4 (2000), pp. 170-172, "In Iran, the tight regulations put in place to conduct the
Islamic financial model have caused it to fail, since the drastic action taken by the
government to eliminate riba has led to a worsening of its informal relationship with external
financial communities....The Malaysian Islamic model incorporated Islamic banking into the
financial system and harmonized it with the Western practice because an Islamic system
should be recognized as a tool for effective financial practices."
81
Man, op. cit., p.67. However, Tan Sri Nor Mohamed Yakcop, who was at Bank Negara
and participated in establishing BIMB in 1983, says: "I chose a new model by creating a dual
system. Here we would have a parallel system that would be equally sophisticated and
comprehensive, and have equally good infrastructure to function side by side with the
conventional system." (Sidhu, op. cit). It is also been cited by Borhan (op. cit., pp. 197-198)
that Dr Halim Ismail, the first Managing Director ofBIMB, said that he did not believe in
universal Islamization; rather, he upheld the system of co-existence, which he believed to be
more suitable to multi-racial Malaysia. Borhan (ibid., p. 197) also quoted from Datuk
Mustapha Mohammad, the former Deputy Finance Minister, who stressed that the
conventional banking system was not going to be abolished or replaced totally with the
Islamic financial system .
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Islamic banking, should be introduced to compete freely with the interest-based
system. Thus, ideally, the interest-based system becomes redundant as a result of
customer preference rather than legal prohibition.82
3.3.4 Supervision and Regulation
In Malaysia, Islamic banks have to abide by two different sets of rules: those of the
Shari'a and those of positive law.83 However, this does not mean that there is a
specific set of Shari'a rules to regulate and control the operations of Islamic banks.
On the other hand, positive law is the legal framework implemented by the govern¬
ment of the country where the Islamic banks are established and it is normally
described as Western law. In the Muslim world, it has been used as a basis or guide¬
lines as a result of historical factors, since most of these countries were colonized by
Western powers. In the case of Malaysia, since the country was colonized by Britain,
its government adopted mainly English law.
In Malaysia, all Islamic banks are regulated by the BNM under a separate legal
framework, the Islamic Bank Act (IBA) 1983. The rules of the Banking and Finan¬
cial Institutions Act (BAFIA) 1989, by which other financial institutions are
governed, cannot be imposed on Islamic banks because some of its clauses are inap¬
plicable.84 It is clearly stated in Section 2 of the IBA that Islamic banking means
"banking business whose aims and operations do not include any element that is not
approved by the religion of Islam."85 Therefore, Islamic banks must conform to the
82 Muhammad Akram Khan, www.renaissance.com.pk/ianvipo2v2.html (accessed 7 April
2006).
83
Haron, op. cit., p.243.
84 Thani et al., op. cit., p.77.
85
Legal Research Board (ed.), Islamic Banking Act 1983 (Act 276) - as at 5"' January 2005
(Kuala Lumpur: International Law Book Services, 2005), p.6.
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Shari'a, which is why the IBA provides a separate set of rules to govern their opera¬
tions.
The IBA was modelled on the Banking Act 1973 with some modifications and
amendments.86 Companies, whether Islamic or non-Islamic, cannot conduct banking
business in Malaysia until they have been granted the necessary licence by the
Minister of Finance on the advice of BNM.87 However, there are certain additional
requirements, as stated in Section 3(5) of the IBA, which provides that an Islamic
banking licence will not be granted to an applicant unless the Minister is satisfied
that
1. the aims and operations of the banking business which it is desired to carry out
will not include any element that is not approved by the religion of Islam; and
2. there is, in the Articles of Association of the bank concerned, provision for the
establishment of a Shari'a advisory body to guide the bank on the operation of
its banking business, so that it does not include any element that is not ap¬
proved by the religion of Islam.
It is also stated in Section 3(5)(b) of the IBA that it is mandatory for an Islamic
bank to establish a Shari'a advisory body to supervise its operations.88 This require¬
ment is to ensure that the internal affairs and operations of the Islamic bank run
smoothly, without the risk of proposed activities conflicting with the Shari'a. There¬
fore, to remove any discrepancies and deal with questions concerning existing pro¬







established the National Shari'a Advisory Council (NSAC) or the Majlis Penasihat
Shariah Kebangsaan on 1 May 1997.89 The primary objectives of the NSAC are:
1. to act as the sole authoritative body to advise the BNM on Islamic banking and
takaful operations;
2. to co-ordinate Shari'a issues concerning Islamic banking and finance, including
takaful; and
3. to analyse and evaluate Shari'a aspects of new products/schemes submitted by
the banking institutions and takaful companies.90
In Section 13A(1) of the IBA 1983, it is clearly stated that an Islamic bank may seek
the advice of the Shari'a Advisory Council on Shari'a matters, and that the Islamic
bank shall comply with its advice. Hence, the Minister in charge can, under Section
11 (1 )(a), on the recommendation of the BNM, revoke any licence issued if any
Islamic bank is pursuing aims or performing operations that include any element not
approved by the religion of Islam.91
The above discussion shows that there are independent authorities with the
powers to supervise the Islamic banks and ensure their adherence to the principles of
the Shari'a. Meanwhile, the BAFIA defines the conventional commercial banks as
persons who conduct banking business. Section 2 of the BAFIA states: "Banking
business means the business of receiving deposits on current accounts, deposit
89 Bank Negara Malaysia (1999), op. cit., p.251. IBS (Islamic Banking Scheme) banks are
required to appoint at least a Shari'a consultant to assist the banks on any Shari'a operational
questions, as stipulated in the IBS guidelines. BNM has also allowed institutions in the
banking group (commercial banks, finance companies, merchant banks, discount houses) to
maintain a Shari'a consultant to minimize duplication of resources. Although this arrange¬
ment has its advantages, BNM has also noted that there some differences in opinion among
these consultants on similar questions, a situation that could impede the formation of a sound
and healthy Islamic banking system.
90 www.bnm.gov.mv. See also, Bank Negara Malaysia (1999), op. cit., p.251.
91
IBA, op. cit., p. 10.
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accounts, savings accounts or other similar accounts, paying or collecting cheques
drawn by or paid in by customers and the provision of finance."92 However, this
business is restricted by Section 32 of the BAFIA, which states that no licensed
institutions (including commercial banks) shall engage in wholesale or retail trade,
including import and export - whether on their own account or on a commission
basis, and whether alone or with others - except in connection with the realization of
security given to or held by it for the purpose of conducting its licensed business.9''
A similar provision to Section 32 of the BAFIA is not included in the Islamic
Banking Act. BIMB's Memorandum of Association contains a stipulation in Clause
4,94 giving BIMB wide powers to conduct trading and commercial activities. Clause
4(15) explicitly states that BIMB may conduct the business of buyers, sellers, impor¬
ters, exporters, manufacturers of, and dealers in motorcars, cabs, omnibuses, bi¬
cycles, sidecars, vans, trucks, lorries and other vehicles.95
Therefore, while engaging in banking, BIMB can also conduct other types of
business. The reason for this difference from conventional banking is that Islamic
banking is based on the principle of loss sharing. If the Islamic banks in Malaysia
were required to adhere to Section 32 of the BAFIA, which clearly prohibits trade
and business transactions within the banks, they would be prevented from making a
profit by venturing into these areas.
92 Thani et al., op. cit., p.81.
93 Ibid.
94 www.bankislam.com.niv. Clause 4 provides that "nothing in this Memorandum shall
empower the company to conduct any business or do anything that includes any element not
approved by the religion of Islam."
95 Thani et al., op. cit., p.81.
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Having been established under the Companies Act 1965, all Islamic banks in
Malaysia must comply with its regulations as well as with those of the Islamic
Banking Act 1983.96 Under the Companies Act 1965, Islamic banks, like other
companies, must adhere to certain rules governing, for example, the appointment of
directors and auditors, and notice of handling meetings. Should there be any conflict
or inconsistency between the IBA and the Companies Act, then the IBA will overrule
the Companies Act. Section 55 of the IBA clearly states:
An Islamic bank which is incorporated under the Companies Act 1965 shall be
subject to the provisions of that Act as well as to the provisions of this Act, save
that where there is any conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of that
Act and the provisions of this Act, the provisions of this Act shall prevail.97
Nevertheless, the most important element, with direct consequences for Islamic
banking in Malaysia, is the legal system itself. Malaysia has a dual system of civil
and Shari'a courts. Although Islamic banks are Islamic organizations, their business
transactions are under the control of the civil court. The Shari'a court has jurisdiction
only over those professing the religion of Islam and regarding matters covered by it,
such as marriage, divorce, guardianship, gifts, etc. However, the Shari'a court does
not have jurisdiction over cases relating to Islamic banking, for that is constituted
under federal law.98 At present, these cases are dealt with by the civil court. If there is
a conflict between an Islamic bank and its customer, the case will be heard in the
civil court, not the Shari'a court. Although there have been some cases in which the
validity of certain documents has been challenged in the civil court, yet none of these
96
IBA, op. cit., p.5.
97
IBA, op. cit., p.36.
98 Thani et al., op. cit., p.93 state that banking, money lending, pawnbrokers, control of
credit, bills of exchange, cheques, promissory notes and similar instruments are covered by
the Federal Constitution.
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challenges has been successful." Therefore, the provisions of the Shari'a covering
Islamic banking in Malaysia have been put forward as a critical question to be
addressed.
Among the objectives of the Financial Sector Master Plan on Islamic banking
takaful100 are that the industry will be based on a comprehensive and conducive
Shari'a and regulatory framework with the support of a Shari'a commercial court
dedicated to addressing legal questions in the judicial system. Shari'a governance
was markedly enhanced when the role and functions of the NSAC at BNM were
enlarged following the amendment in 2003 of the Central Bank of Malaysia Act
1958. Another important step was that the Malaysian judiciary and the Regional
Centre for Arbitration Kuala Lumpur would begin to use the NSAC as the reference
point when dealing with disputes over Shari'a matters concerning Islamic banking
and finance.101
The government has also announced the implementation of tax legislation that
will accord Islamic banks tax neutrality,102 in the hope of creating a fairer system of
tax liability for the Islamic banking industry.103 Before the amendments, Islamic
banks had to pay both zakat and income tax on their income.104 However, zakat is not




Bank Negara Malaysia (2001), op. cit., p. 150.





According to the tax neutrality framework, the Inland Revenue Board (IRB) will exempt
from additional stamp duty and tax those additional instruments and transactions executed to
fulfil Shari'a requirements.
104 For private individuals in Malaysia, zakat based on annual income is allowed to be
deducted for the computation of income tax on 100 per cent of aggregate income.
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tax liability.105 Therefore, certain parts of the revenue of Islamic banks were taxed
twice. Under the new amendments, zakat on business income paid to respective
Islamic religious authorities is allowed as a deduction for the computation of income
tax not exceeding 2.5 per cent of aggregate income.106 Although this is a small reduc¬
tion compared with the previous level, yet this development is encouraging and it is
another sign of the government's gradual approach.
3.3.5 Achievements of the Islamic Banking System in Malaysia
The Islamic banking system has made steady progress since the establishment of the
first Islamic bank in 1983. The government hopes that its development will continue
in parallel with conventional banking so as to achieve 20 per cent of total banking
assets by 2010.107 Table 3.2 compares the Islamic banking assets with those of con¬
ventional banking between 1994 and 2005.108
Table 3.2 Islamic banks vs conventional banks (RM billion)
Total Islamic Islamic
banking banking assets/total Islamic Islamic
Year assets assets assets (%) deposits financing
1994 326.00 4.89 1.50 2.26 1.74
1995 413.33 6.20 1.50 4.66 3.49
1996 533.16 10.13 1.90 7.26 6.00
1997 703.94 17.88 2.54 9.90 10.75
1998 628.49 21.18 J.J / 15.17 10.50
1999 664.34 36.14 5.44 24.80 13.75
2000 680.32 47.01 6.91 35.92 20.81
2001 721.14 59.35 8.23 47.11 28.32
2002 762.26 68.07 8.93 53.18 36.72
2003 847.42 82.20 9.70 60.21 48.66
2004 900.95 94.60 10.50 72.90 57.88
2005 989.38 111.80 11.30 83.90 67.36
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report (various issues 1994-2005)
105 Thani et al., op. cit., p.96.
106
Bank Negara Malaysia (2004), op. cit., p. 164.
107 Further reading in Bank Negara Malaysia (2001), op. cit., pp.146-164.
108 These data were gathered from 1994, since the IBS began operating in 1993.
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In 2005, the total assets of Islamic banking amounted to only 11.3 per cent of
the total assets of the whole banking system, whereas the total assets of conventional
banking amounted to RM877.58 billion. This situation indicates that there is still an
untapped market to be exploited and also raises the question of whether Islamic
banking can achieve the target of 20 per cent of the total assets of the whole banking
system by 2010.
Until October 2006, there were ten Islamic banks, eight commercial banks,
four merchant banks, five discount houses and five development financial institutions
offering Islamic banking services. These financial institutions are listed in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Financial institutions offering Islamic banking services
(as at 19 October 2006)
Islamic Banks A1 Rajhi Banking and Investment
Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad
Amlslamic Bank Berhad
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad
CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad
EONCAP Islamic Bank Berhad
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad
RHB Islamic Bank Berhad





HSBC Bank (M) Berhad
Malayan Banking Berhad
OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Berhad
Public Bank Berhad
Southern Bank Berhad
Standard Chartered Bank Berhad
Merchant Banks Affin Merchant Bank Berhad
Alliance Merchant Bank Berhad
AmMerchant Bank Berhad
Commerce International Merchant Bankers
(CIMB) Berhad
Discount Houses Abrar Discounts Berhad




Development Financial Institutions Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad
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Bank Simpanan Nasional
Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Berhad
Bank Pertanian Malaysia
Bank Perusahaan Kecil and Sederhana
Malaysia Berhad
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, http://www.bnm.gov.mv.
In Malaysia as at June 2006, there are 1,161 branches of Islamic banks and 909 IBS
counters in commercial banks channelling Islamic banking services to customers.
Table 3.4 shows that the number of IBS counters in commercial banks decreased
from 1,553 in 1998 to 1,307 by 2005 and 909 in June 2006, owing to the gradual
mergers in the banking sector.
Table 3.4a No. of financial institutions offering Islamic banking services
As at end
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006*
Islamic Banks 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 6 9
Commercial
Banks
25 23 21 14 14 13 13 11 8
Finance
Companies
18 16 14 10 10 7 3 1 0
Merchant
Banks
5 5 5 5 3 4 4 4 4
Discount
Houses
— 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6
Table 3.4b No. of branches/IBS counters offering Islamic banking services
As at end
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
A




























branches ->J 2 2 2 2 7 1 1 0
SPI counters 823 735 745 730 730 646 216 32 0
Merchant
Banks:
SPI counters 6 6 4 — 0 — — 9 9
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia www.bnm.gov.mv
Note: *Six months ended June 2006.
An encouraging sign is that the financial liberation of the Islamic banking sector
enabled three new Islamic banks from the Middle East to be established in Malaysia
during 2004.109 The three banks are licensed under the IBA.110 These additions to the
Malaysian Islamic banking system are helping to fulfil the government's vision of
Malaysia as the international centre of Islamic finance.1" The establishment of the
following organizations related to Islamic finance shows the strong support of the
Malaysian government:
1. Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB)
2. Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia (1ABIM)
3. Islamic Banking and Finance Institute Malaysia Sdn Bhd (IBFIM)
4. International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF)
109 Bank Negara Malaysia (2004), op. cit., p. 158.
110 The three leading foreign Islamic financial institutions from the Middle East are the
Kuwait Finance House, al-Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation (Saudi Arabia), and a
consortium of Islamic financial institutions represented by the Qatar Islamic Bank, RUSD
Investment Bank Inc. and Global Investment House.
111 It is stated in the Bank Negara Malaysia (2004), op. cit., p. 165 that it is hoped that the
entry of the new players into the market will (1) bring their distinctive capabilities and
strengths to the Islamic banking industry not only in Malaysia but also to the region; (2)
promote healthy competition, necessary for the development of the industry to new levels of
vitality; (3) accelerate the global integration of the domestic Islamic banking system; (4)
promote greater economic and financial links between Malaysia and the Middle East owing
to the exchange of knowledge and expertise; (5) foster greater harmonization in the
interpretation and understanding of the Shari'a; and (6) facilitate greater international trade
and investment flows.
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3.4 Islamic Banking Products and Services in Malaysia
All Islamic banks perform the typical functions of financial intermediation by screen¬
ing profitable projects and monitoring their performance on behalf of the investors
who deposit their funds with these institutions. Hence, two theoretical models"2 have
been suggested for the structure of an Islamic Financial Institution (IFI): one is based
on mudaraba and is referred to as "two-tier mudaraba, and the other is known as the
"two-windows" model.113
The "two-tier mudarabcT uses a concept whereby both fund mobilization and
fund utilization work on the same basis of profit sharing by the investor (depositor),
the bank as intermediary, and the entrepreneur. The first tier of this type of contract
is between the investor and the bank. The bank, as mudarib, will accept funds from
investors on their behalf, and the investors will share the profits (if any) earned by
the bank from their investments. In other words, funds are placed with the bank in
investment accounts as profit-sharing investment deposits, and the bank has no lia¬
bilities to these funds. The capital is not guaranteed, for if the bank declares losses,
these will also be borne by the investors. As an addition to this model, the bank can
also accept investments as demand deposits, which are treated as liabilities although
they yield no return and are payable on demand at par value or face value. The
second tier represents the mudaraba contract between the bank as the supplier of
funds and the entrepreneur as the mudarib. The same principles apply to this con-
112 These two theoretical models are analysed briefly in Chapter 4.
113 Dahlia el-Hawary, A. Wafik Grais and Zamir Iqbal, "Regulating Islamic Financial
Institutions: The Nature of the Regulated". Paper presented at the International Conference
on Islamic Banking: Risk Management, Regulation and Supervision. Jakarta, 30 September
- 2 October 2003.
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tract, for entrepreneurs who are seeking funds will share with the bank whatever
profits they make, according to a certain percentage stipulated in the contract.
The "two-windows" model differs from the "two-tier" model in that it is a
combination of commercial banking and investment companies in the conventional
system. In this model, bank liabilities are divided into two "windows": one for
demand deposits and the other for investment deposits. Since demand deposits are
strictly liabilities to the bank, this model requires that the bank hold a 100 per cent
reserve to guarantee them. However, for investment deposits, there is a zero per cent
reserve, since they are not strictly liabilities and are used by the bank to finance risk-
bearing investment projects. On the assets side, the bank will invest in short-term,114
medium-term and longer-term maturity investments. Therefore, this model is the
one-tier mudaraba with multiple investment tools. It has opted for fixed-income
modes of financing such as murabaha (mark-up sales), al-bay' hi thaman ajil
(deferred payment) and so on.
Section 3.3 has described how the Malaysian government has adopted a sys¬
tematic approach to the development of Islamic banking by acknowledging the right
of Muslim citizens to be provided with banking services consistent with their faith
values. Islamic banking has grown steadily in Malaysia, which is considered a
Muslim country that has successfully promoted this system on a par with its conven¬
tional counterpart. Nevertheless, some local products are not accepted globally
114 In a short-term maturity investment, a bank can provide short-term funds to its clients to
meet their working capital needs if the funds are backed by real assets to minimize the risk to
the bank. The banks, with their skills and market knowledge, also provide financing trade
activities with asset-backed securities that resemble debt securities in terms of pay-offs.
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owing to objections from scholars of other countries, who doubt that the system
complies fully with the principles of the Shari'a."5
The next section reviews briefly the model adopted in the Islamic banking
system in Malaysia and the critiques of some of its products, as well as the range of
products and services offered by the Islamic banks and the Shari'a principles
observed by them.
3.4.1 The Islamic Banking Model in Malaysia
In Malaysia, the Islamic commercial banks follow the "two-windows" model. In
section 3.3, it is stated that all the Islamic banks and conventional banks in Malaysia
have followed the model of the first Islamic bank in Malaysia, namely, the Bank
Islam Malaysia (BIMB). BIMB applies the principles laid down by its founder, Dato
Dr Abdul Halim Ismail, who adapted the model of commercial banking to Islamic
banks. This decision was probably influenced by the large non-Muslim population,
which does not view banks as instruments of social engineering116 as well as by
several other factors that have been discussed in detail in section 3.3.
Abdul Halim Ismail, who was the first Managing Director of BIMB, viewed
Islamic banks as commercial entities that had a responsibility to transact business in
a manner consistent with the Shari'a .ll7 In his model, the banks' main responsibility
is to shareholders and depositors, while social welfare objectives are to be fulfilled
115 Halim Wahab, "The Debate Continues", Malaysian Business (16 May 2004), pp.38-39.
116 Elsa Satkunasingam and Bala Shanmugam, "Disclosure and Governance of Islamic
Banks: A Case Study of Malaysia", Journal ofInternational Banking Regulation, vol.6, no.l
(2004), pp.69-81. Here, the authors are referring to Chapra's model, which sees Islamic
banking as having a socio-economic purpose.
117 Abdul Halim Ismail, "Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad: Principles and Operations", in An
Introduction to Islamic Finance, ed. Shaikh Ghazali Sheikh Abod, Syed Omar Syed Agil and
Aidit Hj. Ghazali (Kuala Lumpur: Quill Publishers, 1992a), pp.243-83.
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by other bodies, such as the government. This model provides an Islamic economic
system consisting of three sectors: siyasi (government), ijtimai (welfare) and tijari
(commercial). Siyasi deals with public finance and central banking, ijtimai is
responsible for the administration of taxes, and tijari covers all private sector com¬
mercial activities. There are several different types of institutions in each of these
sectors, all functioning according to the general Shari'a principles, though with a
particular application to the operation undertaken.
The Islamic financial system comprises institutions from each of the three
sectors. Within this framework, the Islamic commercial banks clearly belong to the
tijari of the commercial sector and therefore their responsibilities are limited to
commercial activities. They are not required to ensure an equitable distribution of
income, which is the task of public finance and therefore the concern of the siyasi,
the government sector. Similarly, the commercial banks are not responsible for the
collection of taxes and distribution of the funds thus accumulated, for that function is
performed by the various ijtimai institutions. The Islamic banking models that have
been implemented in Malaysia are those of commercial institutions, with their
fundamental responsibilities to shareholders and depositors. Their obligations to
society are served by their self-interest as well as the distribution of profit and zakat.
Abdul Halim's framework is different from earlier models, like that of Chapra,
which sees Islamic banks not only abolishing riba in their transactions, but also
having a socio-economic purpose, thus making them significantly different from
conventional interest-based banks.118 Islamic banks should actively promote Islam
118 M. Umer Chapra, Towards a JustMonetary System (Leicester, UK: The Islamic
Foundation, 1985), pp. 154-155.
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and protect the needs of the society as a whole, instead of just playing a profit-
maximizing role. This model also regards Islamic banks as universal or multi¬
purpose, rather than purely commercial institutions. In short, it can be concluded that
the main aim of Chapra's model is the allocation of social welfare responsibilities
and religious requirements to all levels of the financial system, ranging from the
central bank to private commercial banks and the deposit insurance and audit
corporations. This communal role clearly adds an extra dimension to the objective
function of the Islamic financial agent.
The Malaysian system also allows the trading of receivables based on true
trade transaction as opposed to the lending of money. However, this practice raises
the question of whether certain instruments offered in the country are Islamic, for it
contradicts the view widely held in the Arabian Peninsula and South Asia. Indeed,
Abdul Halim believes that in its opposition to interest-based loans, the Qur'an refers
to universal debt instruments based on trade, including sales and leasing."9 Adam
and Thomas state their argument as follows:
Although the fundamental argument that debt-like behaviour, leasing for
instance, is permitted, the idea that a stream of payments alone is eligible for
trading is rejected on the ground that in the case of sale with deferred payment,
buying the receivables at a variable price is the same as buying or selling cash
alone and this is analogous to behaviour that was forbidden in the hadith as
ribawi.no
The argument in the Arabian Peninsula and South Asia is expressed by Mufti
Taqi Usmani as follows:
119 NathifAdam and Abdulkader Thomas, Islamic Bonds: Your Guide to Issuing, Structuring
and Investing in Sukuk (London: Euromoney Books, 2004), p.48. See also, Abdul Halim
Ismail, "The Deferred Contracts of Exchange in al-Qur'an", in Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad:
Principles and Operations, ed. Sheikh Ghazali Sheikh Abod, Syed Omar Syed Agil and
Aidit Hj. Ghazali (Kuala Lumpur: Quill Publishers, 1992b), pp.284-313.
120 Ibid.
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Some scholars argue that the permissibility of sale of debt (bai' al-dairi) is
restricted to a case where the debt is created through a sale of commodity. In
this case, they say, the debt represents the sold commodity as its sale may be
taken as a sale of the commodity. The arguments, however, are devoid of force.
For once the commodity is sold, its ownership is passed on to the purchaser and
it is no longer the commodity of the seller. What the seller owns is nothing
more than money, therefore if he sells the debt, it is no more than a sale of
money and it cannot be termed by any stretch of the imagination to be a sale of
commodity. That is why this view has not been accepted by the overwhelming
majority of the contemporary scholars. The Islamic Fiqh Academy of Jeddah,
which is the largest representative body of the Shar'ia scholars and has the
representation of all the Muslim countries, including Malaysia, has approved
the prohibition of bai' al-dain unanimously without a single dissent.121
As has been emphasized by Mufti Usmani, the traditional Muslim jurists
(fuqaha) are unanimous on the point that the sale of a debt is not allowed in the
Shari'a.122 However, Shafi'i scholars in Malaysia permit debt trading from sales
receivables, whereas this practice is not permitted by Shafi'i scholars elsewhere.12j
Mufti Usmani also points out that although the Shafi'i scholars in Malaysia normally
refer to the ruling of the Shafi'i school, wherein it is held that the sale of a debt is
allowed, they ignore the fact that the Shafi'i jurists have allowed it only where a debt
is sold at its par value.124
3.4.2 Shari'a Principles, Islamic Banking Products and Services in
Malaysia
This section reviews the Shariah principles used in the Islamic banking system in
Malaysia. They can be divided into five broad categories: (1) profit/loss sharing; (2)
sales and purchase; (3) fee or charge-based; (4) free services; and (5) ancillary.
121 Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance (New Delhi: Idara
Isha'at-e-Diniyat, 1999), pp.217-218. See also, Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani, Principles






There are various terms used by Islamic banks all over the world to describe
the Shari'a principles applied to the products and services offered by their organiza¬
tions. Some banks use only the Arabic language for these terms, some use Arabic for
certain terms and the vernacular for others, and some use only the local language for
all the terms. Malaysia is the only country where Arabic is used to describe all the
Shari'a principles governing its Islamic banking operations.125
3.4.2.1 Application of Shari'a Principles to the Islamic Banking System in
Malaysia126
The Shari'a principles used by the Islamic banks in Malaysia are as follows:127
1. Wadiah yad dhamanah (savings with guarantee) refers to goods or deposits left
for safekeeping with another person who is not the owner. Since wadiah is a
trust, the depository becomes a guarantor and therefore guarantees repayment
on demand of the whole amount or the deposit, or any part thereof, outstanding
in the account of the depositors. The depositors are not entitled to any share of
the profits although the depository may provide returns to the depositors as a
token of appreciation.
2. Mudharabah (profit-sharing) refers to an agreement between a capital provider
and another party (entrepreneur) to enable the entrepreneur to carry out busi¬
ness projects on a profit-sharing basis at a previously agreed ratio. Any losses
incurred are borne by the provider of the funds.
Haron, op. cit., p. 172.
126 The spelling of the Arabic terms in sections 3.4.2.1 ,3.4.2.2 , 3.5 and Chapter 5, is that
used by BNM and is therefore different from that used in the rest of the thesis.
127 Bank Negara Malaysia, Islamic Banking Concepts and Range ofIslamic Banking
Products and Services in Malaysia, www.bnm.gov.mv (cited 24 February 2007).
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3. Musyarakah (joint venture) refers to a partnership or joint venture for a specific
business, whereby the distribution of profits is apportioned according to an
agreed ratio. Any losses incurred are shared by both parties, based on their
equity participation.
4. Murabahah (cost plus) refers to the sale of goods at a price that includes a
profit margin agreed by both parties. This type of sale contract is valid on
condition that the price, other costs and the profit margin of the seller are stated
at the time of the sale agreement.
5. Bai' bithaman ajil (deferred payment sale) refers to the sale of goods on a
deferred payment basis at a price that includes a profit margin as agreed by
both parties.
6. Bai' dayn (debt trading) refers to debt financing, that is, the provision of finan¬
cial resources required for production, commerce and services by way of
sale/purchase of trade documents and papers. Only documents evidencing real
debts arising from bonafide merchant transactions can be traded.
7. Bai' inah refers to the contract of sale by the financier to the customer. The
financier sells an asset to the customer on a deferred payment and then imme¬
diately repurchases the asset for cash at a discount.
8. Al-ijarah thumma al-bai' refers to an ijarah (leasing/renting) contract, fol¬
lowed by a bai' (purchase) contract. Under the first contract, the hirer leases
the goods from the owner at an agreed rental over a specific period. Upon
expiry of the leasing period, the hirer enters into a second contract to purchase
the goods from the owner at an agreed price.
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9. Ijarah (leasing) refers to an agreement by which a lessor leases equipment, a
building or other facilities to a client at an agreed rental against a fixed charge
as agreed by both parties.
10. Qard hasan (benevolent loan) refers to non profit loan. The borrower is
required to repay only the principle borrowed, although he/she can pay an extra
amount, at his/her absolute discretion, as a token of appreciation.
11. Bai' al-salam (future delivery) refers to an agreement whereby payment is
made in advance for the future delivery of specified goods.
12. Bai' al-istijrar (supply contract) refers to an agreement between the client and
the supplier, whereby the supplier agrees to supply a particular product on a
continuing basis at an agreed price and according to an agreed mode of
payment.
13. Kafalah (guarantee) refers to a contract of guarantee by the contracting party or
any third party to guarantee the performance of the contract terms by the
contracting parties.
14. Rahn (collateralized borrowing) refers to an arrangement whereby an asset is
placed as collateral for debt. The collateral may be disposed of in the event of
default.
15. Wakalah (nomination of a representative/agent) refers to a situation where one
person nominates another person to act on his/her behalf.
16. Hiwalah (remittance) refers to a transfer of funds/a debt from the
depositor's/debtor's account to the receiver's/creditor's account, and a com¬
mission may be charged for this service.
17. Sarf (foreign exchange) refers to the buying and selling of foreign currencies.
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18. Ujr (fee) refers to a commission or fees charged for services.
19. Hibah (gift) refers to a gift awarded voluntarily in return for a loan.
3.4.2.2. Islamic Banking Products and Services Available in Malaysia
Tables 3.5(a) to 3.5(f) list some of the range of Islamic banking products and
services in Malaysia, consisting of deposits, financing, treasury/money market
investments, trade financing, card services and banking services.
Table 3.5(a) Deposit and Investment
Products/Services Applicable Concepts
Current account Wadiah yad dhamanah /mudharabah
Savings account Wadiah yad dhamanah /mudharabah
General investment account Mudharabah
Special investment account Mudharabah
Other deposits Murabahah/ tawarruq





Block discounting Bai' dayn
Bridging finance Istisna '/bai' bithaman ajil
Bungalow lots financing Bai' bithaman ajil
Cash line facility Bai' 'inah/bai' bithaman ajil
Club membership financing Bai' bithaman ajil
Computer financing Bai' bithaman ajil
Contract financing Bai' bithaman ajil/istisna'/musyarakah/mudharabah
Education financing Murabahah/ bai' bithaman ajil/bai' 'inah
Equipment financing Bai' bithaman ajil
Factoring facility Bai' dayn
Fixed asset financing Bai' bithaman ajil
Floor-stocking financing Murabahah/bai' bithaman ajil
Hire purchase agency Wakalah
Home/house financing Bai' bithaman ajil/istisna '/variable rate bai' bithaman
ajil
Industrial hire purchase Ijarah
Land financing Bai' bithaman ajil
Leasing Ijarah
Pawn broking Rahnu (qard and wadiah yad dhamanah)/ Rahnu
(qard)
Personal financing Bai' bithaman ajil/murabahah/bai' 'inah
Plant and machinery financing Bai' bithaman ajil/istisna'/ ijarah
Project financing Bai' bithaman ajil/istisna '/ijarah
Property financing Bai' bithaman ajil/istisna /variable rate ijarah
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Revolving credit facility Bai' bithaman ajil/murabahah/hiwalah/bai' 'inah
Share financing Bai' bithaman ajil/bai' 'inah
Shop house financing Bai' bithaman ajil/istisna '/variable rate bai' bithaman
ajil
Sundry financing Bai' bithaman ajil
Syndicated financing Istisna '/bai' bithaman ajil/ijarah thumma al-bai'
Term financing Bai' bithaman ajil/ variable rate bai' bithaman ajil
Tour financing Bai' bithaman ajil
Umrah and visitation financing Bai' bithaman ajil
Vehicle/automobile financing-i Ijarah/bai' bithaman ajil/murabahah




Accepted bills Murabahah/ bai' dayn
Bank guarantee Kafalah
Bills of exchange Wakalah
Export credit refinancing Murabahah




Table 3.5(d) Trade financing
Products/Services Applicable Concepts
Accepted bills Murabahah/ bai' dayn
Bank guarantees Kafalah
Bills of exchange Wakalah
Export credit financing Murabahah/ bai' dayn
Letters of credit Wakalah/murabahah/ijarah/bai' bithaman ajil
Shipping guarantees Kafalah
Trust receipts Wakalah/murabahah
Table 3.5(e) Card services
Products/Services Applicable Concepts
Charge card Qard
Credit card Bay' 'inah/bai' bithaman ajil
Debit card Ujr
Table 3.5(f) Banking services
Products/Services Applicable Concepts









3.5 Implementation of Profit/ Loss-Sharing Modes of
Financing by the Malaysian Islamic Banking System
As mentioned in section 3.4, although the development of products and services in
the Islamic banking system in Malaysia is very encouraging, those products in
financing activities under the profit/loss-sharing principles are almost non-existent.
On the other hand, Islamic banking assets (financing activities) are concentrated in
certain contracts such as al-bai' bithaman ajil, al-murabahah and al-ijarah. One of
the factors contributing to the low occurrence of financing activities in profit/loss
sharing is the theoretical model that they follow. Although the Islamic banking
system is often described as consisting of profit/loss-sharing financial institutions,
and the concept of profit/loss sharing has dominated the theoretical literature,128 the
allocation of most Islamic funds is confined to short-term and low-risk investments
with a slim profit margin. Islamic banks prefer to operate according to principles
within the fee-based category owing to its simplicity, lower risk and predetermined
fixed rate of return.129 However, it is believed that the use of these facilities opens a
back door to interest.130
During the early years of their establishment, the concentration by the Malay¬
sian Islamic banks, particularly Bank Islam Malaysia, on low-risk financing could be
interpreted as their awareness of the fierce competition from conventional banks,
which are more stable. However, continuing this type of financing at the same level
128
Humayon Dar and John R. Presley, "Lack of Profit and Loss Sharing in Islamic Banking:
Management and Control Imbalances", International Journal ofIslamic Financial Services,
vol.2, no.2 (2003), pp.3—18.
129 Sudin Haron andNorafifah Ahmad, "Islamic Financial System: Issues Reexamined".
Paper presented at the Muzakarah Pakar: Ke arah 20% Pasaran Perbankan Menjelang 2010:




would not be advisable in the long term.13' This circumstance raises the question of
whether the essence of risking-taking and value addition, which are indispensable
social imperatives and hence Islamicity, seems to have been lost.132 This situation is
not confined to Malaysia. Indeed, nearly all Islamic banks, investment companies
and investment funds offer trade and project finance based on a mark-up,
commissioned manufacturing or leasing.133 In 1998, the Dubai Islamic Bank
allocated only 10 per cent of its total funds to profit/loss sharing, and the Jordan
Islamic Bank and the Qatar Islamic Bank 3 and 4 per cent respectively. Even the
specialized Islamic firms, like the mudaraba companies (MCos) in Pakistan, which
are supposed to function purely on a profit/loss-sharing basis, invest only a negligible
proportion of their funds in the mudaraba and musharaka systems.134 According to
the International Association of Islamic Banks (IAIB), profit/loss sharing comprised
less that 20 per cent of investments made by Islamic banks worldwide (1996 figures).
Similarly, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) has so far not used profit and loss
sharing in its financial businesses, apart from a few small projects.135
It has been suggested that the Malaysian Islamic banks should diversify as a
matter of urgency by promoting ethical banking via arrangements such as the trustee
partnership (mudharabah) and the joint venture (musyarakah).1,6 It is believed that in
this way, Islamic banking can generate the much-needed economies of scale and
131 Saiful Azhar Rosly and Mohd Affandi Abu Bakar, "Performance of Islamic and
Mainstream Banks in Malaysia", Journal ofSocial Economics, vol.30, no. 12 (2003),
pp. 1249-1265.
132 Ibid.




Rosly and Bakar, op.cit., pp. 1249-1265.
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scope to increase profitability in addition to having a positive influence on the well-
being of society.137 In addition, Islamic banks are not only intermediaries and trustees
of other people's money but also incorporate both profit and morality into their
objectives; they share profits and losses with their depositors, thereby giving their
depositors some ownership rights.1'8
In the next section, the financing activities according to contract in the
Malaysian banking system are reviewed. Since Bank Islam (M) Berhad was the first
Islamic bank in Malaysia, it is important to understand its direction of financing and
the implementation of profit/loss-sharing in its financing activities.
3.5.1 Financing Activities in the Malaysian Islamic Banking System
Table 3.6 shows that al-bai' bithaman ajil is the contract that has dominated
financing activities in Malaysia. In 2005, financing based on these principles
constituted 40.7 per cent of the financing of RM9.5 billion,139 though it was a lower
percentage than that of the previous four years (2001-2004). This type of financing
contract was followed by ijarah and murabahah. In contrast, financing based on the
musyarakah and mudharabah contracts was small or non-existent, being only 0.5 per
cent in 2004 and decreasing to 0.3 per cent in 2005.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report (2005), pp. 166-167,
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Table 3.6 Islamic financing activities in the Malaysian Islamic banking system
according to contracts
Contracts
Per cent as at end
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Al-bai' bithaman ajil 48.3 49.1 47.7 49.9 40.7
Al-ijarah thumma al-bai' 22.2 23.3 27.6 — -
Al-murabahah 7.0 7.3 6.2 7.0 6.9
Al-musyarakah 1.4 0.7 0.5 OLo * 0.3*
Al-istisna' 0.9 1.3 0.6 1.2 0.9
Al-ijarah 4.3 3.0 1.4 24.0 31.6
Other principles 15.9 15.3 16.0 17.4 19.6
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report (various issues 2001-2005).
Note: *This figure consists of products under musyarakah and mudharabah principles.
An analysis of the direction of financing according to the sector (Table 3.7)
between 1995 and 1999 found that Islamic banking activities were dominated by the
broad property sector consisting of real estate and construction. However, the trend
changed between 2000 and 2005, when it was pushed into second place by consump¬
tion credit. This consisted of financing for personal users, namely, credit cards, and
the purchase of consumer durables and passenger cars, the last item being the largest
in this sector.
140 Bank Negara Malaysia began to classify the Islamic financing activities according to
contract (as a percentage of total financing) only in 2001.
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Table 3.7 Islamic banking system: Direction of financing (RM million)
Sector
Year
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Agriculture 40 153 194 172 491
Manufacturing 757 924 1,283 1,298 1,252
Mining and quarrying 3 5 73 69 74
Electricity 62 89 99
o ->
J J 221
General commerce 179 329 524 628 627
Real estate, construction and housing 1,032 2,101 4,317 4,561 2,132
Transport and storage 73 259 720 720 990
Financial, insurance and business services 289 536 306 457 901
Purchase of stocks and shares 605 503 1,128 853 745
Consumption credit 168 508 633 947 878
Others 284 737 1,475 1,205 1,855
TOTAL 3,492 6,144 10,752 10,943 14,007
Sector Year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and
fishing
1,578 1,640 1,594 1,862 2,329 2,369
Manufacturing 2,044 3,073 3,881 4,387 6,113 7,520
Mining and quarrying 79 64 75 64 77 105
Electricity, gas and water supply 856 544 534 249 719 419
Wholesale and retail trade, 855 1,135 1,386 1,797 3,071 3,388
restaurants and hotels
Real estate, construction and housing 7,506 10,783 15,736 20,483 22,451 22,923
Transport, storage and 788 763 825 1,024 1,177 1,287
communication
Financial, insurance and business 596 1,230 1,272 1,933 2,090 1,999
services
Purchase of securities 705 873 935 921 878 920
Consumption credit 4,043 6,813 9,287 14,872 17,803 24,376
Community, social and personal
services and purchase of transport
vehicles
293 353 214 303 419 635
Others 1,550 932 980 721 757 716
TOTAL 20,899 28,203 36,719 48,616 57,884 66,658
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report (various issues 1995-2005).
141 Bank Negara Malaysia began to classify Islamic financing activities by sector in 1995.
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3.5.2 BIMB: Implementation of Profit/Loss-Sharing Principles in
Financing Activities
As has already been discussed in section 3.4, the model followed by Bank Islam
Malaysia (BIMB) is that of the "two windows". On the Bank's liability side, the
customers' deposits are accepted for current accounts, savings accounts, investment
accounts and other deposits. On the financing side, the schemes could take two
forms: equity financing (profit/loss-sharing modes of financing) and debt financing
(non-profit/loss-sharing modes of financing).142 The instruments available in the
category of debt financing include al-bai' bithaman ajil, murabahah and ijarah.
These are financing schemes that generate profits within the short term and are based
on a contract of exchanging goods and services for money. Under equity financing,
the instruments available are musyarakah and mudharabah.
Table 3.8 shows that the percentage of the financing activities under
musyarakah and mudharabah of the total financing of BIMB were low compared
with other types of financing contract such as al-bai' bithaman ajil. For example,
according to the table, the financing contract under al-bai' bithaman ajil dominated
the financing activities ofBIMB. It could be said that from Table 3.8, after more than
twenty years of operation, BIMB has not shown much interest in offering the profit-
sharing modes of financing. For example, musyarakah financing constitutes only
about 0.48 per cent of total financing in 2005 compared with 0.02 per cent in 1988,
142 For details, see Ismail (1992a), op. cit., pp.256-274; see also, Wan Ismail Wan Jusoh,
"Islamic Financial Instruments: The Case ofMalaysia", in Islamic Financial Instruments for
Public Sector Resource Mobilization, ed. Ausaf Ahmad and Tariqullah Khan (Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia: Islamic Research and Training Institute, Islamic Development Bank, 1997), pp.327-
349.
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an increase of just 0.46 per cent of their total financing. Mudharabah financing,

































































































































In the direction of financing, BIMB also records a similar trend. It is clear that
the broad property sector, consisting of real estate, construction and housing, domi¬
nated its financing facilities. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 indicate that the funds deposited by
customers have been used to finance activities in sectors that are considered less
risky, for under such contracts the price is predetermined and they generate a quick
return. The tables also show that, to a lesser extent, funds are also directed to the
productive sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing.
Table 3.9 Bank Islam Malaysia: Direction of financing (RM million)
Sector
Year
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Agriculture, mining and
quarrying
41 49 157 155 188 194 394 257
Manufacturing 484 601 536 475 672 638 902 1.052
General commerce 148 123 147 334 300 136 84 220
Real estate, construction
and housing
457 806 1,012 1,629 1,783 1,959 2,119 2,713
Financial, insurance and
business services
41 62 42 35 84 112 85 167
Consumption credit 43 99 118 129 192 234 493 344
Others 281 306
L 510 340 354 888 1,375 1,392




Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 248 171 267
Manufacturing 1,008 1,005 1,447
Mining and quarrying 29 14 14
Electricity, gas and water supplies 343 133 301
Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels 259 273 401
Real estate, construction and housing 3,526 4,164 4,538
Transport, storage and communication 94 122 173
Financial, insurance and business services 237 208 186
Purchase of securities 159 182 579
Consumption credit 572 606 932
Community, social and personal services and purchase of
transport vehicles
627 988 1,384
Others 187 118 130
TOTAL 7,194 7,985 10,351
Source: Bank Islam (M) Berhad, Annual Report (various issues 1995-2005).
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The concentration on the financing of the non-productive sector does not
appear to contribute much to the economic development of the country. B1MB has
clearly stated that its corporate mission is "to seek to operate as a commercial bank
functioning on the basis of Islamic principles", which would not be included towards
trade-related equity participation. However, its concentration on non-profit/loss-
sharing modes of financing raises the question of whether its operations and those of
the Islamic banks in general are totally Islamic or whether the name is used as a
"mask" placed on a conventional bank to attract funds from Muslim investors.
It is stated that there are a number of reasons for the reluctance of the modern
Islamic financial system to use equity financing: (1) high risk; (2) moral hazard; (3)
the banks' lack of suitably qualified staff with the management skills to undertake
this task; (4) the fact that most Islamic banks are very new and cannot afford to
undertake equity financing until they are more securely established; and (5) structural
and other regulatory issues.143 Therefore, risk and its management, particularly in the
profit-sharing modes of financing in the Islamic banking system are discussed in
detail in Chapter 4.
143 Mohd Daud Bakar, "Contracts in Islamic Commercial and Their Application in Modern




4 The Concept of Risk
Islamic Banking vs Conventional Banking
4.1 An Overview
Chapter 3 consisted of a brief look at the global development of Islamic banking and
a more detailed scrutiny of the system of profit/loss sharing in Malaysia. The global
implementation of this system appears to be very low or even non-existent.1 One of
the main reasons for this situation is the high risk associated with this system.
Theoretically, only investment deposits should be accepted as a bank's liabili¬
ties, these funds being channelled via profit/loss-sharing contracts to the bank's
assets side - the entrepreneurs. Any shock to the bank's assets would be absorbed by
the risk-sharing nature of the investment deposits. It is believed that the Islamic
system is a more stable alternative to that operated by the conventional banks.2
Thus, before proceeding to the discussion of risk management in the Islamic
banking system in Malaysia in Chapter 5, it is vital to understand the differences in
the concept of risk from both the Islamic and modern perspectives. This chapter also
analyses how risk is managed in Islamic banks compared with conventional banks.
1
For example, Muhammad Anwar, "Islamicity of Banking and Modes of Islamic Banking",
Arab Law Quarterly, vol.18, no.l (February, 2003), p.62, notes that Islamic scholars have
used a technique similar to that applied to conventional banks to measure the performance of
Islamic banks. This situation confirms that globally, Islamic and conventional banks are
competitors in the same business, for both are taking deposits and extending credit to
customers, despite the fact that the correct application of Islamic modes would have
distinguished the Islamic banks from their conventional counterparts. Fie further argues that
the Islamic banks, which were supposed to become entrepreneurs, do not engage in trading
activities because they are not interested in doing so. Instead, they prefer to loan money to
the entrepreneurs, as do the interest-based banks.
2
See, further discussion in section 4.5.3.
4.2 The Concept of Risk
Since ancient times, risk has been a familiar concept to humankind. People generally
prefer certainty and security in their lives to the risk of uncertainty and insecurity.
Nevertheless, the entirely rational person knows that even if all the necessary
precautions have been taken, a certain amount of risk is unavoidable. Wharton
contends that neither man nor organizations can survive without taking risks, for risk
encompasses all human activity.3 He maintains:
At one level, every decision or action carries some risk of a loss of face, status,
money, health or liberty, whilst at another level, man is threatened by infec¬
tions, diseases, fatal accidents, economic disaster, political upheaval, famines
and the effects of environmental degradation.4
Humans, by their nature, are prone to taking various levels of risk, which is
why some people are called risk takers and others risk averters.5 However, most
rational beings (and certainly those abiding by Islam) prefer risk aversion, and when¬
ever a risk is taken, a price or compensation is always expected.6 In other words,
there is the risk that is unavoidable because it is part of life and there is the risk that
stimulates productivity. It should be noted that Islam is unique in its principle of
tawakkul, that is, the concept of reliance on God after all the necessary precautions
have been taken. This topic is discussed further in section 4.4.
3 Frank Wharton, "Risk Management: Basic Concepts and General Principles", in Jake
Ansell and Frank Wharton (eds), Risk Analysis, Assessment andManagement (Chichester,
UK: John Wiley, 1992), p.3.
4 Ibid.
5
Monzer Kahf, "Comments on Decision Making under Uncertainty", in Islamic Banking
and Finance: New Perspectives on Profit Sharing and Risk, ed. Munawar Iqbal and David T.
Llewellyn (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2001), p.34.
6 Ibid.
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4.2.1 Definitions of Risk
An early definition of risk, given by the Encyclopaedia Britannica, is "hazard,
chance of danger or loss, especially the chance of loss to property or goods."7 The
term (French: risque [noun], risquer [verb]; Italian: risco "danger" [noun]; Spanish:
riesgo [noun]) is derived from the Latin verb resecare, to cut back, shut off. It was
originally a sailor's term, referring to the Spanish noun risco, a steep rock; hence, the
Spanish verb arriesgar, to run into danger, meaning literally "to go against a rock".8
The term indicates the possibility of a sailor's having his ship wrecked by hitting a
rock and can be best described as the danger of loss. Another definition of risk in the
English lexicon given by the Oxford Advanced Learners' Dictionary is the possi¬
bility of something bad happening sometime in the future, or a situation that could
become dangerous or have a bad result. In other words, risk is always associated with
uncertainty, so if something is certain, then there is no risk.9
It is stated in some literature, however, that the word "risk" has come into the
English language either from the Arabic word risq or the Latin word risicum.10 This
unique opinion argues that it is a Greek derivative of the Arabic risq, which means
"anything that has been given to you [by God] and from which you draw profit and
has connotations of a fortuitous and favourable outcome." It appears to relate to
7




Sami al-Suwailem in "Towards an Objective Measure of Gharar in Exchange", Islamic
Economic Studies, nos.l and 2 (2000), p.64, states that economists usually differentiate
between the terms "risk" and "uncertainty". He quotes Knight (1921), who asserts that risk
describes situations in which probabilities of different events can be "objectively" measured.
Uncertainty describes situations where this measurement is not feasible. However,
Takayama (1993) (also quoted by al-Suwailem) states that if subjective probabilities are used
instead, and an axiomatic approach is employed, the distinction between risk and uncertainty




outcome in general, having neither positive nor negative implications.11 On the other
hand, the Latin word risicum, which originally referred to "the challenge that a
barrier reef represents to a sailor and has connotations of an equally fortuitous but
unfavourable event", has been considered a more relevant word reflecting risk in the
modern sense.12
4.2.2 Risk in Banking
In business, risk is classified in different ways, one of which is to separate its
systematic and unsystematic components.13 Systematic risk is linked to the overall
market or the economy and unsystematic risk to a specific asset or business firm.
Systematic risk is also known as uncontrollable risk, for the decision-maker or firm
has no control whatsoever over the eventual outcome, whereas unsystematic or
controllable risk is subject to change by these agents. In simple business termino¬
logy, the asset-specific unsystematic risk can be mitigated by spreading it over a
large diversified portfolio, the systematic risk being non-diversifiable.14 Neverthe¬
less, some parts of systematic risk can be reduced by risk mitigation and transferring
techniques, although others cannot be eliminated or transferred and must be absorbed
by the banks.
Financial institutions face the following three types of risk: that, which can be
eliminated; that which can be transferred to others; and that which can be managed




Tariqullah Khan and Habib Ahmed, Risk Management: An Analysis of Issues in Islamic
Financial Industry (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Development Bank: Islamic Research and




activities in which risks can be efficiently managed and to shift risks that can be
transferred.
As in human life generally, risk is also a familiar concept in banking.16 Nowa¬
days, more than ever as a result of globalization, the information technology
revolution, and so on, financial institutions - particularly banks - face more vigorous
and complex competition. For example, with the expansion of advanced technology,
there is an increasing level of fraud and defaulting on the repayment of loans.17
However, as in other businesses, the nature of banking activities is such that nothing
can be achieved without engaging in risk. In other words, to gain a high income or
profit as a reward, there will always be a high risk. According to Cade, risk in
banking is "exposure to uncertainty of outcome". Exposure indicates a position or a
stake in the outcome, an outcome is the consequence of a particular course of action,
and uncertainty is the volatility of a potential outcome.18
In the conventional banking system, the ability to attract depositors and credi¬
tors depends on the quality of the management, especially the management of risk.
This is crucial, for the objective of financial institutions is the maximization of profit
and shareholder value and therefore risk management is the main influence on the
survival and growth of the industry. Risk management refers to "the overall process
that a financial institution follows to define business strategy, to identify the risks to
16 Eddie Cade, in Managing Banking Risk: Reducing Uncertainty to Improve Bank
Performance (Chicago, IL: Glenlake Publishing, 1999), p.l, classifies banks as highly
geared financial risk-takers.
17
Examples are those of the Bank ofNew England, which made provision for massive bad
debts in 1991, for they suffered a run on deposits and had to be supported by the
government. In 1992, Barclays Bank declared the first loss in its history and had to provide
£2.5 billion to cover bad and doubtful debts, while, in 1995, Barings, London's oldest
merchant bank, was brought down by losses of £830 million on a speculative proprietary
position in Nikkei 225 stock index futures. See, ibid., pp. 1-2.
18 Ibid.
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which it is exposed, to quantify those risks, and to understand and control the nature
of risks it faces".19 For Bessis, risks in banking are usually defined by the adverse
impact on the profitability of several distinct sources of uncertainty.20 Bessis states
that the capability to monitor and control risk serves several important functions,
including:
1. the implementation of strategy;
2. the development of competitive advantage;
3. the measure of capital adequacy and solvency;
4. the aid to decision-making;
5. the aid to pricing decisions;
6. the reporting and control of risk; and
7. the management of the portfolios of transactions.
He also notes that "ignoring today's risk amounts to ignoring future losses and
giving up taking corrective actions today to avoid them tomorrow."21 Thus, risk
control is very important, for it is an indication of profitability and competitive
advantage. Clearly, controlling future costs is a priority, for it influences the contri¬
bution of present and future income.
4.3 The Concept of Risk in Islam
As discussed in Chapter 2, Islamic banks are not expected to have a philosophy
similar to that of other business entities, which are likely to regard profit in their
organization as their primary objective. Although profit in business organization is
19 Khan and Ahmed, op. cit., p.27.
20




crucial, Islamic institutions must, in theory and in practice, also incorporate the
concept of morality into their aims. In Islam, making a profit entails sharing risk,
which requires a sense of morality and equality. The concept of baraka (briefly
examined in Chapter 2) clearly indicates that there is a positive relationship between
the implementation of the system and prosperity, which applies not only to the
individual and the community but also to the institution. Therefore, just as the philo¬
sophical foundation of Islamic banking is different from that of conventional banks,
so is the management of risk.
Before discussing these points in detail, it is important to understand the
concept of risk in Islam. As has been noted by Professor Mohamed el-Gari of King
'Abd al-'Aziz University,
The concept of risk mentioned by jurists in their studies on the theory of con¬
tract has nothing to do with the concept of risk as known in modern financial
studies.22
When jurists refer to certain "risky" contracts and render them unacceptable
from the Shari'a point of view, some practitioners of Islamic finance take it as
referring to risk in the jargon of finance.23
Warde also comments that in Islamic finance, with only a few exceptions, the vast
majority of writings simply ignore the issue of gharar.24 According to a survey of
literature on Islamic economics, gharar is the nearest equivalent to the concept of
risk, and this topic is discussed in the next section.
22 Mohamed el-Gari, "Credit Risk in Islamic Banking and Finance", Islamic Economic
Studies, vol.10, no.2 (2003), p.l.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh
University Press, 2000), p.29.
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4.3.1 Definition of Gharar
The term gharar literally means risk or hazard, and its verbal noun taghrir means
exposing oneself or one's property unknowingly to danger.25 According to
al-Zuhayli, the linguistic origin of gharar refers to "items with likeable appearance
and disliked reality. Thus, our life on earth has been called in the Qur'an mata'u
al-ghuru (utilities of ghurur), i.e., deceptive."26 Buang states that the word gharar is
derived from the root verb gharara/gharra, meaning to expose oneself and one's
property to destruction without being aware of it.27 In general, the Arabic lexico¬
graphers, such as Jawhari, Ibn Manzur and Mughri, classify the word gharar as a
synonym of khatar, which broadly means danger, peril, jeopardy or risk.28 Haque has
a similar view, for he defines gharar as hazard, chance or risk.29 Buang concludes
that the word gharar in the Arabic language covers a variety of negative elements,
2"
Al-Saddiq M. al-Amin al-Darir, Al-Gharar in Contracts and Its Effects on Contemporary
Transactions. (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Development Bank: Islamic Research and
Training Institute, 1997), p. 10.
26 Wahbah al-Zuhayli, Islamic Jurisprudence and Its Proofs: Financial Transactions in
Islamic Jurisprudence, [al-Fiqh al-Islami wa Adillatuh], trans. Mahmoud A. el-Gamal, vol.1
(Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 2003), p.82.
27 Ahmad Hidayat Buang, "The Prohibition ofgharar in the Islamic Law ofContracts: A
Conceptual Analysis with Special Reference to the Practice of Islamic Commercial Contracts
in Malaysia". Unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1996, p. 130. The author also
states that although there is an unfounded assertion that the word gharar is of Persian origin,
there is no suggestion that the word is not Arabic.
29 Ib'd'Ziaul Haque, Landlord and Peasant in Early Islam: A Study ofthe Legal Doctrine of
Muzara'a or Sharecropping (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1977), p.12. He says: "In
the legal terminology of thefuqaha, it is the sale of a thing which is not present at hand; or
the sale of thing whose 'aqiba (consequences, outcome) is not known; or a sale involving
risk or hazard in which one does not know whether it will come to be or not, as a fish in the
water, or the bird in the air. It means that this kind of transaction (which was banned in
Islam) 'in its external aspect is tantamount to deceiving the buyer, while in its internal
aspects the nature of the object is not known'".
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such as deceit, cheating, danger, peril and risk, any of which might lead to
destruction and loss.30
4.3.2 Gharar Sales
Although there is no direct definition of gharar in the Qur'an and Hadith, references
to it in these sources are abundant among the examples of contracts of sales that are
prohibited because they contain elements of gharar,3' Kamali states that the term
gharar literally means fraud (al-khida) and that in transactions it has often been used
in the sense of risk, uncertainty and hazard. Thus, he says: "In a contract of sales,
gharar often refers to uncertainty and ignorance of one or both of the parties over its
existence at the time of contract."32 Kamali asserts that, broadly speaking, gharar can
carry different shades of meaning, depending on the transaction/3 Indeed, there is no
generally accepted definition of gharar by Muslim jurists, for they have widely
differing views, though many of them define it as doubt about the existence of the
subject matter of the contract.34 Vogel states that as with riba, fiqh scholars have
been unable to define the precise scope of gharar, or to come to an unanimous
agreement over its meaning.35 Zaki Badawi also maintained that the precise meaning
of gharar was itself uncertain, since the literature did not give an agreed definition.36
In his view, scholars relied more on enumerating individual instances of gharar as a
Buang, op. cit., p. 131.
31
Ibid., pp. 132-134.
j2 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, "Uncertainty and Risk Taking in Islamic Law", Law Journal
(International Islamic University Malaysia), vol.7, no.2 (1999), p.200.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
j5 Frank E. Vogel. "Part I: The Islamic Law of Finance", in Frank E. Vogel and Samuel L.
Hayes III (eds), Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk and Return (London: Kluwer Law
International, 1998), p.64.
36 Zaki Badawi, "The Question of Risk", quoted by al-Suweilam, op.cit., p. 1.
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substitute for a precise definition of the term. Warde comments: "As in the case of
riba, the prohibition is unequivocal though the concept itself is somewhat vague."37
El-Gamal then notes that juristic definitions of gharar vary and can often seem
contradictory.38 Thus, he also quotes al-Qarafi, who states:
The origin of gharar is that which is not known to occur or not (e.g., birds in
the sky or fish in the water). On the other hand, that whose existence is known,
but whose characteristics are unknown (e.g., when a seller sells that which is
hidden in his sleeve), it is called majhul (unknown). Thus, the definitions of
gharar and ignorance are each more general in some respects and less general
in other respects....This is the reason for the (legal) scholars' differences over
the natures ofgharar andjahalah (ignorance)/9
Generally, classical jurists agreed that gharar aroused suspicion of danger,
owing to the uncertainty of the outcome of a contract. However, differences arose
when the scholars assessed the level of gharar in each contract, because of the
reasons that they gave for its existence.40 Some of the definitions ofgharar given by
the classical jurists are as follows.
Al-Darir summarizes the definitions of gharar according to jurisprudence as
follows:41
First, gharar applies exclusively to cases of doubtfulness or uncertainty, as in
the case of not knowing whether something will take place or not. This excludes
the unknown. The definition by Ibn Abidin is a case in point: "gharar is uncer¬
tainty over the existence of the subject matter of sale".
Second, gharar applies only to the unknown, to the exclusion of the doubtful.
This view is adopted by the Zahiri School alone. Thus, according to Ibn Hazm,
"gharar in sales occurs when the purchaser does not know what he has bought
and the seller does not know what he has sold."
Third, a combination of the two categories above; gharar here covers both the
unknown and the doubtful, as exemplified by the definition proposed by
,7
Warde, op. cit., p.59.
18 Mahmoud A. el-Gamal, An Economic Explication ofthe Prohibition ofGharar in





Buang, op. cit, p.214.
41
Al-Darir, op. cit., p. 10.
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Al-Sarakhsy (Hanafi School) "gharar obtains where consequences are con¬
cealed". This is the view favoured by most jurisprudents.
Al-Darir opts for the third definition, owing to its more extensive coverage of the
jurisprudential elements gathered under gharar.
The following definitions have been collected by al-Zuhayli:
1. Al-Sarakhsi said for the Hanafi School: "Gharar is that whose consequences
are hidden."
2. Al-Qarafi of the Maliki School said: "Gharar is what is not known to exist in
the future, e.g., birds in the air and fish in the water."
3. Al-Shirazi of the Shafi'i School said: "Gharar is that whose nature and con¬
sequences are hidden."
4. Al-Isnawi of the Shafi'i School said: "Gharar is that which admits two possi¬
bilities, with the less desirable one being more likely."
5. Ibn Taymiyyah of the Hanbali School said: "Gharar is that whose con¬
sequences are unknown." His student, Ibn al-Qayyim, said: "It is that which is
undeliverable, whether it exists or not (e.g., the sale of a runaway slave or a
runaway camel, even if they exist)."
6. Ibn Hazm of the Zahiri School said: "Gharar is where the buyer does not know
what he bought or the seller does not know what he sold."42
Thus, al-Zuhayli's summarized definition of gharar is: "A gharar sale is any con¬
tract which incorporates a risk which affects one or more of the parties and may
result in loss of property."43
42
Al-Zuhayli, op. cit., p.83.
43 Ibid.
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Modern Islamic scholars have also outlined the definition of gharar. Although
their interpretation ofgharar is similar to that of the classical jurists, they define it in
ways that are more appropriate to modern practices. For example, Kamali has
summarized four main categories of gharar as uncertainty and risk in the (1)
existence of the subject matter; (2) availability; (3) quantities; and (4) timing of
completion and delivery.44 Al-Zuhayli also contends that a gharar sale is (1) that
which is not known to exist or not; (2) one whose measure is not known to be large
or small: or (3) that which is undeliverable.45 Zarga also maintains that gharar exists
in a contract where the contractual parties rely upon something that is uncertain and
unclear, owing to its risky nature, which equates the transaction to gambling.46 It is
worth noting that el-Gamal concludes that the term gharar can be best translated as
"risk", and therefore, the prohibition of bay 'u al-gharar is best translated as "trading
in risk".47
Some Western scholars have also expressed their views of gharar. Buang
asserts that they have a wider perception of gharar, for they take historical and social
factors into consideration.48 It could be said that they have developed a different
approach to the discussion. For instance, Coulson says that the prohibition of gharar
is the linking of the prohibition of riba with that of gambling. This forms the basis of
gharar with the aim of removing or avoiding inequality that might arise in con¬
tractual relationships, such as the delivery of profit to one party and loss to the
44
Kamali, op. cit., p.210.
45




El-Gamal, op. cit., p.2.
48
Buang, op. cit., p.350.
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other.49 Similarly, when referring to the social factors, Saleh also noted that the
protection of the weak party against exploitation by the strong party is the basis of
the prohibition ofgharar. This idea has resulted in the formulation of the general rule
that all transactions should be free from uncertainty and speculation.50 Saleh, for
instance, also states that the Qur'an prohibits games of chance (2:219 and 5:93), thus
providing religious grounds for doubt about gharar as an important aspect of Islam,
with its concern for protecting people from their own foolishness and excesses.51 It
did not escape the Prophet (pbuh), with his wide experience as a merchant and his
deep knowledge of human nature, that it is not uncommon in secular transactions for
one of the parties to be stronger than the other, or perhaps more clever or more
experienced.52 Thus, the disadvantaged party is in need of some protection and
guidance before an agreement is concluded or a bargain struck.
On the other hand, Vogel has based the prohibition of gharar on a number of
hadiths,53 according to the degree of risk entailed: (1) pure speculation; (2) uncertain
outcome; (3) unknowable future benefit; and (4) inexactitude.54 He states:
49 Noel J. Coulson, Commercial Law in the GulfStates (London: Graham and Trotman,
1984), pp.43-44.
50 Nabil A. Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law: Riba, Gharar and




Vogel., op. cit., pp.88-89. Among these hadiths are the following: (1) The Messenger
forbade the "sale of the pebble" (hasa: sale of an object chosen or determined by the
throwing of a pebble), and the sale of gharar. (2) Do not buy fish in the sea, for it is gharar.
(3) The Messenger ofGod forbade [the sale of] the covering [of a mare] by a stallion. (4)
The Prophet forbade the sale of the content of the womb and the udder, the sale of a runaway
slave, ... and [the sale of] the "stroke of the diver" (darbat al-gha 'is: sale in advance of the
yield of a diver's dive, whenever it was). (5) Whoever buys foodstuffs should not be allowed
to sell them until he has possession of them. (6) He who purchases food shall not sell it until
he has weighed it (yaktalahu). (7) The Prophet forbade the sale of grapes before they were
fully ripe and the sale of grain before it had hardened.
54 Ibid.
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A possible interpretation of the gharar hadiths is that they bar only risks affect¬
ing the existence of the object as to which the parties transact, rather than just
its price. In the hadiths, such risks arise either (1) because of the parties' lack of
knowledge; (2) because the object does not exist; or (3) because the object
evades the parties' control. Therefore, the scholars might use one of these
characteristics to identify transactions infected by the type of risk condemned as
gharar?5
4.3.3 Excessive and Trifling Gharar
Generally, gharar affects contracts of exchange (uqud al-mu 'awadat), in particular,
contracts of sale and leasing. In principle, it does not affect contracts of charity
{,al-tabarru 'at), such as gifts and bequests (although there is some disagreement over
this point).56 Concerning the extent of the effects of gharar, Kamali lists four condi¬
tions for gharar to have legal consequences or to invalidate a contract:
1. It must be excessive, not trivial. A slight gharar, such as the sale of unidentical
items at the same price is held to be negligible.
2. It occurs in commutative contracts ('uqud al-mu 'awadat al-malliyah) as sale,
rent or partnership, thus precluding tabarru 'at.
3. The gharar directly affects the subject matter of the contract, as opposed to
what might be attached to it (for example, concerning a cow, it is the animal
herself, not her unborn calf).
4. The people are not in need of the contract in question. Should there be a public
need (hajjat al-nas), gharar, even if excessive, will be ignored.57
Concerning the first and fourth conditions, the prohibition of gharar is not absolute.
Instead, it is limited by the counterbalancing consideration of the removal of hard¬




Kamali, op. cit., p.201.
57 Ibid. Cf. al-Darir, pp.23-34. He explains in detail when gharar invalidates a contract.
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that fulfilling the needs of the people takes priority by virtue of the Qur'anic
principle of the removal of hardship (rafal-haraj). For example, the Shari'a vali¬
dates salam (advance purchase) and istisna '(contract of manufacture), regardless of
the elements of gharar contained therein, simply because of the people's need for
them.58 It should be noted that certain schools offiqh tolerate gharar in cases of need
(haja) and where its avoidance would cause great difficulty.59
Kamali notes that gharar is divided into three levels: excessive gharar
(al-gharar al-khatir), which can invalidate a transaction; slight or trifling gharar
(al-gharar al-yasir), which is tolerated; and average gharar (al-gharar
al-mutawassit), which falls between the two extremes.60 In explaining excessive
gharar, Ibn Rushd, for instance, says that it can originate in
1. ignorance and lack of information about the nature and attributes of an object;
2. a doubt about its existence and availability;
3. a doubt about its quantity or a requirement for exact information about its
price;
4. the unit of currency in which the price is paid and the terms of its payment.61
Some jurisprudents have tried to establish a rule or a means of measuring the level of
gharar.62 Among them is Abu al-Walid al-Baji, who considers trifling gharar to be a
type found in nearly all contracts, although it is not a dominant element.63
58
Kamali, op. cit., p.201.
59
Saleh, op. cit., p.53.
60
Kamali, op. cit., p.201.
61 Ibid.
62
Al-Darir, op. cit., p.46.
63 Ibid.
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However, excessive gharar dominates and engulfs a contract to the extent that
"it comes to characterize it" or, in other words, becomes a prominent feature
thereof.64 Al-Darir maintains:
It is obvious, though, that this rule does not place a clear dividing line between
the excessive and the trifling or slight gharar, because there is a large inter¬
mediate area between "the gharar from which hardly a contract is free and that
which so dominates the contract that it comes to characterize it."65
He understands excessive gharar to mean influential gharar and that any other level
is insignificant. He points out that otherwise, it is not feasible to give precise defini¬
tions ofwhat might be excessive and what might be trifling, since gharar itself might
be regarded as excessive and unacceptable under certain circumstances, yet could be
judged differently under other circumstances.66 Kamali concludes that gharar is a
broad concept encompassing not only uncertainty and risk-taking, excessive specula¬
tion, gambling and ignorance of the material aspects of contracts, but also the whole
range of contracts and transactions. Thus, he states that gharar (1) cannot be entirely
eliminated from any contract; (2) is significant relative to the current conditions of
society and traditions; and (3) has a strong element of subjectivity and value judge¬
ment, which has led to differences among jurists.
4.3.4 Gharar vs. Risk
From the above discussion, it should be noted that there is a difference in the con¬
cepts of risk and gharar. Gharar is a legalistic concept that arises in the contractual
relationship, and that is independent of the parties concerned, whereas risk is
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for one party, yet less so for the other. Kafh explains that gharar is frequently used
interchangeably with "ignorance", for it is ignorance of either the existence of an
outcome or the characteristics of an outcome whose existence is well known.
However, gharar is more general that ignorance, for although everything containing
ignorance is gharar, not all gharar is due to ignorance.68 As al-Zuhayli points out:
"There is no ignorance (jahalah) without excessive risk {gharar)."69
El-Gari explains that there are several differences between gharar sales and
risk in modern financial terminology, although there are also some similarities
between them.70
1. Gharar relates to a defect in the "form" of a contract, which creates a risk,
although risk in itself does not lead to the vitiation of a contract. The financial
meaning of risk is related to the circumstances of the operations resulting from
the contract, whereby the objective of the party concerned might not be
achieved. Gharar pertains to the contractual relationship and depends on the
form of the contract. Risk, on the other hand, is related to the outcome of the
contract.
2. Gharar has a fixed meaning. Therefore, if there is no gharar in a contract when
it is concluded, then gharar cannot arise later.
Kahf further notes that gharar does not mean deception, for it relates to the
contract itself, not to a calculation in the minds of the parties concerned. Indeed, even
the Shari'a does not go beyond the contract to read the minds of the parties to it.71
68
Al-Zuhayli, op. cit., p. 109.
69 Ibid.
70
El-Gari, op. cit., p. 18.
71
Kahf, op. cit., p.34.
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Warde also contents that gharar should not be used interchangeably with the broad
concept of risk.72 He clarifies this point as follows:
Gharar is prohibited, yet it would be nonsensical to prohibit risk. Islam does not
even advocate the avoidance of risk. Indeed, incurring commercial risk is
approved, even encouraged, provided it is equitably shared. More accurately,
gharar refers to aleatoric transactions - that is, transactions conditioned on
uncertain events.73
The Shari'a's principles of al-kharaj hi al-daman (entitlement to return an
asset, resulting from assuming the risk and responsibility of owning the asset) and
al-ghurm bi al-ghunm (entitlement to a return, resulting from the liability of risk)
stipulate that all the relevant parties to the commercial undertaking must bear the risk
associated with the venture as a prerequisite of earning the potential return.74 It
should be noted that this type of risk should be distinguished from the prohibited
gharar, which is similar to asymmetric information and moral hazard in modern
terms.75 In other words, money must be put to productive use and risk must be
undertaken to justify the return. Furthermore, returns should not be fixed, despite the
profits. The application of the maxim (al-ghurm bi al-ghunm) differentiates between
the income from an investment contract and the prohibited riba income from a loan
transaction. In a loan transaction, there is no undertaking of liability to justify the
extra income, since the principal is guaranteed. In an investment contract, however,
there is an undertaking of liability, since neither capital nor profit is guaranteed, so
the extra income is justified. This arrangement reflects the Shari'a's commitment to
ensuring fairness and justice between the contracting parties.
72
Warde, op. cit., p.59.
73 Ibid.
74 Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, "Progress and Challenges of Islamic Banking",
Thunderbird International Business Review, vol.41, no.4/5 (1999), p.389.
75 Ibid.
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Nowadays, the advances in computerization are unlikely to change the
relationship and conditional aspects of gharar, although this modern means of
communication has reduced the uncertainties of pricing, delivery and deferment.76
Nevertheless, the introduction of new products and modes of transaction in banking
and finance, stock markets and futures markets have brought with them new and ever
more complicated levels of gharar, which need careful analysis and evaluation.
Therefore, a certain level of risk and vagueness, which was unacceptable in earlier
times, cannot be seen in the same perspective in modern market realities. For
example, modern jurists have differing opinions of the validity of trading in future
commodities, because it contains gharar. Again, this matter is open to a fresh, and
preferably collective judgement or ijtihad.
4.4 Islamic Management of Risk
In their daily lives, people first determine the level of risk that they might face. If the
level appears high, then they will try to avoid it or at least take some precautions to
minimize or mitigate it. In other words, people always determine risk according to
the level perceived. Then, having made a decision, they manage the risk by taking
appropriate precautions. As stated by el-Gari, risk has no significance if it cannot be
measured.77 It should be noted that each person perceives risk differently. What some
people might assess as a high level of risk, others might assess it at a lower level.
When making financial decisions, such as the choice of investments, people
measure the risk entailed and the return that they can expect to receive if they decide
to invest their money. This does not mean that people avoid high-risk investments. If
76
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they can afford to take that risk and can take the appropriate precautions, they might
decide to accept that investment. Keown et al. state that investment options have
varying levels of risk and expected returns. However, the higher the risk of an invest¬
ment, the greater the expected return.78 Sometimes, therefore, investors choose to put
their money in risky investments because of the higher expected returns that are
offered. Nevertheless, they might avoid investment opportunities that entail ambi¬
guous and unclear risk, since ambiguity itself is a form of risk. Investments having
unclear risks are considered high-risk investments.79 As emphasized by Keown et al.,
according to the theory of risk-return trade-off, additional risk will be taken if it is
compensated by an additional return.80 Shapiro asserts that the rule is to provide
compensation appropriate for the investors, for they always prefer less risk to more
risk.81 Therefore, before financial decisions can be assessed and finalized,
organizations try to "assess the forces that can possibly alter the course of events so
as to prevent reaching the target."82 Financial decisions depend on the expected
future prospects. Clearly, managing risk is crucial in today's businesses as financial
organizations try to maximize their shareholder value.
The concept of risk from the modern and Islamic perspectives has already been
discussed in this chapter. It should be noted that the prohibition of gharar by the
Shari'a is aimed at minimizing, or even eliminating risk and hazard in contracts by
imposing the appropriate rules. One reason for this view is to remove injustice from a
contract where one party enjoys an absolute advantage over the other. Another
78 Arthur J. Keown et al., FinancialManagement: Principles andApplications, 10th edn
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall), p. 14.
79
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81 Alan C. Shapiro, Modern Corporate Finance (London: Collier Macmillan, 1990), p.l 10.
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reason is to eliminate unfair transactions, where one party might gain and the other
party lose, a situation that would upset the balance of the contract. It can be said,
therefore, that risk mitigation and risk management conform to Islamic principles.
Risk management under contracts of salam (advance payment) was widely
practised in agriculture by the early Muslims of Madina and it was approved by the
Prophet.83 The contract of salam is intended to deal with the price risk, in which the
farmers, although expert at crop cultivation and animal husbandry, do not have suf¬
ficient expertise in the market and trading and so have to transfer their produce on
the basis of a description by someone with greater ability in dealing with the mar¬
ket.84 Therefore, to avoid losses by the party lacking sufficient knowledge, this risky
situation is taken over by another party that has the necessary expertise to deal with
the market. It is also clear that although the contract of salam contains an element of
gharar, it is validated by considering the public interest.
The concept ofmanagement of risk is not contrary to Islamic principles for not
being dependent on God for protection. The reference is that when a man's camel
bolted, having been left untethered, he said that it had been left under God's protec¬
tion. The Prophet (peace be upon him) asked the man to take the appropriate
precautionary measures of safety and then trust in God.85 This hadith shows that
people are required to plan and manage their daily lives to obtain lawful benefits. In
short, the management of risk, as employed in the above example, to minimize loss
83
El-Gari, op. cit., p.6.
84 Ibid.
85 Mohd Ma'sum Billah, Islamic Law ofTrade and Finance, 2nd edn (Kuala Lumpur: Ilmiah
Publishers, 2003), p. 151. The Prophet (pbuh) once asked a Bedouin who had left his camel
untethered: "Why do you not tether your camel?" The Bedouin answered: "I put my trust in
God." The Prophet (pbuh) then said: "Tether your camel first and then put your trust in
God." (Hadith narrated by al-Tirmidhi.)
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in one's economic activities, is not against the Will of God. Indeed, after all the
appropriate precautions have been taken, people can then rely on God (tawakkul), for
they have done everything possible to protect their "belongings". It should be noted
that according to Islam, human beings are only the vicegerents, and everything in this
world belongs to God (as discussed in detail in Chapter 2). Therefore, whatever
profit or loss is made by Muslims is viewed as sustenance from God and they should
be satisfied with it.
4.4.1 Types of Risk in Islamic and Conventional Banking Compared
As discussed in Chapter 2, the primary function of a financial intermediary is the
mobilization of savings from the savers of funds to the users of funds. Both Islamic
and conventional banks perform this function by pooling small savings from house¬
holds to finance productive businesses, whether small or large. The depositors or
savers might be reluctant to make the investments themselves, or lend their money
directly, or take equity in a borrowers' project, since they do not have the necessary
knowledge or expertise, the lack of which can lead to moral hazard and asymmetric
information. In conventional commercial banking, the depositors, as creditors,
transfer the risk to the bank, which, in turn, might transfer the risk to the borrowers
as the debtors. Under this system, the customers have the privilege of knowing the
exact amount of return to expect from their deposits. However, the customers of
Islamic banks do not have this information. Therefore, it is likely that the customers
of conventional banks base their decisions on existing information, whereas the
customers of Islamic banks have to rely on historical facts and make assumptions
about the future.
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In Islamic banking, since the Islamic theory of finance rejects the principle of
risk transfer and the mechanism of a fixed rate of interest, the investors (depositors),
the intermediary, and the entrepreneur (borrower) are subject to risk and uncertainty
in the investment projects. It should be noted that the important feature of Islamic
financial institutions is that in line with the prohibition of the payment and receipt of
a fixed or predetermined rate of interest, the rate of return is not known and is not
fixed. The rate of return can be determined only ex post or on the basis of the actual
profit accrued from real sector activities.86 There are two intermediation models in
Islamic banking - "two-tier mudaraba" and "two windows" - each having a different
level of exposure to risk.
As intermediaries, both Islamic and conventional banks face many types of risk
that affect their ability to compete and meet the interests of their stakeholders, that is,
their depositors, shareholders and regulators. Therefore, they need to develop sys¬
tems to manage risk. It is the responsibility of supervisors and regulators to create
within their banks a culture of extreme caution about exposure to risk. The features
and intermediation model of the Islamic banks expose them to particular risks that
need to be recognized for their management to be truly effective.87 Khan and Ahmed
conclude that the nature of some of the risks faced by Islamic banks are different
from those faced by conventional banks.88 They divide these risks into two catego¬
ries: (1) risks that are commonly faced by conventional banks, such as credit risk,
market risk, operational risk, and so on; and (2) risks that stem from the profit/loss-
86 V. Sundararajan and Luca Errico, "Islamic Financial Institutions and Products in the
Global Financial System: Key Issues in Risk Management and Challenges Ahead"
(International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2002), p.20.
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sharing feature of Islamic banking. Although Islamic banks share the same risks in
the first category as their conventional counterparts, the magnitude of some of them
is different owing to the Islamic banks' compliance with the Shari'a. The risks in the
second category are covered in detail in section 4.5. The discussion here is a
comparison of the risks in Islamic and conventional banking (see Table 4.1).
Table 4,1 Comparison of Islamic and conventional banking
Features Islamic Banking Conventional
Banking
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Use of Islamic modes of












Use of discretion by banks with
regard to collateral
Not allowed to reduce





Source: Adapted from Sundararajan and Errico (2003).
Notes: (a) In Malaysia, some Islamic banks, for example, Bank Islam (M) Berhad, normally
give a hiba (gift) to the depositors. However, this is at the bank's discretion.
(b) Sundararajan and Errico state that some scholars argue that as an exception to this general
rule, banks might occasionally require collateral to reduce moral hazard.
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It has been mentioned in section 4.2.2 that risk in banking is divided in two
types: systematic and unsystematic. According to Santomero, risk in banking in
divided into six generic types: (1) systematic or market; (2) credit; (3) counterparty;
(4) liquidity; (5) operational; and (6) legal.89 Bessis divides risk in banking into seven
types: (1) credit; (2) interest rate; (3) market; (4) liquidity; (5) operational; (6)
foreign exchange; and (7) other risks, such as country, settlement, performance and
solvency risk.90 Below is a discussion of some of these risks in Islamic and conven¬
tional banking.
4.4.1.1 Systematic Risk
This is sometimes described as market risk and "is the risk of asset value change
associated with the systematic factor."91 The systematic market risk is the result of
the overall movement of prices and policies in the economy.92 This type of risk can
be hedged, though not completely diversified.93 It can also be classified as equity
price, interest rate, currency and commodity price risk. In conventional banking,
interest rate risk is one of the major problems with which banks have to contend.94
Since Islamic banks do not deal in riba or interest-based transactions and instru¬
ments, it is argued that they do not face this type of risk. Nevertheless, according to
89
Anthony M. Santomero, "Commercial Bank Risk Management: An Analysis of the
Process", Journal ofFinancial Services Research, vol.12, nos.2/3 (1997), p.88.
90
Bessis, op. cit., p. 12.
91
Santomero, op. cit., p.88.
92 Khan and Ahmed, op. cit., p.28.
93
Santamero, op. cit., p.88.
94 Interest rate risk is the exposure of a bank's financial condition to the movement in the
interest rate.
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Chapra and Khan, Islamic banks can face this type of risk, also known as the rate of
return risk, in the mark-up price of deferred sales and lease-based transactions.95
Islamic banks use the underlying market interest rate (usually LIBOR) as a
benchmark for pricing their financing facilities, specifically in a murabaha (mark-up)
contract.96 The mark-up rate is fixed for the duration of the contract, whereas the
benchmark rates change. Islamic banks are exposed to the risk of change in the
LIBOR rate, for it alters the value of the murabaha (mark-up) contract.97 A rise in
LIBOR mean a rise in the mark-up and also the payment of a higher profit to future
depositors compared with those received by the banks from the users of long-term
funds.98 For instance, in investment or mudaraba deposits, the rate of the profits to be
paid will have to respond to changes in the market rate of mark-up to satisfy and
retain their fund providers and dissuade them from withdrawing their funds.
Chapra and Khan also point out that conventional banks try to manage interest
rate, exchange rate, commodity and equity price risks by using futures, forwards,
95
M. Umer Chapra and Tariqullah Khan, Regulation and Supervision ofIslamic Banks
(Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Research and Training Instituterlslamic Development Bank,
2000), p.55.
96
Iqbal and Mirakhor, op. cit., p.399. They state: "An operational difficulty facing Islamic
finance is the availability of an equity-based benchmark or reference rate (reflecting the rate
of return on the real sector) for pricing assets and evaluating portfolio performance or
comparing various investment alternatives. In the absence of such reference rate or
benchmark, a questionable but common practice has been to use the London Inter-Bank
Offer Rate (LIBOR) as a proxy."
97
Chapra and Khan, op.cit., p.55.
98 An increase in the benchmark rates might result in depositors (investors) in Islamic banks
expecting a higher rate of return. Since the result of their investment activities can be
determined only at the end of the investment-holding period, Islamic banks might be under
market pressure to pay a return that exceeds the rate that has been earned on assets financed
by them, especially when the return on the assets is under-performing compared with
competitors' rates. Some Islamic banks might decide to waive their rights or their entire
mudarib share of the profits. On the other hand, in conventional banking, the asset side can
be adjusted by repricing the receivable account at a higher rate. They can also attract new or
future depositors by offering a higher interest on their fixed deposit accounts compared with
those existing depositors, who receive fixed returns.
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options and swaps contracts. In Islamic banking, however, it has not been possible to
design Shari'a-compatible substitutes for the conventional risk-management instru¬
ments, since there has been no agreement so far by the fuqaha on the permissibility
of these instruments."
4.4.1.2 Credit Risk
This is "the risk that the counterparty will fail to meet its obligations timely and fully
in accordance with the agreed terms."100 It is the risk that the customers might default
or fail to comply with their obligation to service their debts.101 It occurs where a bor¬
rower, owing to his/her inability or unwillingness, does not perform according to the
agreed contract. This type of risk can affect the bank's liquidity and also unfavour¬
ably affect the quality of the bank's assets. Although this type of risk can be diversi¬
fied, it is difficult to eliminate it completely because part of the default risk might be
the result of systematic risk.102 Bessis emphasizes that credit risk is critical and the
most important of all risks, since the default of a small number of customers can
generate large losses, possibly leading to insolvency. In his view, default means any
situation other than simple negligence.103
As in conventional banks, financing activities in Islamic banks are also
exposed to credit risk. Chapra and Khan emphasize that the supervisory authorities
99
Chapra and Khan, op.cit., p.55.
100 Khan and Ahmed, op. cit., p.28.
101
Bessis, op. cit., p. 13.
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Santomero, op. cit., p.89.
103
Bessis, op. cit., p. 13, states: "There are various default events: delay in payment
obligation; restructuring of debt obligations due to major deterioration of the credit standing
of the borrower; bankruptcies. However, simple delinquencies or payment delays do not turn
out as plain defaults, within a durable inability of lenders to face debt obligations.
Restructuring is very close to default because it results from the view that the borrower will
not face payment obligations unless its funding structure changes. Plain defaults imply that
the non-payment will be permanent."
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need to be familiar with the major factors influencing the general nature of credit risk
to which Islamic banks are exposed.104 For example, when financing customers under
the mudaraba system, Islamic banks cannot take any collateral or other guarantee to
reduce credit risk. As a result, the exposure to credit risk is very high under this
financing.
Another issue for Islamic banks to deal with is late payment by customers.
Warde mentions that Islamic banks face a serious problem of late payment because
"some people take advantage of every dilatory legal and religious device."105 Vogel
also says that since court procedures are slow, late payment causes serious problems
for Islamic banks.106 Conventional banks can resort to late fees, lawsuits, bankruptcy
and so on to protect their interests as lenders. However, in Islamic banking, late fees,
in particular, have been classified as riba.m Consequently, since late payment does
not entail any extra cost, some customers might take advantage of the situation.
In an effort to solve these problems, scholars have proposed expediting court
procedures or imposing criminal fines on solvent debtors, whereby the fines will be
104
Chapra and Khan, op. cit., p.55, say that in general, the standing of counterparties, nature
of the legal system, quality of collateral, maturity of credit facilities, size of banking and
trading books, utilization of credit derivatives and internal control systems determine the
level of a bank's credit risk. They also summarize the general points to be considered in
assessing the credit risk of Islamic banks, which need the attention of the bank supervisors.
105
Warde, op. cit., p. 156. Warde quotes the Qur'an (2:280-1), which states that Islam
recommends forbearance and even the cancellation of the loan when borrowers are in
difficulties. He says that although under a secular system, these prescriptions can be ignored,
under a religious or hybrid system, that is not possible.
106
Vogel, op. cit., p. 140. Vogel notes that penalties for delay, which can be applied not only
to sales but also to all obligations, cannot be imposed on late payers. However, delay by one
who is solvent is a sin, and therefore a crime. Except in Saudi Arabia, where those who delay
payment can be imprisoned, measures such as flogging and imprisonment are no longer in
use.
107
Warde, op. cit., p. 156. Cf. el-Gari, op. cit., p. 19, who also states that some banks impose a
penalty as a means of preventing late payment and then donate these amounts to charity.
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paid to the government instead of the banks.108 Some scholars have issued a fatwa
supporting the charging of fines, although that has provoked some strong objec¬
tions.109
On the other hand, el-Gari reveals that, instead of charging fines, some Islamic
banks have adopted other measures to reduce the impact of late payment on their
revenues.110 One method is to charge a higher rate ofmark-up according to the custo¬
mer's assumed pattern of payment. As a result, the customer has to pay a higher
deferred price. Another method is to create two payment schedules on the assump¬
tion that the customer might default on payment, and therefore the price is kept very
high if payment is delayed. If the customer pays promptly according to the first
schedule, part of the increased price is repaid. However, the second schedule is based
on delay in payment, in which case the full price has to be repaid to the bank. El-Gari
rightly points out that adding to the debt will probably lead to excess in the credit
risk. He states that the purpose of the addition is to prevent default. It is not a valid
way of increasing profits, for the level of risk depends on the types of customers and
the choices that they make. Therefore, el-Gari agrees that to prevent late payment,
the imposition of penalties, which will be distributed to charity later, is the best
option.
108
Vogel, op. cit., p. 140.
109 Ibid. Vogel asserts: "Classical law does not tolerate damages for lost profits (i.e.,
hypothetical profits, which would have occurred but for the debtor's actions) but only for
actual destruction of property or actual out-of-pocket losses. Damages may include usufructs
ofwhich the creditor was wrongly deprived. Loss of use ofmoney during delay cannot be
compensated on this ground, however, since the money has no usufruct." These objections
were raised because some banks, while waiting for the proposed solutions, included certain
terms in their documentation. The terms required the customers to pay late penalties, which
had been measured by the profit percentages earned by depositors, for apparently, the bank
could have invested the unpaid amount and could have gained at least that figure.
110
El-Gari, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
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4.4.1.3 Operational Risk
This type of risk was defined by the New Basel Accord of January 2001 as "the risk
of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal process, people
and systems."111 Bessis states that operational risk arises from different sources: (1)
people; (2) processes; (3) technical; and (4) information technology.112
Human capital is a critical aspect of Islamic banking, which not only has
unique features but also is considered to be still in its infancy. Here, operational risk
occurs where the bank staffs do not have sufficient competence and experience to
conduct Islamic banking operations. Chapra and Khan point out as well that an
efficient and swift Shari'a litigation system has not yet been established, and most
levels of bank staff do not have a sound knowledge ofJiqh.112 Warde says: "Perhaps
the most vexing managerial issue is lack of qualified personnel. Bank officers must
possess at once management skills appropriate to a conventional institution and reli¬
gious training."114 Furthermore, the Shari'a supervisors (Shari'a Board) are not fully
aware of the implications of modern risk management. Thus, Islamic banks do not
make sufficient use of many genuine instruments of risk management that certainly
do not conflict with Shari'a principles.115 Clearly, the supervisory staff of Islamic
111 This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
112
Bessis, op. cit., p.21. He elaborates as follows: "People risk designates human errors, lack
of expertise and fraud, including lack of compliance with existing procedures and policies....
Technical risks relate to model errors, implementation and the absence of adequate tools for
measuring risks....Technology risks relate to deficiencies of the information system and
system failure." Inadequate procedures for reporting, monitoring and decision-making and
inadequate procedures for processing information are among the sources of risk in the
process category.
"J
Chapra and Khan, op. cit., p.56.
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Warde, op. cit., p. 158.
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Chapra and Khan, op. cit., p.56.
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banks must possess a sound knowledge of not only conventional banking but also
Islamic principles and the relevant aspects of the Shari'a.
Indeed, people risk, arising from incompetence and fraud, could expose Islamic
banks to reputation risk, for they bear the name of Islam. This could be very damag¬
ing to their image and performance. For instance, the spread of rumours or correct
information about the performance of or any other circumstances related to any
Islamic bank might influence depositors to withdraw their deposits. An example is
that of the Dubai Islamic Bank, the oldest and one of the largest Islamic commercial
banks, which was hit by a scandal affecting its employees in 1998.116 The Bank
incurred losses of $50 million on its business loans, which had been given without
complying with the Bank's credit terms. The news about the losses provoked a run
on deposits, amounting in one day to $138 million (or 7 per cent) of the Bank's total
deposits. In this situation, the Dubai Central Bank and the United Arab Emirates
authorities were obliged to come to the rescue by providing the necessary liquidity
and guarantees to reassure depositors.117
In Islamic banks, operational risks also arise from technology, reputation and
compliance with regulatory standards."8 Khan and Ahmed point out that since
Islamic banks operate a different type of business, the computer software available
on the market for conventional banks might not be appropriate for Islamic banking
information technology.119 Islamic banks also face risks from the litigation system
concerning their documentation and enforcement.120 Khan and Ahmed explain that
116
Warde, op. cit., p. 155.
117 Ibid.
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Chapra and Khan, op. cit., p.56.
119 Khan and Ahmed, op. cit., p.55.
120 Ibid.
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since there are no standard forms of contracts for various financial instruments,
Islamic banks prepare their documentation according to their understanding of the
Shari'a, local laws, and their own needs and concerns. Therefore, the lack of both
standardization and an effective litigation system increases the legal risks arising
from Islamic contracts.
In complying with regulations, mistakes and negligence by supervisory staff
expose a bank to regulatory risk and might incur penalties.121 Since regulatory risk
arises from changes in the regulatory work, it might also be the result of confusion,
especially in Islamic banks operating in a country that has dual regulations covering
a mixed system of Islamic and conventional banking. El-Hawary et al. also state:
"Differences between the supervisory Shari'a boards of individual Islamic financial
institutions within each country as well as differences between the regulatory bodies
in various countries may create general uncertainty as to the rules to be followed."
4.4.1.4 Liquidity Risk
This is the risk of a funding crisis.122 It arises when "there is an unexpected decline in
bank's net cash flow and the bank is unable to raise resources at a reasonable cost by
either selling its assets or borrowing through the issuance of new financial instru¬
ments."123 Therefore, this type of risk occurs when a bank cannot meet its obligations
as they become due or to fund new profitable business.124 Santamero states that this
type of risk would certainly be associated with an unexpected event, such as a loss of
121 Dahlia A. El-Hawary, Wafik Grais and Zamir Iqbal, "Regulating Islamic Financial
Institutions: The Nature of the Regulated." Paper presented at the International Conference
on Islamic Banking: Risk Management, Regulation and Supervision, held in Jakarta,
Indonesia, 30 September - 2 October 2003, p.25.
122 Ibid.
121
Chapra and Khan, op. cit., p.55.
124 Ibid.
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confidence.125 Bessis emphasizes that an extreme lack of liquidity leads to the bank¬
ruptcy of the bank, although extreme conditions are often the outcome of other
risks.126 Chapra and Khan maintain that if a bank's assets are far larger than equity,
even a small loss can be enough to eradicate the whole equity of the bank and cause
it to collapse.127 They state: "As a result of the contagion effect, the collapse of even
a small bank has the potential of becoming a source of serious systemic instability in
the payments system."128 Therefore, careful liquidity management is vital to avoid
being overwhelmed by serious liquidity problems.
Islamic banks, in particular, are exposed to liquidity risk owing to their limited
opportunities to access funds, since borrowing money when necessary would entail
dealing with interest. Islamic banks do not have an efficient mechanism for funding
shortages of cash.129 The absence of an active Islamic inter-bank money market has
also restricted Islamic banks in efficiently managing their liquidity position.
However, according to el-Hawary, the current use of secured commodity murabaha
and short-term trade financing has given an opportunity for Islamic banks to invest
their short-term surplus cash.130 As a result of the unavailability of adequate
investment opportunities compatible with the Shari'a, the liquidity risk appears to be
low at present. However, it could increase in the future for several reasons:131
1. Most of the Islamic banks rely on current accounts, from which withdrawals
can be made on demand.
125
Santomero, op. cit., p.85.
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2. The sale of debts, which constitute a major part of their assets, is restricted by
fiqh.
3. There has been a very slow development of Islamic financial instruments.
The third reason shows that human capital is crucial in Islamic banking as well
as co-operation between the Islamic banks and the fuqaha for product innovation and
development. In this respect, it is hoped that the establishment of the International
Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) and the Liquidity Management Centre (LMC) could
efficiently manage the Islamic financial institutions in their liquidity needs.Ij2 It has
also been mentioned in Chapter 3 that the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) has
developed an inter-bank investment facility, where Islamic financial institutions can
obtain short-term finance from one another.
4.5 Profit/Loss-Sharing (PLS) Modes of Financing
The discussion so far has shown that the majority of risks are shared by both
conventional and Islamic banks. However, Islamic banks are also prone to other risks
and at a higher level, owing to the required compliance with the Shari'a and the
operation of the two models of banking: the two-tier mudaraba and the one-tier
mudaraba (two-windows). It is important to understand fully the differences in the
operation of these two models (mentioned in Chapter 3, section 3.4) before discus¬
sing the specific risks of profit/loss-sharing modes of financing, and so this topic is
covered in greater detail below.
4.5.1 Analysis of the Two Models in Islamic Banking
Generally, the operation of Islamic banks is similar to that of investment companies
and commercial banks in the conventional system. In Islamic banking, depositors are
132
El-Hawary, op. cit., p.26.
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classified as investors, though the investments are not guaranteed and are subject to
the bank's performance. The investors are entitled to a share of the profits (or losses)
according to the PLS ratio stipulated in their contracts. Yet, they do not have any
voting rights nor can they claim a share in the ownership of the bank, and this is a
situation similar to that of the depositors of commercial banks. It is also similar to
that of investment companies, for although the investors share the profits generated
from the companies' operations, yet they have no say in determining investment
policy. Therefore, investment companies sell their capital to the public, whereas
Islamic banks receive deposits from the public.
In Islamic banking, there are two models of operation, and the differences
between them are detailed in Table 4.2. The analysis shows that although the "two-
windows" model mobilizes deposits from the customers through investment deposits
similar to "two-tier" mudaraba, it is different from the aspect of financing and
deposit mobilizing from demand deposits. The investment deposits are used to
finance risk-bearing projects. Under both models, any external shock such as econo¬
mic turmoil, which would affect their investment from the asset side, could be
absorbed by reducing the nominal value of the investment deposits. It means that no
profit would be distributed if the banks declared their losses. If the situation
worsened, deductions might be made from their investments to cover the losses.
Under the "two-tier" mudaraba model, although demand deposits are repayable at
par value on demand, the banks could use them to take on risk-bearing projects after
informing the customers. This condition is not applicable to the "two-windows"
model, since, under this system, the requirement of a 100 per cent reserve must be
applied.
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Table 4.2 Analysis of the two models of Islamic banking operations
Features Two-tier mudaraba "Two-windows"
(One-tier mudaraba)
Liability Side (Deposits)
Demand Deposits Yes Yes
Investment Deposits'"'
{mudaraba principles) Yes Yes
Asset Side (Financing)
Profit-and-Loss-Sharing Modes Yes Yes
Non-Profit-and-Loss-Sharing
Modes (Fixed-income modes of No Yes
financing)
Reserve Requirement





Demand Deposits Yes No
Investment Deposits Yes Yes
Returns on Deposits
Demand Deposits No (must be repay¬ No (must be repayable
able at par value on at par value on
demand) demand)
Investment Deposits Yes (if any) Yes (if any)
Notes'.(a) Investment deposits cannot be withdrawn before their date ofmaturity. However, in
many cases, banks do not object should the depositors wish to withdraw them (Sundararajan
and Errico, op. cit., p.25).
(b) Traditionally, even if they are not classified as amana (deposits in trust), Islamic banks
operating under the two-tier mudaraba model have kept substantial reserves against demand
deposits and little (or sometimes none) against investment deposits (Ibid., p.24).
4.5.2 Salient Features of Mudaraba and Musharaka Principles
Table 4.3 shows that according to the mudaraba principles, the entrepreneur is under
less control. Therefore, if banks participate in this mode of financing, they have no
control over the project nor can they even monitor the activities. This situation might
encourage a customer to use the funds too freely and even divert them from the main
purpose of the contract. Since taking collateral to reduce credit risk is not allowed,
banks have no means of security to protect their investments and ensure that the
entrepreneur will not break the contract. Indeed, the death or insolvency of any of the
partners will affect the project or any agreement that has been made. Moreover, all
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losses will be borne by the bank unless it can be proved that they were due to the
negligence or default of the entrepreneur. Nevertheless, this method of financing has
some advantages. Mudaraba financing is very simple, therefore, if the bank plays
only a minor role in these projects, it can concentrate on other business. In addition,
the capital consumed is only in the form of cash, which means that the liquidity of
the project is very high and participation in this kind of arrangement is less costly.
Table 4.3 Mudaraba and Musharaka principles: characteristics and conditions
Type Characteristics Conditions
Mudaraba }
"is a form of partnership
where one of the contracting
parties, called the sahib
al-mal (the financier), pro¬
vides a specific amount of
capital and acts like a sleep¬
ing or dormant partner, while
the other party, called the
mudarib (entrepreneur),
provides the entrepreneur-
ship and management for
carrying on any venture,
trade, industry or service
with the objective of earning
profits."(b)
The contract ofmudaraba
can be made between 2 or
more people.®
1. Unrestricted
No specification for the
place of business, the period,
line of trade, industry or
service, and the suppliers or
customers to be dealt with.
2. Restricted
The financier imposes some
restrictions on the
entrepreneur. If the entre¬
preneur contravenes these




Under this contract, the
bank as investor provides
the whole capital as cash
to the entrepreneur, who
offers his/her labour and
expertise.
Profit ratio
The profit ratio should be
agreed by all the parties
concerned and fixed at
the beginning of the
project.
Profit distribution
The financial losses are
borne completely by the
bank, whereas the entre¬
preneur is liable only for
his/her time and effort.
The profit, if any, is
shared by all of the
parties. However, if the
losses are proved to be








until the losses incurred
have been made good and
the equity of the financier
has been recovered.
Under this contract, the
following conditions need to be
met by all the parties concerned:
1. No collateral can be
requested from the entrepreneur.
2. The profit ratio must be
determined.
3. The entrepreneur has com¬
plete freedom to manage the
business.
The capital must be only in the
form of cash.
The contract can be revoked at
any time, unless such revocation
is prejudicial to the interests of
the other party. It will also be
dissolved by the death or
insanity of any of the other
parties.®
All losses incurred in the
ordinary course of business
must be charged against profit
before they can be charged
against the equity of the
financier.
The liability of the financier is
limited only to the extent of
his/her contribution to the
capital. The entrepreneur is not
allowed to commit the business
for any amount more than the
capital contributed by the
financier. If he/she does so, then
he/she is eligible for the extra




"is a form of business
organization where two or
more persons contribute to
the financing as well as the
management of the busi¬
ness, in equal or unequal
proportions."
1. Sharikat Mulk (non¬
contractual partnership)
Implies co-ownership and
comes into being when
two or more persons
happen to acquire joint
ownership of an asset
without having entered





have willingly entered into
a contractual agreement
for joint investment and
the sharing of profits and
risks.
(a) Muwafadah












Two or more persons
contribute to finance the
project. The contributed
capital can be in the form
of cash, labour, manage¬




The basis of the division of
profit should be deter¬
mined at the time of
musharakat 'aqd.
Profit Distribution
The profit is to be divided
in the contractually agreed
proportion. Losses,
however, must be shared
in proportion to the capital
contributions.(h) However,
if the loss is due to the
negligence of the manag¬
ing partner or management
team, then the partner or
the team shall bear the
loss.
Under this contract, the
following conditions need
to be met by all the parties
concerned:
The capital contributed by
the partner need not be on
an equal basis. However,
the capital will then be
owned by the partnership.
All the partners have a say
in the management of the
contract.
The musharaka terms must
be voluntarily accepted by
all the parties concerned.
The termination of the
arrangement must be
clearly stated and the
remaining capital distri¬
buted.
Notes:(a) Muhammad Umer Chapra, Towards a Just Monetary System (Leicester, UK: The
Islamic Foundation, 1985), p.248, says that the term mudaraba is used by the Hanafi and
Hanbali Schools, whereas the Maliki and Shafi'i Schools prefer the term qirad. In Malaysia,
although the majority ofMuslims follow the Shafi'i School, nevertheless, mudaraba is used.
(b) Ibid.
(c) Muhammad Akram Khan, "Types of Business Organization in an Islamic Economy"
Sheikh Ghazali Sheikh Abod, Syed Omar Syed Agil and Aidit Hj. Ghazali (eds), An




(e) Ibid., p.218. Khan lists the rights of the entrepreneur in mudaraba contracts. However, the
entrepreneur is required to obtain the express consent of the financier for the following
activities: (1) lending money to a third party; (2) buying goods on credit; and (3) borrowing
money for the business.
® For a detailed discussion, see Saleh, op. cit., pp.91-94, and Chapra, op. cit., pp.251-255.
(g) Chapra, op. cit., p.259, quotes Ibn Rushd, who said: " 'Inan is the only partnership
recognized by the Shafi'i and the partners must share the profits and the losses in accordance
with their capital contributions."
(h) Ibid. Chapra quotes Ibn Rushd as follows: "According to the Shafi'i School, even profits
should be divided in proportion to capital contributions. This is because the contribution of
labour (or skill and management) is difficult to measure and it is assumed that labour will be
contributed equally. Profit, like losses, should also be in proportion to the risk shared.
However, if two partners contribute to the capital and only one of them works, then, even
according to the Shafi'i School, the working partner's share in the profit should be higher."
Under the musharaka modes of financing, both the bank and the entrepreneur
inject capital into the project. Therefore, despite the lack of security or collateral,lj3
the bank as shareholder/partner is included in management decisions. The bank can
employ its representatives in the project to protect its investment. This means that the
bank has a say in decision-making as well as in the management of the investment
and the cash flow of the project. The risk faced by the business, whether it makes a
profit or a loss for a given financial year, will be shared by both entrepreneur and the
bank. However, as in a mudaraba contract, partners in a musharaka contract are free
to leave the enterprise at any time. It should be noted that both types of contract
require expertise and competence by the bank's employees so that the projects can be
evaluated and administered efficiently. Unlike a conventional bank or a mutual com¬
pany, an Islamic bank must determine the profit/loss-sharing ratio at the beginning of
an investment project. In addition, it must regularly audit the project to ensure an
133
Saleh, op. cit., p.94, says: "From the point of view of Islamic law, no security can be
taken from the partner as such; only one sort of security is allowed, and indeed required, by
some Islamic banks, such as the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan, and that is a security against
the risk of negligence or wilful wrongdoing of the partner or his non-compliance with the
terms of the partnership contract. The business risk inherent in the partnership and its
outcome cannot be secured."
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appropriate valuation and control. However, these requirements should help Islamic
banks to enforce stricter discipline in selecting investments with a more careful
evaluation of projects and to improve the efficiency of inefficient and unproductive
projects.134 By using PLS modes of financing, especially in mudaraba, default cannot
be recognized until the project is completed, unless there is evidence of negligence or
mismanagement on the part of the entrepreneur. Indeed, the default of the entre¬
preneur means that "the investment project failed to deliver what was expected, that
is, a lower-than-expected profit or none at all, or a loss."135
4.5.3 Risks of Profit/Loss-Sharing Financing (PLS) Modes
Sundararajan and Errico state that the administration of PLS modes is more complex
than conventional financing. However, they accept that the structure and balance
sheet of Islamic banks and the use of PLS modes mean that Islamic banks are better
placed than conventional banks to absorb external shocks.136 The authors add:
In the event of operational losses, unlike conventional banks, Islamic banks
have the ability to reduce the nominal value of a portion of their liabilities. As a
result, solvency risks that may result from an asset-liability mismatch are typi¬
cally lower in Islamic banks than in conventional banks.
El-Gari also rebuts the assertion that Islamic banks face more risks than their
conventional counterparts, since dealing in loans - as conventional banks do - does
not lead to a reduction in banking risk. Therefore, the cause of a higher level of risk
for Islamic banks is the result of relying on non-PLS modes of financing, such as
murabaha. The reason for this situation is that financial assets generated from
murabaha assets resemble those which are generated by conventional bank loans.
L'4
Chapra, op. cit., p. 108.
135
Sundararajan and Errico, op. cit., p.4.
136 Ibid.
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This led those dealing with Islamic banks to compare the burden of financing
through murabaha with the burden arising from bank loans, because each in the
end is a debt. This, in turn, led to the conclusion that the operations of Islamic
banks carry a heavier burden that bank loans.w
As has been stressed by Chapra, the non-PLS modes of financing, such as mu 'ajjal
and murabaha,138 could degenerate into purely financing agreements with an agreed
profit margin and thus would be no more than a mask for interest.139
Iqbal and Mirakhor assert that the systems under which the assets and liabilities
of banks are acquired on a PLS basis have created important implications:
First, the real values of assets and liabilities would be equal at all points in time.
In addition, the prospect of instantaneous equilibrium between the assets side of
the banking system - driven mainly by the real sector of the economy - and the
liability side means that there must necessarily be a close and direct relationship
between investment and deposits yields. Also, since the return to liabilities of
the banking system is a direct function of the return to the asset portfolio of the
system, and since assets are created in response to investment opportunities in
the real sector of the economy, it is the real sector that determines the rate of
return to the financial sector rather than the reverse. Furthermore, in an Islamic
financial system, the adjustment to shocks leading to banking crises and disrup¬
tions in the country's payment mechanism is faster than in the conventional
system. There will also be no disruption in the intermediation process of the
banking system, nor is there any reason to believe that the savings and invest¬
ment process will be impaired. Indeed, savings and investment need not
decrease, and if the rules of the Shari'a regarding contracts - including full
disclosure requirements - are observed, both will increase.140
From these views, it seems that, theoretically, an Islamic bank is better placed
than a conventional bank to absorb external shocks such as economic turmoil. If the
enterprise or project makes a vast amount of profit, the bank expects to receive a
high return. Upon receiving a proportionately huge share of the profit from the busi¬
ness, the bank compensates the depositors or investors with a high profit rate, which
might be much higher that the return indicated earlier. The returns to the bank and
lj7
El-Gari, op. cit., p.21.
1,8 In Malaysia, Islamic banks use the term al-bai' bithaman ajil instead ofmurabaha and
mu 'ajjal.
139
Chapra, op. cit., p. 169.
140
Iqbal and Mirakhor, op. cit., pp.391-392.
200
investors are closely related to the performance of the business. As a result, the
profit-sharing arrangement could bring prosperity in a balanced manner, thus avoid¬




5 Management of Risk in Islamic Banking in Malaysia
5.1 An Overview
In Chapter 4, the concept of risk from the Islamic and conventional perspectives has
been examined in detail. Risk in Islamic and conventional banking has also been
carefully compared to discover why the principles of profit/loss-sharing modes of
financing have been neglected or "overlooked" by Islamic banks.
In Chapter 5, the results of interviews with officers at Bank Islam (M) Berhad
are analysed and briefly discussed to examine the reasons for the slow implementa¬
tion of profit/loss-sharing modes of financing in Malaysia, especially in BIMB itself.
Islamic banking in Malaysia faces serious challenges, for financial operations in the
country are organized according to a dual system. In addition, this chapter discusses
the huge losses incurred by BIMB in 2005, with particular reference to the
management of risk by this bank. Chapter 4 has emphasized that the supervision and
governance of Islamic banking are essential in managing risk. In Chapter 3 (section
3.3.4), the supervision and regulation of the banking system in general under Bank
Negara Malaysia (BNM) has already been discussed in detail. However, in Chapter
5, the discussion is taken to the next stage, namely, the steps that have been taken so
far by BNM in managing risk in Islamic financial institutions in Malaysia.
5.2 Profit/Loss-Sharing Modes of Financing vs Non-Profit/
Loss-Sharing Modes of Financing
Chapter 4 has described how some of the risks faced by Islamic banks differ from
those faced by conventional banks. It has been found that even where the type of risk
is the same in both banking systems, the level in Islamic banking is higher, owing to
the requirement for the latter to comply with the Shari'a.1 This section discusses
briefly the over-reliance of Islamic banks in Malaysia on non-profit/loss-sharing
modes of financing, specifically al- bai' bithaman ajil (BBA)2, and the effects of the
financial crisis in 1997 on Islamic banking. The risks of profit/loss-sharing financing
have already been discussed in detail in Chapter 4. It has also been mentioned in
Chapter 3 that Islamic banks are reluctant to implement profit/loss-sharing financing
because they consider the risks associated with it to be too high. However, some
scholars, such as El-Gari (section 4.5.3), point out that the cause of the higher level
of risk for Islamic banks is the result of relying on non-PLS modes of financing. In
addition, some scholars accept that the use of PLS financing means that Islamic
banks are better placed than conventional banks to absorb external shock such as
economic turmoil.3 Therefore, in this section it is particularly important to analyse
the reasons for the slow implementation of mudharabah and musyarakah financing
in Malaysia by examining the situation from the point of view of the officers at
BIMB.
1 In Chapter 4, it has been stated that there are two categories of risks in Islamic banking: (1)
risks that are commonly faced by conventional banks, such as credit risk, market risk,
operational risk, and so on; and (2) risks that stem from the profit/loss-sharing features of
Islamic banking. Although Islamic banks share the same risks in the first category as their
conventional counterparts, the level of some of these risks is different. For example, the
conventional banks can control the interest rate, exchange rate, commodity and equity price
risks by using futures, forwards, options and swap contracts. In Islamic banking, however, it
has not been possible to design Shari'a-compatible substitutes for the conventional risk
management instruments, since there has been no agreement so far by the fuqaha on the
permissibility of these instruments.
2 It has been discussed in Chapter 3 that al- bai' bithaman ajil (BBA) is a contract of
financing sales by deferred instalments. It is one of the most popular financial instruments in




5.2.1 Over-reliance on Non-Profit/Loss-Sharing Modes of Financing:
Impact on Islamic Banks
During the Asian financial crisis in 1997, which began in Thailand and hit Malaysia
in July of that year, a policy of high interest rates was pursued to defend the Malaysia
Ringgit. As a result, Islamic banking was seriously affected, owing to its structure.4
In its Annual Report of 1997, BIMB noted the following:
The tight liquidity situation has put pressure on the operations of Islamic bank¬
ing. The current turmoil has revealed a structural weakness in Islamic banking
operations, particularly under a volatile economic environment. In Malaysia, 90
per cent of Islamic financing is negotiated on fixed-rate terms such as
al-murabahah, al- bai' bithaman ajil and ijarah thumma al-baiConventional
banking has the flexibility to adjust upwards the interest rate on borrowing
accordingly to reflect the higher cost of funds. Comparatively, the return for
financing under Islamic banking would decline under this environment and
contribute to lower deposit rates to depositors. In essence, Islamic banking
could not react swiftly under the current interest rates environment due to the
absence of a floating-rate option. Thus the lagging factor resulted in a mis¬
match, whereby the financing-deposit ratio registered an increase from 84.6 per
cent as at end 1996 to 108.6 percent as at end 1997. To accommodate the short¬
fall, Islamic banking institutions had to resort to mudharabah placements,
which amounted to RM2.6 billion as at end 1997.5
In a study of al- bai'bithaman ajil (BBA), Rosly says that the rise in interest
rates has the following consequences for Islamic banks:
In general, as interest rates rise, the demand for BBA is expected to increase,
since the existing BBA profit rate will not change. As the volume of BBA
increases, Islamic banks are expected to make more profits as higher profit rates
can then be attached to the new BBAs. However, the margins of the existing
BBAs will be severely affected if the bank decides to increase the hibah and
dividend on al-wadiah and al-mudharabah investment deposits in order to
attract more deposits.6 In the dual-banking system, where the sizes of assets and
deposits of conventional banks are much bigger than Islamic banks, changes in
the market interest rates are expected to shift the supply of deposits towards
alternative facilities that award higher returns. For example, when interest rates
are rising, more customers will opt for BBA financing, since it is not a floating
4 Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report, quoted in Saiful Azhar Rosly, "Al- bai' bithaman
ajil Financing: Impacts on Islamic Banking Performance", Thunderbird International
Business Review, vol.41, no.4/5 (1999), p.475. The empirical evidence showed that the
profits ofBIMB declined during the period of rising interest rates (1997), whereas the




rate asset. However, the profits on existing BBA contracts cannot be adjusted
upward, despite the desire of Islamic banks to compete with conventional
banks, whose interest rates on loans are not fixed. While maintaining their profit
margins, conventional banks will increase interest rates on deposits. To regain
competitiveness, Islamic banks may also choose to increase the hibah and
dividends, but this strategy will lead to diminishing profit margins.7
A fall in market interest rates means lower rates on loans. With regard to their assets,
Islamic banks fail to react quickly to market volatility and make loans cheaper than
BBAs, causing the demand for BBAs to fall. Rosly explains further:
The BBA facility simply cannot adjust the contractual selling price downwards,
as this will violate the sale agreement, in which the bank is required to quote
only one selling price. Consequently, the BBA will be more expensive than
loans.8
The structural weakness was noted by BNM in its Annual Report in 1997, and
it asked Islamic banks to create a floating rate product that would react quickly to the
sudden changes in a volatile economy. However, until 2005, BIMB never declared
any losses.9 Eight years later, for the financial year ended in 2005, BIMB declared a
7
Ibid., p.472. As a fixed-rate asset, BBA contractual prices cannot change to reflect a tight
credit market; thus they will be cheaper than loans. In a Gap analysis, overdependence on
deferred sale financing would mean that most assets would not be sensitive to changes in
market interest rates, since all Islamic liabilities are interest sensitive (i.e., hibah and
dividend rates can be altered according to prevailing competitive market deposit rates) (ibid.,
p.469).
8
Ibid., p.473. According to the author, under the dual banking system in Malaysia, the non-
Muslim customers are expected to gain more compared with Muslim customers, for the
demand for financing and placement of deposits shifts from one system to another, depend¬
ing on which provides the greatest benefit.
9 Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report (Kuala Lumpur: Bank Negara Malaysia, 1997),
pp. 141-142. An attempt to strengthen the Malaysian banking industry after the Asian
financial crisis resulted in the mergers of financial institutions into ten in 2000 and nine in
2006. However, BIMB did not participate in the mergers because, at that time, it was the
only Islamic bank in the country. During the Asian financial crisis, the former Prime
Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, his Finance Ministry officials and Bank Negara spent
much time, effort and resources in restructuring the Malaysia financial system and corporate
debt. This included the adoption of the Financial Sector Masterplan (covering conventional
banking, Islamic banking, capital markets, insurance, and takaful). The special purpose
vehicles Danaharta and Danamodal were also established, the former to be responsible for
the restructuring of the financial sector debt, and the latter the restructuring of corporate
debt. The merger plan was subject to criticism. See, for example, Thomas Fuller, "Financial
Restructuring to be Overhauled: Banking Merger Plan Collapses in Malaysia", in
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net loss of RM507.8 million, compared with a profit of RM98.3 million for the
financial year ended in 2004.10 The loss was due to a higher provisioning for non-
performing financing (NPF) of RM648 million, following the increase in the NPF
level, mainly attributed to Bank Islam Labuan Offshore Branch (BILOB)." It is
reported that 35 per cent of the NPF came from BILOB, 30 per cent from the Bank's
commercial unit and the balance from consumer and corporate clients.12 It was
confirmed by Dato' Noorazman Aziz13 that this longstanding problem of NPF had
accumulated since the Asian financial crisis in 1997.14 Noorazman Aziz said that the
NPF of BILOB was due to weak client-originated credit structuring, inadequate
International Herald Tribune , 21 October 1999. The criticisms included the following: "The
plan was perceived as a combination of greed and desire to control the financial system."
"The government is feeling intense pressure and lobbying before the election." It was also
stated that opposition groups had criticized the merger for being politically motivated and for
concentrating control over the banking system in the hands of banks with strong links to the
government. Indeed, many analysts said that the plan was flawed from a purely financial
point of view. For example, Mohammed Ariff, Executive Director of the Malaysian Institute
of Economics Research, stated: "The idea was to strengthen the whole system, but
somewhere along the line, they missed the point. They thought, the bigger the better. That is
where things went wrong. They wanted to create banks that were too big to fail. But that is
the wrong assumption, because if a big bank fails, it causes big waves. If a small bank fails,
it only causes ripples" (Fuller, ibid.).From the government's point of view, the former
Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin, said that banks needed to be stronger because the
government was tired of bailing them out. He added: "We cannot afford to save banks every
10 years or so. That is why the mergers are unavoidable. The recent crisis has exposed the
vulnerabilities of a fragmented banking system." Bank Negara officials said: "It is important
that the present window of stability be used to the fullest by bringing about a major
consolidation of the banking system." See, Anil Netto, "Rushed Bank Mergers Cast Shadow
on Malaysian Recovery" Asia Times Online, 8 September 1999, www.atimes.com . Cited 8
July 2007.
10 Bank Islam (M) Berhad, Annual Report (Kuala Lumpur, Bank Islam (M) Berhad, 2005),
p.4.
i" Ib'd'12 Anil Netto, "Islamic Bank's Woes Highlight Problems", Asia Times Online, 5 November
2005, www.atimes.com. Cited 10 July 2007.
13 Dato' Noorazman A. Aziz was appointed as the new Chief Executive Officer of the new
management team on 1 April 2005. He left B1MB Berhad in June 2006 to be the Group
Managing Director of BIMB Holdings, the parent group of BIMB. His successor in July
2006 was Dato' Zukri Samat, the former Managing Director ofDanaharta and Khazanah
Nasional.
14 "Bank Islam Suffers RM500m Loss", New Straits Times, 1 November 2005,
www.nst.com.mv. Cited 15 November 2005.
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account monitoring and ineffective recognition. He also confirmed that most of the
bad debt comprised loans made to companies in Sarajevo and South Africa and some
of the borrower firms no longer existed.15
The news of the huge losses on BIMB put the spotlight on Malaysia's banking
system, particularly Islamic banking. It raised the question of dereliction of duty on
the part of the government and the regulator. There is further discussion of the BIMB
losses, the first in its history, in section 5.3.
5.2.2 Interview Findings
BIMB was chosen as a case study to find the reasons for the slow implementation of
profit/loss-sharing modes of financing because it was the first Islamic bank in
Malaysia. As a pioneer in the market, its example will be followed by other banks. In
comparison with other Islamic banks and Islamic "windows" banks in Malaysia,
BIMB had already been established ten years earlier, which indicates the Islamic
banks are more stable in resources such as market knowledge and expertise.16
However, the use of the profit/loss-sharing modes of financing remains low.17 These
factors seemed to justify the choice of BIMB for this interview.
The fieldwork for these interviews was carried out in April 2005. Ten members
of staff were interviewed, seven from the Risk Management Department at BIMB's
head office, and three from the state office. They consisted of senior managers,
managers and officers. The data were then validated by interviews with the Chief
15 Ibid.
16 Informal discussion with a few employees of other commercial banks at the Seminar on
Risk Management in Islamic Financial Services, organized by the Centre for Research and
Training (CERT) at the Istana Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 26-27 April 2005.
17
See, Chapter 3 for a statistical analysis of the pro fit/loss-sharing modes of financing from
1983 to 2005.
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Executive Officer, Mr Najib Shaharuddin18 of the Bank Islam Labuan Offshore
Branch (BILOB). The questionnaire concentrated on the factors affecting the Bank's
ability to offer financing products under the profit/loss-sharing modes financing. The
outcome of the interviews is described below.
5.2.2.1 Factors Affecting the Availability of Financing Products under
Mudarabah and Musyarakah Contracts
The interviews with the employees were analysed manually and the factors arranged
as shown in the discussion below. It should be noted that the factors are not in a
particular order, that is, they are not arranged in order of importance according to the
employees participating in the questionnaire. In the discussion, the respondents are
identified as Mr A, Mr N, Mr X and so on, as appropriate. The interviews were con¬
ducted in the Malay language (Bahasa Malaysia).
Staff Competency and Efficiency
Most of the respondents said that BIMB was faced with the problem of human
capital, which was preventing it from offering the financing products under the
profit/loss-sharing system. For example, under a musyarakah contract, the bank in its
role of financier or partner is allowed to have a say in the management of the project,
to monitor its progress and follow up its achievements. In practice, however, it is
very difficult to monitor and control musyarakah financing, for this type of contract
is open to fraud, fund leakage or the overstatement of costs, all of which are hard to
prove. It should be noted that it is even more difficult for a bank to evaluate the
investment viability of a project if the resources, such as human capital, monetary
capital, an appropriate system, etc., are lacking. In mudharabah financing, although
18 He left the Bank in the middle of 2005.
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the bank has no say in the management of a project, nevertheless, it is crucial that it
monitors its progress.
The bank must also have access at all times to the borrower's account to ensure
that the business is conducted correctly and efficiently. Since the return to the bank is
a proportion of the total profit, which, in turn, is linked to the return to the depositors
or investors, the effect of losses could be disastrous. Therefore, the bank employees
monitoring the project to check the validity of invoices and claims and the quality
and quantity of goods etc. supplied by a third party must have the appropriate com¬
petency and expertise. There are other problems, which are shared by the con¬
ventional banks too, such as dishonesty, irresponsibility and other negative behaviour
by the bank's employees themselves. In addition, employees come from a range of
educational. The bank must also have access at all times to the borrower's account to
ensure that the business is conducted correctly and efficiently. Since the return to the
bank is a proportion of the total profit, which, in turn, is linked to the return to the
depositors or investors, the effect of losses could be disastrous. Therefore, the bank
employees monitoring the project to check the validity of invoices and claims and the
quality and quantity of goods etc. supplied by a third party must have the appropriate
competency and expertise. There are other problems, which are shared by the con¬
ventional banks too, such as dishonesty, irresponsibility and other negative behaviour
by the bank's employees themselves. In addition, employees come from a range of
educational backgrounds and most of them do not have a sufficient grounding in the
Shari'a before joining BIMB. An empirical study conducted in the northern states of
Malaysia (Kedah, Perlis and Pulau Pinang) also revealed that employees at both
Islamic banks and Islamic "windows" banks had not received any education relevant
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to Islamic banking. They stated that they did not have a sufficient knowledge of the
Shari'a and Islamic banking.19
Moral Hazard
Moral hazard20 is a critical factor that seriously limits BIMB's ability to offer
profit/loss-sharing modes of financing. That is especially true ofmudharabah financ¬
ing, in which the bank has no means of monitoring and controlling a project. This
could encourage a customer to use the fund too freely or even divert the business or
project from the main purpose of the contract. Financing based on profit/loss-sharing
principles depends heavily on the honesty of the entrepreneur as well as the
efficiency of the bank to assess and evaluate his/her character, capability and
credibility. This is not an easy task, for it affects the returns to the depositors.21
One of the respondents, Mr X, said that the profit/loss-sharing modes of
financing, especially mudharabah, were probably more suited to an earlier way of
life, when members of a community were more closely tied to one another. Thus,
they had a good knowledge of one another's character and capabilities and knew
whom they could trust. Nowadays, however, life is very different, for modernization
has caused the disintegration of community relationships. Furthermore, the advances
in modern technology have contributed to fraud and negligence in banking, and
19 Zairani Zainol, Rohaya Shaari, and Hafizi Muhammad Ali, "A Comparative Analysis on
Bankers' Perceptions on Islamic Banking". Paper presented at the National Seminar on
Islamic Banking and Finance 2006 (1BAF 2006), Kolej Universiti Islam Malaysia (KUIM),
Kuala Lumpur, 30-31 August, 2006.
20 The notion of moral hazard is commonly used in financial regulation. It refers to policies
that may encourage reckless behaviour (see Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global
Economy (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), p. 155).
21 To avoid serious misuse of investors's funds and to ensure that the funds are well
protected, BIMB Holdings - Bank Islam (M) Berhad, also one of its subsidiaries -
established BIMB Musyarakah Satu Sdn Bhd and BIMB Musyarakah Dua Sdn Bhd as a
subsidiary, whose main activities are a venture capital company and an investment company.
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therefore, it is almost impossible to adopt systems that are based on trust and do not
require any collateral. Most of the respondents agreed that it was difficult and,
indeed, almost impossible, to find trustworthy entities today compared with the era
of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). Mr A also pointed out that in the literature of Islamic
economics, the Muslim economists assume the ideal situation, where the entre¬
preneur is a good Muslim and the transaction under the profit/loss-sharing system
will work smoothly without any difficulty.
Warde also reveals that for many people, religious fervour was a reason to
work for an Islamic bank or to conduct business with it. Nevertheless, "it was soon
discovered that religion could be a double-edged sword."22 He states that in the
Qur'an, there are numerous references to hypocrites. Since time immemorial, swind¬
lers have used the cover of religion as a means of rapid enrichment. He quotes a
saying attributed to L. Ron Hubbard, founder of the Church of Scientology: "If you
want to get rich, start a religion."23
Satkunasingan and Shanmugam have pointed out that the existence of
corruption and evidence of the failure to enforce good governance requirements are
among the factors discouraging Islamic banks from adopting modes of financing that
offer greater opportunity for corporate mismanagement and abuse. Nevertheless,
during the interviews, the respondents did not reveal directly that the extra
susceptibility of BIMB to these problems was due to past and current political
interference and manipulation in the corporations and the banking industry.24
22
Warde, op. cit., p. 155.
23 Ibid.
24
Elsa Satkunasingan and Bala Shanmugam, "Disclosure and Governance of Islamic Banks:
A Case Study of Malaysia", Journal ofInternational Banking Regulation, vol.6, no. 1 (2004),
p.74.
21 1
Satkunasingan and Shanmugam point out that politics in Malaysia during the 1990s
heralded close relations between business people and politicians. This was later
known as "cronyism", in which evidence showed that politicians were engaged in
awarding contracts to business people who returned favours.25 It was also believed
that in some situations, "politicians or their family members owned businesses and
obtained government contracts easily and this was part and parcel of patronage poli¬
tics practiced within political parties in Malaysia very soon after independence."26 In
addition, "political supporters of the ruling party were rewarded with directorships
on the boards of such state corporations, despite their lack of experience and, at
times, lack of integrity."27 The Asian financial crisis in 1997 was believed to have
been caused by the lack of transparency and accountability of Asian banks and it
brought about the incorporation of some of the principles recommended by the
Cadbury and Hampel Committee into the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance
2000.28
Satkunasingam and Shanmugam assert that one of the aims of the Code is to
encourage companies to have independent non-executive directors on the board to
ensure good corporate governance. However, the Code has not addressed how to
protect the independence of the board from political influence. Satkunasingam and
Shanmugam also believe that the banking sector was "not independent of politicians
who interfered with the central banks' recommendations of sound financial practices
In 1981, BMF (Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Finance Ltd) as a subsidiary to Bank Bumiputra
Malaysia Berhad lost RM2.5 billion to three property developers in Hong Kong. The
managers of BMF were found to have had a friendly relationship with the developers and the







to serve their political interests or those of their cronies."29 The customers placing
mudharabah deposits in Islamic banks have to bear only the risks normally attached
to these accounts, not the risks imposed by corrupt politicians. Therefore, the authors
suggest that Islamic banks should not operate according to mudharabah principles,
but instead in a conventional manner by requesting collateral from the borrowers
who wish to obtain loans from them. However, it is a question of whether the
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance can be fully implemented, for it is
currently seen as an example of "law in books", rather than "law in action", although
certain parts of the Code have been incorporated into the listing requirements of the
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.30
"Cronyism" is not a new problem in Malaysia. The former prime minister, Tun
Dr Mahathir Mohamed, had an altercation with his successor, Dato' Seri Abdullah
Badawi,31 over this question. The first row erupted in April 2006, when Abdullah
cancelled plans to build what was to have been the Malaysian half of a new bridge
between Malaysia and Singapore. This new link was one of several "mega-projects"
approved when Mahathir was in power. Abdullah's action gave Mahathir the oppor¬
tunity to launch a stream of allegations against him. Mahathir's allegations included
the mismanagement of Proton (the national motor manufacturers), and the growing
influence of Abdullah's relations in obtaining government contracts and deals.32 At




31 Abdullah was made deputy prime minister after Mahathir dismissed his predecessor,
Anwar Ibrahim, in 1998.
32 Romen Bose, "Malaysian Leaderships Spat Steps up a Gear", Monday, 30 October 2006
www.aliazeera.net. cited 31 October 2006
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In addition, corruption is one of the factors contributing to the low level of
participation of Islamic banks in the profit/loss-sharing modes of financing.3 ' A few
of the respondents admitted that this was true of BIMB, for corruption could
seriously harm the system and the Bank had to protect its depositors. The evidence of
the level of corruption in Malaysia is reflected in the statistics compiled by
Transparency International, a non-governmental organization founded in Berlin in
1993.34
Malaysia as aMultiracial Country
Most of the respondents contended that Malaysia was a multiracial country where
different faiths were followed by the various ethnic groups. Therefore, it would be
difficult to adopt the profit/loss-sharing system wholesale. In Malaysia, there are
large numbers of non-Muslims, whose beliefs are very different from those of
33
Satkunasingan and Shanmugam, op. cit., p. 79.
,4
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, www.transparencv.org. This is
a composite survey of the perceptions of business people and country analysts, both resident
and non-resident. The survey is widely used as a reference by investors and therefore, it has
a marked effect on a country's economic and political interests. According to Hamden
Ramli, "Indeks Rasuah: Kedudukan Malaysia Merosot Ke Tangga 44", Utusan Malaysia, 7
November 2006, www.utusan.com.mv (cited 8 November 2006). Malaysia in 2006 is ranked
at 44, having fallen from its 39th position of 163 countries in 2005. The ranking has revealed
that the Corruption Perception Index for Malaysia has slipped from 5.1 on a scale of 1-10
(where 10 denotes clean and 1 extremely corrupt) in 2005 to 5.0 in 2006. At a Press
conference held in Kuala Lumpure on 6 November 2006, Datuk Zakaria Jaafar, the Deputy
Director-General of the Anti-Corruption Academy (ACA) announced the result of the
Corruption Perceptions Index. He pointed out that the rise in the number of complaints about
corruption was a good sign of public confidence in the ACA. At the World Ethics and
Transparency inaugural in Kuala Lumpur, a Minister in the Prime Minister's Department,
Tan Sri Bernard Giluk Dompok, said: "There were certain weaknesses in the study
methodology as Malaysia's CPI score was based on a composite of corruption indicators
from nine institutes, while some other countries scores were based on fewer studies.
Nevertheless, these problems with their perception and image will only spur us to work
harder to address the perceived lag between the formulation ofnew policies and the actual
implementation of these policies on the ground." He added that the concept of transparency
had become irrevocably linked to competitiveness, thus giving reason for the current
administration to highlight transparency, ethics and accountability as cornerstones of
improving the nation. See, "Malaysia Trying to Attain Greater Transparency",
www.mstar.com.mv. Cited 12 February 2007.
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Muslims. Since there is a wide choice of banks and products, non-Muslim customers
prefer to put their hard-earned savings in a low-risk investment, for they have the
assurance that they will receive a fixed amount of money. In their view, this is
preferable to sharing the risk, despite the possibility that returns on profit/loss-
sharing accounts would be higher, because these accounts also carry the risk of
losing part or all of the principal. Non-Muslim customers are not influenced by
religion or the wish to avoid riba, and therefore, they can choose the bank that gives
them excellent service, high return, etc. It cannot be denied, however, that the
Islamic banks have a small number of non-Muslim customers, who state that they are
impressed with the system operated by these banks.
The motives of Muslim customers are still open to question. As pointed out by
Warde, nowadays, it is very difficult to measure accurately the relative importance of
the two reasons - one religious and the other financial/commercial - why people
choose to deal with Islamic financial institutions.35 In his view, the motives for parti¬
cipation in any human endeavour are complex. In addition, the surveys conducted so
far can be misleading, for respondents are always likely to exaggerate the role of
religion. Warde further emphasizes that although there are innumerable marketing
tools available to segment markets and analyse customers' needs and characteristics,
the religious dimension remains indefinable.
It was stated by a few respondents that if BIMB were to survive and have an
advantage over its competitors, it would need to attract as many depositors as
possible. It should be noted that another aspect of Islamic banking was highlighted,
namely, the lack of marketing effort by the Islamic banks themselves. Most of the
j5
Warde, op. cit., p. 159.
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respondents agreed that the marketing efforts by BIMB were not intensive, compared
with their competitors from Islamic "windows" banks and conventional banks. In
BIMB (when these interviews were conducted), the marketing efforts were handled
by the Business Development Manager at the state office.36
Concentration of Other Types of Products and Services
BIMB offers many types of financing and deposit/investment products and services
to its customers. It was also pointed out by a few respondents that a concentration on
other types of financing products contributed to a low use of profit/loss-sharing
modes of financing. Many of the respondents said that the reason was that the Bank's
experience and expertise were in products such as al-bai' bithaman ajil, murabahah,
etc. However, one of the respondents, Mr N, said that BIMB should concentrate on a
particular market or specialization. He added that currently, BIMB did not focus on a
particular market, whereas it could make full use of its resources to exploit the
market where it had the greatest capability.
The question of capital was raised by some of the respondents as a factor
restricting BIMB's use of the profit/loss-sharing modes of financing. Mr N said that
the greater concentration of capital in other types of financing meant that an
insufficient amount was available to support profit/loss-sharing modes of financing.
Legislation
The question of legislation was raised by one of the respondents, Mr A. He gave the
example of a musyarakah joint venture, in which capital contributed by the partners
belonged to the partnership. Therefore, the title to the capital should be in the name
of the partnership to indicate its common ownership. However, Section 66 of the
16 At that time, the division of the regional office was based on the state office.
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Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 (BAFIA) imposes restrictions on the
holding of shares in other corporations and the holding of immovable property other
than that which is necessary for conducting on its business, except where it is taken
by way of security for loans. The Central Bank may approve the holding of shares in
selected corporations. In addition, there is no civil law specifically covering
profit/loss-sharing modes of financing to protect the bank from any losses resulting
from fraud or default by the other party. Bakar also agrees that one problem of equity
financing in the Islamic banking system in Malaysia is the structural issues:
Structural issues are issues related to the existing bank regulations, tax structure
and other regulatory issues. Even though the Islamic Banking Act 1983 gives
more flexibility to Islamic banks in terms of financing products, other aspects
are very similar to conventional banks, flexibility is not elaborated and in
practice, the Interest-Free Banking Scheme (SPTF) guidelines issued by Bank
Negara also do not clearly provide the guidelines for mudharabah and
musyarakah financing. Also, there is a limit of a 10% shareholding by a bank in
a particular company under the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989
(Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 (Act 372), Section 46 (1) (a). This
amount is so insignificant that the entrepreneur has to approach several
investors to take off a new venture. Most banks are still unsure on what they can
or cannot do, whether mudharabah and musharakah financing will affect their
capital adequacy ratio, what are the relevant accounting treatment and the like.
Confirmation on any issues requires clarification from Bank Negara or other
regulatory agencies and this could delay a financing exercise. This eventually
could lead to banks taking the easy way out and resorting to other more con¬
venient tools of financing such as murabahah and bai 'bithaman ajilT
According to Bakar, BNM has its reason for limiting the shareholding to 10 per cent.
The aim is to avoid the formation of a conglomerate of the banks and a giant
company, which might create a monopoly. However, since BIMB is governed by the
Islamic Banking Act 1983, it has the freedom to exceed the limit of 10 per cent
shareholding in any particular company.38
j7 Mohd Daud Bakar, "Contracts in Islamic Commercial and Their Application in Modern
Islamic Financial Systems". Teaching material used at the Centre for Research and Training,
Kuala Lumpur, 2002, p.32.
38 Ibid.
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5.3 Product Innovation and Development
In Malaysia, product innovation and development are very important in Islamic
banking, owing to its structure and the market itself. The aim here is to protect the
parties concerned, that is, both the customers and the banks. Therefore, the Shari'a
experts and practitioners must be prepared to meet the challenges for innovation, to
construct and develop products that are efficient, competitive and practical from the
perspective of modern banking. It should be noted that the products must be
available at a fair price. This section examines the view put forward by el-Gamal
concerning Islamic financial products.
5.3.1 El-Gamal's Views
El-Gamal looks at the reasons for the price difference between Islamic and
conventional financial products:
The term "Islamic finance" brings to mind an analogy to the concept of a
"Christian shoe," rather than to good products that are fairly priced. Indeed, we
shall see that the primary emphasis in Islamic finance is not on efficiency and
fair pricing. Rather, the emphasis is on contract mechanics and certification of
Islamicity by the "Shari'a Supervisory Board." To the extent that "Islamic"
financial products also cost more than the conventional products they seek to
replace - partly because of relative inefficiency, and partly to cover otherwise
unnecessary jurist and lawyer fees — one may make partial analogies between
those certifications and the European pre-Reformation practice of selling
indulgence certificates.39
El-Gamal asserts that an analysis of the products and services currently offered
under an Islamic financial system shows that innovation has almost caught up with
'9
Mahmoud A. el-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.l. Regarding the price difference between Islamic and
conventional financial products, Mr M from Bank B says: "There are many factors
determining product pricing. Among others are an unfriendly legal and tax regime, and a risk
premium imposed on new ideas or product invention. All these occur during the stages of
research and development and initial production, which is what happened to Islamic banking
in the late 1980s. Now, if you look at the mature debt capital market in Malaysia, especially
the Islamic sukuklbond of the same rating, it is always cheaper than its conventional
counterpart. Among the reasons for this are a friendly legal and tax regime, a lower product
risk premium, and high Islamic money liquidity."
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the conventional sector.40 He says that jurists are likely to continue offering innova¬
tions that will eventually lead to a convergence of Islamic financial practice with its
conventional counterpart. This situation will, in turn, cause disappointment among
both potential new customers and existing customers of the Islamic financial institu¬
tions, for the differentiation between an Islamic product and its conventional counter¬
part will appear increasingly contrived.41 He criticizes the functions of the bankers,
lawyers and jurists on the Shari'a Board concerning product development:
Interactive discussions between bankers, lawyers, and jurists commonly start
with an existing conventional product for which no Islamic alternatives are
available. The three groups then engage in a process of financial reengineering
of the product, replacing its various conventional components that are deemed
un-Islamic with others that can be presented to the public and defended as
Islamic. In the later stage of product development and marketing, the vehicle of
choice has been modification and adoption of pre-modern nominate financial
contract names. Coverage of the pre-modern contracts in classical jurisprudence
texts thus makes the new products identifiable as Islamic. To maintain credibi¬
lity, industry practitioners insist on using Arabic names of contracts, for
instance, "ijara " instead of equivalent "lease," or "murabaha" instead of the
equivalent"cost-plus sale."n
El-Gamal proposes refocusing Islamic finance on its substance instead of its
form by abandoning the "paradigm" of the "Islamization" of every financial
practice.43 The brand name of Islamic finance would also require reorienting to







43 It is interesting to note that during the interview with Mr W, a banker from Bank C in
Malaysia gave his opinion that the Islamic financial products were the the result of the
"Islamization" of conventional products. It means that the development of Islamic financial
products has been based on conventional products. Tan Sri Nor Mohamed Yakcop also
pointed out: "We believe a dual system is better than a pure Islamic system. In a
conventional banking system, changes are made every day and new products are developed
as more research and development is done. Products get more sophisticated by the day. And
if you do not have a conventional banking system, you would not know what is happening in
the outside world. Because we have it in Malaysia, Islamic banks will have to learn to find
products to keep the Islamic banking system on its toes when compared with the
conventional banking system." See, Jagdev Singh Sidhu, "Malaysian Islamic Banking", New
Straits Times, 29 October 2001.
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and so on. In other words, he argues that "Islamic" in "Islamic Finance" should relate
to the social and economic ends of financial transactions, rather than contract
mechanisms with which financial ends are achieved.44 He concludes that the ethical
and development goals are shared widely by Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
Hence, once "Islamic finance outgrows its formulaic current mode of operation, and
assumes a new identity based on substantive and ethical religious tenets, it will no
longer need to hide behind the "Islamic" brand name.45
5.3.2 Malaysian Islamic Financial Institutions: Product Innovation and
Development
Prior to 2004, Islamic banks and financial institutions in Malaysia were required to
consult BNM before introducing new products and services.46 The aim of this
requirement was the careful control of development so as to ensure the effective
assessment and management of the inherent risks and the acceptability of introducing
innovations to the banking customers and the financial market as a whole.
Nevertheless, BNM regarded the prior approval of all new products and services as
one of the obstacles to innovation. In July 2004, BNM issued a new set of guidelines
recommending that the approach of "what is not prohibited is allowed" be adopted
towards new Islamic financial products. The updated procedure requiring only the
simple notification of new products for specific approval was designed as an
44
El-Gamal, op. cit., pp.11-12.
45
Ibid., p. 191.
46 Bank Negara Malaysia, Guidelines on New Product Approval Requirements (for Islamic
Banking Institutions), July 2003. According to BNM, a new product comprises: (1) a product
or service that has never been introduced by the Islamic banking institutions/banking group;
(2) an existing approved product or service that is applying a different or new combination of
Shari'a concepts; (3) a combination of existing approved products or services that have
already been offered by the Islamic banking institutions/banking group; or (4) the enhance¬
ment of an existing approved product or service, which has never been introduced by the
Islamic banking institutions/banking group.
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incentive to Islamic financial institutions to concentrate on further innovation.47
Figure 5.1 illustrates the three steps of the standard procedure to be followed when a
new product has been developed, ending with an application to BNM - as the
regulator - for approval.
47 Ibid. According to Mr. Ismail Taib (BIMB), these guidelines were implemented in August
2003.
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Figure 5.1 Standard Procedure for Product Development Approval48
Variation on an existing product (Step 1) includes modifications made to an existing
approved product or service that is already offered by the Islamic banking institution or
banking group.
222
In general, to approve a new product,49 excluding the variation on an existing
product, BNM requires Islamic financial institutions to provide the following infor¬
mation:
• Islamic financial institutions must describe in detail how they intend to finance
the necessary skills, expertise, resources and infrastructure to enable the effec¬
tive provision of the new product, for example, staff retraining.
• The product owner must describe the potential risks arising from the intro¬
duction of the new product, the method of quantifying the downside risks, as
well as their mitigation and management.
• The endorsement of the relevant compliance and risk units/departments
(particularly the Heads of Risk Management, Internal Audit, Compliance,
Information Technology, and/or the Legal Department) concerning the ability
to manage risk arising from the introduction of the new product must be
provided.
• The endorsement must include the readiness of the Information Technology
(IT) system to monitor and manage the new product so that operational risk is
minimized.
49
Applications for approval (last item of Step 3) fall into one of the following two
categories: (1) a new product that qualifies for automatic approval; or (2) a new product that
does not qualify for automatic approval. The conditions for automatic approval must include
the following: (1) the new product must be part of the approved business of the Islamic
banking institution; (2) the new product must conform to the Shari'a concepts approved for
that type of product or service; (3) if the prohibition of the new product is based on the
Shari'a requirements of another country, the Islamic financial institutions need comply only
with those approved in Malaysia; (4) a certain minimum level of product transparency must
be made known to customers. If a new product does not qualify for automatic approval, then
application must be made to BNM for specific approval. Assessment might therefore take
longer, especially if the approval of the Shari'a Advisory Council is required. However,
where approval of variations on an existing product is sought, the Islamic financial
institutions need disclose only the relevant modifications.
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• A description is also required of the security features and controls that are to be
used, for example, to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of
information.
• The application must include the endorsement and decision of the Shari'a
Committee concerning the compliance of the new product's concept and
mechanism/structure with the Shari'a. The relevant fiqh literature and support¬
ing evidence and reasoning must also be submitted.
• Other important information to be provided is the accounting treatment to be
applied to the new product, particularly the regulatory and capital adequacy
requirement.
Further examination of the guidelines indicates that financing products under the
mudharabah and musyarakah systems do not qualify for automatic approval and
should therefore be submitted to BNM for specific approval. This situation could be
viewed as one of the impediments to innovation in this type of financing, for Islamic
financial institutions might prefer to follow a safe and simple procedure to introduce
new products, thus avoiding an application that might be lengthy and complicated.
However, during a further interview, Mr R, who was employed in one of the
Islamic financial institutions in Malaysia, said that BNM had formed a working
group (WGMMF) in 2001 to promote mudharabah and musyarakah financing. Its
members comprised representatives from BNM, Islamic banks and Skim Perbankan
Islam (SPI) banks. They were also supported with input from external parties such as
Shari'a advisers, academics, practitioners and lawyers. In addition, the group had
studied the practice of the Islamic banking system in Sudan. From these studies,
according to Mr R, the group was able to highlight certain issues concerning
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mudharabah and musyarakah financing in Malaysia. Under the present system of
Islamic banking, one of the suggestions made by the group was the implementation
ofmusyarakah mutanaqisah (diminishing musyarakah) financing.50 However, certain
changes would be required in the current laws and regulations, particularly in the Tax
Act, Stamp Duty Act, accounting treatments, BAFIA, and the Partnership Act, to
allow the financing models to be implemented smoothly. The group also suggested
that for more specific solutions to be found, further input was needed from Shari'a
advisers, lawyers and the authorities.51
5.4 Regulation and Supervision
The discussion throughout Chapter 4 has shown that managing risk is crucial,
particularly in Islamic banking. Therefore, sound regulation and supervision are very
important to support the system. According to Chapra and Khan, "The greater market
50
Musyarakah mutanaqisah (diminishing musyarakah) is said to have some important
advantages over bai' bithaman ajil contract, for example: (1) Owing to its greater flexibility,
musyarakah mutanaqisah is a serious alternative to a conventional mortgage. Customers
have the options of floating rates and revolving facilities, as well as a combination of term
and revolving facilities. (2) Should delinquent/default financing occur, musyarakah
mutanaqisah is better able to survive and control the situation. Under bai' bithaman ajil, on
the other hand, the selling price stated in the contract restricts any restructuring or
rescheduling of the financing facilities. It is not a good economic decision to draw up a new
buy and sell contract, which is likely to incur further legal and administrative costs. (3) A
contract for a property under construction needs a content that is not open to dispute, which
can be provided under musyarakah mutanaqisah. When combined with istisnathis type of
contract clearly defines the responsibilities of the parties concerned. This is unlike bai'
bithaman ajil which is clearly involve the element ofgharar when a property which is not
yet exist is used as an underlying asset in the trading transaction. (4) Musyarakah
mutanaqisah is an Islamic means of financing property, which has been accepted throughout
the world. See, "Islamic Home Loans for Everyone", The Star Online, 12 June 2007.
51
According to Mr K, Marketing Manager at one of the Islamic financial institutions in
Malaysia (May, 2007), it is not yet available in Malaysia, although it is practised throughout
the Arab world, particularly in the Gulf States. The reason appears to be that musyarakah
mutanaqisah contract in Malaysia means joint venture financing between the bank and the
corporate customer, and an individual cannot be a corporate customer. However, it is
interesting to note that the Kuwait Finance House (one of three Middle East banks in
Malaysia has recently offered musyarakah mutanaqisah for house financing to their retail
customers in Malaysia. See, www.kfli.com.mv . See also, "Kuwait Finance House Introduces
New Islamic Financing Product", BERNAMA, 8 May 2006.
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discipline that the Islamic system has the potential of introducing in the financial
system cannot, however, eliminate the need for regulation and supervision."52 Yet,
they also point out: "Regulation should not, however, be so tight and comprehensive
that it raises compliance costs unbearably and also strangulates innovation and
creativity."53 It is certainly true that since banks deal with deposits from the public,
effective supervision and regulation are necessary to create public confidence and
financial stability, and, moreover, to protect them from fraud and mismanagement.
However, if the banks are to use their expertise most efficiently, then regulation
should not be too stringent.
It has been stated in Chapter 3 that the financial system in Malaysia, which
includes the Islamic financial institutions, is under the supervision of BNM as the
central national bank. According to Satkunasingan and Shammugam, the Malaysian
government implicitly and unilaterally guarantees all deposits in the banks in
Malaysia. However, it gives no written guarantee to this effect.54 Should a bank
invest and lose depositors' funds, consumers would be given to understand that the
loss would not have to be borne by the bank alone and that the government would
refund the depositors' savings, even if only in part.55
The huge losses of BIMB have already been mentioned in section 5.2. Yet,
since financial losses are related to supervision and regulation, this section investi¬
gates the case of BIMB in greater detail. In addition, the management of risk in both
BIMB and BNM are briefly discussed to give an insight into their current practices.
52 M. Umer Chapra and Tariqullah Khan, Regulation and Supervision ofIslamic Banks




Satkunasingan and Shanmugan, op. cit., p.71.
55 Ibid.
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5.4.1 BIMB: The Losses
Criticism of the losses incurred by BIMB has shown that managing risk is crucial
from the point of view of not only the financial institutions but also that of the
regulatory authorities and the government.
BIMB's losses have raised questions about Malaysia's banking system, for
they followed the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, and also about political
connections in the corporate and financial world. How strong and autonomous is the
country's regulatory framework in scrutinizing questionable loans and decisions,
especially in a free-rolling offshore financial centre such as Labuan?56
It has been mentioned in section 5.2 that most of the losses were attributed to
Bank Islam Labuan Offshore Branch (BILOB).57 BILOB is the conversion of Labuan
Offshore Subsidiary (Bank Islam) [L] Ltd [BILL] on 10 December 2004. The loans
were distributed in US dollars mainly overseas from 1998, the majority in 2002 and
2003.58 BIMB's former Chief Executive Officer, Dato' Noorazman, said:
The Labuan outfit appeared to have operated without much oversight when it
was subsidiary. It had a separate Board. And it had management sitting on the
Board as well, which is not right. Loans were given out generously without
sufficient understanding of the risks involved, including country and project
risks.59
It is also stated in BIMB's Annual Report (2005) that the "conversion of BILL into
an offshore branch of the Bank led to the adoption of stricter non-performing
financing (NPF) regulations as a more stringent risk management framework, result¬
ing in more prudent financial reporting of BILOB activities."60 The closer super-
56
Netto, op. cit.




60 Bank Islam (M) Berhad, Annual Report (2005), op. cit., p.4.
227
vision and tighter accounting standards for non-performing financing (NPF) revealed
that the losses were much larger than that which its Kuala Lumpur head office had
expected.61 During the financial crisis, BIMB could not transfer the non-performing
financing to Danaharta, as did other conventional banks, because Danaharta could
not remove the loans from BIMB's records owing to its inability to take Shari'a-
compliant loans.62
5.4.1.1 Criticism of the Losses
This disturbing and shocking news was also discussed in Parliament.63 During the
debate on the Budget for 2006 on 26 October 2005, Lim Kit Siang from the
Democratic Action Party or DAP (an Opposition party), asked the government to
give details of the results of the investigation. He also called for a White Paper to be
tabled with a report on action taken against those responsible.64 Salahuddin Ayub,
from the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia or PAS (also an Opposition party), urged the Prime
Minister to intervene in the BIMB affair, adding that those who misappropriated
funds from Bumiputra agencies for their personal gain were traitors.65 Dato'
Mohamed Aziz, from the Barisan Nasional Party or BN (ruling coalition), said that
the reaction to the losses seemed to suggest that it was "a small matter" or "not really
important".66 He urged that "those responsible should be heavily punished."67 When
winding up the debate on the 2006 Budget, Datuk Tengku Putera Tengku Awang, the
Deputy Finance Minister, promised that the government had no intention of disguis-
61
Netto, op. cit.
62 "New Management Takes Big Hit to Move Ahead Afresh", New Straits Times, 27 October
2005 (cited 8 July 2007).






ing BIMB's losses and if there had indeed been negligence by an individual, then
that person would be punished.68 Earlier, on 25 October 2005, the Second Finance
Minister, Nor Mohamed Yakcop, had told Parliament that the losses were due not to
a failure of Islamic banking principles but to the negligence of some officers and that
action would be taken against those concerned in the case.69 The Prime Minister,
Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi, said that B1MB must quickly identify and act against
those officers responsible for the bad loans, for negligence and inefficiency were not
an excuse.70 He added:
This is very important because banks are involved in business activities using
other people's money and any action on the part of officers that can result in
losses must be viewed very seriously.71 Otherwise, there will be this perception
that we are not serious about punishing the guilty party. In time, this will erode
their confidence in banks.72
The Prime Minister also said that the loss had, to a certain extent, damaged the image
of the Bank, though its integrity remained intact.73
Despite the public criticism of the losses, it was reported that, according to
banking analysts, Malaysia's Islamic banking industry was in a healthy state and
would not be affected by BIMB's losses.74 The analysts pointed out that BIMB's
losses were mainly due to the new management's decision to tackle bad debt and that
the Bank's performance was not a systemic problem that would jeopardise the whole
68 Ibid.
69
"Pegawai Cuai Punca Bank Islam Rugi RM700 juta", Utusan Malaysia , 24 October 2005.
Cited 26 October, 2005.
70 "Hukum Pegawai Cuai Sebabkan Bank Islam Rugi RM700 juta", Utusan Malaysia, 27




74 "Islamic Banking Industry Healthy", New Straits Times, 8 October 2005. Cited 9 October,
2005.
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establishment.75 On the other hand, Edmund Terenze Gomez, a political economist at
the University of Malaysia and temporarily attached to the United Nations Research
Institute for Social Development in Geneva, felt that the Ministry of Finance, too,
should share collective responsibility for the regulatory weaknesses that contributed
to BIMB's dilemma.76 He said:
The regulatory bodies can't be held solely responsible, given the questionable
issue of their autonomy. The Executive has to be held accountable [as well],
especially since the Ministry of Finance is led also by the Prime Minister.77
He added:
The problem, however, with institutions like BIMB, which is majority-owned
by government agencies, is that the activities are monitored and regulated by
bodies that have a say over managerial appointments and presumably, by
extension, over decision-making by directors. The BIMB crisis suggests that we
may have a problem of selective corporate governance, or worse, outside
interference in the management of this bank. Given the extent of the power of
the Executive over other arms of government, this would suggest that regulatory
bodies may not have enough autonomy to act independently. This crisis
suggests that since the government presently has ownership and control of a
large number of publicly listed firms and banks, it should seriously review a
number of issues including devolution of power to regulatory bodies and ensure
that the directors of these quoted firms and banks have the capacity to act
independently and transparently.78
According to Netto, the Bank's woes also put the Labuan Offshore Financial
Services Authority (FOFSA)79 uncomfortably under the spotlight. It was reported
that the lack of autonomy from the Executive and the central bank was highlighted in
an International Monetary Fund assessment report released in December 2004 - at
about the same time that BIMB was coming under closer scrutiny. An IMF team






79 Ibid. LOFSA, established in 1996, is a statutory body that reports to a Board (authority)
and to the Finance Minister on the overall management and regulation of Labuan.
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Labuan's regulatory and supervisory arrangements complied with internationally
accepted standards and good practices. Some of the findings were as follows:
Autonomy of LOFSA within Malaysian government not fully transparent.
Develop memoranda of understanding (MoUs) between LOFSA and the
Finance Ministry and LOFSA and BNM (the central bank), spelling out Execu¬
tive and operational arrangements.
All the essential elements for suitable framework for financial supervision with
LOFSA staff well-trained and experienced and funding adequate. But it is noted
that non-performing loans are relatively high in the banking sector and demand
for credit has been soft.
Average profitability is low and a number of banks and insurance companies
maintain only a token presence. Although supervision has been stepped up,
LOFSA staff resources for the compliance function are currently insufficient to
conduct effective on-and-off-site supervision across the whole offshore in¬
dustry.
Corporate governance standards for offshore financial institutions are not well
developed.
Crucially, the IMF team recommended that "loan classification and provisioning
rules should be rigorous and the capital adequacy risk-weight rule should be revised
to Basel standards."80
When the losses were blamed on the Labuan branch, BIMB had a reputation in
the financial market for being the spoilt child of the Malaysian Ministry of Finance.
The general perception of the Bank was that of a Muslim financial fraternity or
government development institution, whereas, in reality, BIMB had a commercial
banking licence.81 Interviews held by Dato' Mohammad Yusuf Haji Nasir, former
Chairman of BIMB, with Islamic bankers revealed that certain crucial matters had
been overlooked by the management and regulatory authorities in BIMB.82 This
80
Ibid., See also, http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04391.pdf
81 "A Litany of Lost Opportunities", Islamic Banker, November/December 2005.
82 The interviews had been conducted a year earlier, though this fact was revealed only after
the news of the huge losses incurred by BIMB.
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"seasoned Malaysian banking elder" had been brought in by BNM as Chairman in
December 2000. Below are some of the important points made by the former
Chairman:
I was surprised at what I found. The composition of the Board was not appro¬
priate in the sense that there were no bankers or Board members who were
familiar with banking. I am not criticising the past Chairman, because he was
also put there by the authorities. He is not a banker.
I was surprised at the way things were done; the way the Board meetings were
conducted. I knew 1 had a very tough task ahead. BIMB at that time was not run
as a commercial bank. In the public perception, BIMB was just like Bank
Industri or Bank Pembangunan - a government development bank. I told the
senior management that this kind of perception must be erased from the minds
of the general public because BIMB is a commercial bank with a commercial
licence governed by the Islamic Banking Act (BAF1A).
The branches I saw were not what a branch of a bank ought to be. They were
old and dilapidated. I was also informed that the non-performing financing
(NPF) account was very bad. Nobody was looking at it at all. At my previous
bank during the 1998 financial crisis when we had an NPF account of 40
percent, we immediately zeroed in on the NPF account; on the credit policy;
and the staff itself. If the credit policy is not there, the NPF will just balloon. I
mentioned this to the management of BIMB, but somehow the reception was
not there. There was also no reporting to the Board what was happening.
BIMB was established in 1983. The first ten years - it was new and introducing
a new system of banking. After 1993, the Bank should have been more
transparent and commercial. It may be that the management themselves felt that
they were tempered by the authorities. When I went in, I suggested that Bank
Negara inspectors come in and audit BIMB like any other commercial bank,
which they did. They uncovered a lot of things, which the management of the
Bank were unaware were happening. The fact remains that the reporting by
BIMB hitherto was so bad. The management of the Bank seemed lost.
The credit policy assessment and review were very weak. This is where the
NPF account comes in. There was no one with the responsibility of looking
after the account. You give out the loan and that's it. Nobody followed through.
The staff in general at BIMB did not think businesslike or commercial. I told
them that Islam is not like this. You have to be businesslike and commercially-
minded. If the staffs make an error, you don't reprimand them. This is not the
Islamic way. You have to reprimand them. The bank had Board members who
knew nothing about banking, let alone commercial banking. I was very worried
that the policies of the Bank were coming from the Board and they were not
really with [banking and commercial] substance.
Another thing which I insisted on was a strong Board, and for some members
also to sit on the Boards of subsidiaries of the Group, such as the Venture
Capital, Ijara, Asset Management and Takaful entities. Before I arrived, there
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was very little participation of Board members in these subsidiaries. The
management themselves were Board members of the subsidiaries, which I think
is not the way forward. I want the Board members to oversee these subsidiaries,
to help synergise their activities perhaps through co-branding. The branding of
BIMB is good and we need to leverage this.83
5.4.1.2 Current Financial Highlights of BIMB
Finally, on 10 July 2006, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Finance Ministry, Datuk
Hilmi Yahya, told Parliament that the losses incurred by BIMB had been due to weak
credit management in its offshore operations in Labuan, not to any misapprop¬
riation.84 He said that the losses were an isolated case and did not affect the Bank's
domestic operations. Meanwhile, the Bank had taken steps to strengthen its corporate
governance and risk and credit management framework in Labuan.85 However, it
seems that there was no further statement revealing the names of those who were
responsible for the losses.86
For the financial year ended 30 June 2006, BIMB recorded a total net loss of
RM1.29 billion, and as of that date, the Bank's total liabilities exceeded its total
assets by RM277.8 million.87 Despite the Bank's total income of RM960.6 million,
the provision for non-performing financing (NPL) amounted to RM1.48 billion,
resulting in a loss. The Managing Director of BIMB said that it should be profitable
83 Ibid.
84 "Weak Credit Management Blamed for Bank Islam's Loss", Bernama, 10 July 2006.
85 Ibid.
86
Perhaps, with a view to maintaining the stability of the financial system, especially the
Islamic financial system, the government is very careful to announce the outcomes. The
importance of the Islamic banking system can be seen from the statement by Datuk Dr Gan
Khuan Poh (Chairman of the Economic Society ofMalaysia), who said in 2004 that there
was an US$200 billion (RM760 billion) cash investment fund in the market, "moving
towards" the Islamic banking system after having been drawn from the banking system in
the United States after 11 September 2001. He added that the Western countries such as
Britain and Switzerland had realized this potential and begun to establish Islamic financial
systems to grasp those opportunities. See, "Dana RM760b Berlegar Cari Peluang
Pelaburan", Utusan Malaysia, 9 December 2004. Cited 10 December 2004.
87 Bank Islam (M) Berhad, Annual Report (Kuala Lumpur: Bank Islam (M) Berhad, 2006),
p.39.
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in the current financial year ending 30 June 2007. It was making efforts to implement
elements of a turnaround plan, such as human capital development.88 So far, there has
been no negative reaction to the newspaper report of this result on 27 October 2006,
compared with the announcement in 2005, when the loss was even greater. Perhaps
public confidence has been maintained, owing to the news that BIMB has received
an injection of capital from the Dubai Investment Group and Lembaga Tabung Haji.
Despite the loss, the overall total deposits from customers increased from
RM13.4 billion in 2005 to RM14.4 billion in 2006, as shown in Table 5.1.
88 BIMB received an injection of capital from the Dubai Investment Group (DIG) and
Lembaga Tabung Haji, giving these investors a 40 per cent and 9 per cent stake respectively
in the Bank. Group Managing Director ofBIMB said: "Lembaga Tabung Haji is providing
huge synergies in the domestic market, while Dubai Investment Group is providing a bridge
to one of the fastest-growing economic regions in the world, both of which would boost
BIMB's earnings recovery." See, www.bankislam.com.mv. "BIMB Holdings Berhad
Expects to Turn Around in the Current Financial Year and Bank Islam is Working on 'Total
Solution' to Return to Profitability". (Cited 18 June 2006.)
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Table 5.1 Deposit Funds for Bank Islam (M) Berhad for financial years
ended 30 June 2004, 2005 and 2006
2004 2005 2006
Fund RM'000 RM'000 RM'000
Non-Mudharabah
Fund:
Demand deposits 2,686,075 2,954,160 3,650,270
Savings deposits 1,264,025 1,385,432 1,422,174
Negotiable Islamic
Debt Certificates 328,026 747,951 2,480,933
(NIDC)
Others 21,156 18,999 24,897
Total 4,299,282 5,106,542 7,578,274
Mudharabah
Fund:
Savings deposits 364,763 433,229 454,387
General investment 2,903,708 3,110,483 2,417,239
deposits
Special investment 3,692,048 4,823,817 3,927,516
deposits
Others 9,100 9,100 9,100
Total 6,969,619 8,376,629 6,808,242
Total deposits
from customers 11,268,901 13,483,171 14,386,516
Nevertheless, Table 5.1 also shows a reduction in deposits from customers
from the mudharabah fund. Despite the increase in the non-mudharabah fund, there
was a fall in the mudharabah fund from RM8.4 billion in 2005 to RM6.8 billion in
2006. The mudharabah fund in 2006 is also lower compared with that of 2004
(RM6.9 billion). This is a large amount and it could be said that customers were
taking precautions by carefully selecting the products and services that they
considered high risk, since BIMB declared the loss in that financial year.89 Empirical
89 Mr Ahmad Mudahir Omar, Assistant General Manager, Strategic Risk Control and
Compliance, Risk Management Division of BIMB, said: "Reduction in mudharabah deposits
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research could be conducted to highlight the factors contributing to the decline. The
case of BIMB shows that the competence and efficiency of the staff are crucial,
bearing in mind that the Bank's reputation is at stake, for it carries the name of Islam.
5.4.2 BNM: Management of Risk
In April 2004, the BNM announced the timetable of a two-phase implementation of
the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel 2) for conventional banking.90 BNM then
issued a similar schedule for the Islamic banks in September 2004. However, as
stated by David Vicary, the operation of Islamic financial institutions must comply
with both international best practice (standards and guidelines) and the Shari'a.91
Although Basel 2 is sufficiently flexible to accommodate institutions offering Islamic
financial services, nevertheless, it does not cover (1) compliance with the Shari'a;
and (2) risks arising from the unique features of the Islamic financial system such as
the profit/loss-sharing principles. He adds that the design of the Basel 2 mechanism
is such that it could penalize Islamic banks as a result of the unique structures of
Islamic banking products and services. Since there are no international standards and
is not due to the loss. The main reason is the strategy to reduce what is payable, because the
loan and deposits ratio has always been low, yet capital is limited."
90 Basel 2 (also called the New Accord - International Convergence of Capital Measurement
and Capital Standard: A Revised Framework) is the second Basel Accord. It defines capital
and sets minimum capital requirements for internationally active banks in the G10 countries.
Banking supervisors are the guardians of these standards and are expected to enforce them in
their respective jurisdictions. See, Chapra and Khan, op. cit., p.34. Basel 2 uses the concept
of three pillars - (1) minimum capital requirements; (2) supervisory review; and (3) market
discipline - to promote greater stability in the financial system. The earlier Accord, Basel 1,
was adopted in 1988. Previously, there were no standard definitions of bank capital and
minimum capital requirements. By 1998, almost all countries had officially changed their
capital requirements to conform to the Basel Accord (see Joel Bessis, RiskManagement in
Banking, 2nd edn (Chichester, UK : John Wiley, 2002), p. 189. It has also been implemented
in many IDB member countries in addition to the G10 (Chapra and Khan, op. cit., p.34).
Therefore, although initially designed for the industrialized world, international operations
soon ensured a universal standard (Bessis, op. cit., p. 189).
91
David Vicary, "Risk, Risk-Taking and Risk Management Process in Islamic Financial
Services". Paper presented at the seminar on Risk Management in Islamic Financial
Services, Kuala Lumpur, 26-27 April 2005.
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guidelines for Islamic financial institutions to follow, it seems that Bank Negara
Malaysia has to use Basel 2 as the international best practice.
In February 2006, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB)92 issued two
standards - the Capital Adequacy Standard (CAS)93 and the Guiding Principles of
Risk Management (Guiding Principles)94 - for institutions offering Islamic financial
services. The CAS and the Guiding Principles are the first two international stan¬
dards governing the prudential regulatory and supervisory framework of Islamic
banking institutions. According to its Annual Report of 2005, BNM will collaborate
with the Islamic banking institutions to ensure a smooth and successful implementa¬
tion of both standards.95 It is hoped that these two standards and guidelines will be
adopted by all the Islamic financial institutions both in Malaysia and throughout the
world.
In addition, BNM introduced the Bank Negara Malaysia Sukuk Ijarah, a new
Islamic monetary instrument for liquidity management, thus increasing its range of
instruments for managing liquidity in the Islamic money market.96 BNM also issued
92 The IFSB was officially established in 2002 and went into operation on 10 March 2003.
Malaysia, as the host country, passed the Islamic Financial Services Board Act 2002, which
gives the IFSB the immunity and privileges usually granted to international organizations
and diplomatic missions. The IFSB serves as a body setting international standards for
regulatory and supervisory agencies. Its 94 members include 22 regulatory and supervisory
authorities as well as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Bank for
International Settlements, the Islamic Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and
67 financial institutions from 17 countries. Cited 22 November 2006 from www.ifsb.org .
9j Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report (Kuala Lumpur: Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005),
p. 157. The CAS provides guidance to Islamic banking institutions on requirements for
minimum capital adequacy to cover credit, market and operational risk. This is equivalent to
the Basel 2 Capital Framework.
94 Ibid. The Guiding Principles provide specific guidelines for establishing and implementing
effective practices in risk management. Fifteen principles are applied in managing six
categories of risk arising from Islamic contracts: credit, equity investment, market, liquidity,




the Guidelines for the Governance of the Shari'a Committees for Islamic Financial
Institutions, which came into effect on 1 April 2005.97 The BNM also evaluates the
effectiveness of the Shari'a committees in providing correct advice and validating the
compatibility of the Shari'a in the banks' daily operations, such as observing the
adequacy of firewalls to ensure no mixing of Islamic and conventional funds in the
Islamic window operations. Furthermore, the internal auditors of Islamic financial
institutions are also required to ensure that these institutions comply with the Shari'a
principles by formulating an appropriate and comprehensive audit programme and
undergoing the necessary training to implement it.
On realizing that the human factor is the crucial element in Islamic banking,
BNM took the initiative to establish a fund of RM200 million for Shari'a scholars of
Islamic finance. This fund will finance Shari'a research activities, scholarships for
Shari'a studies and the organization of the annual international Shari'a scholars'
forum. Meanwhile, the International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance
(INCEIF) was launched in March 2006, its operations to be supported by an endow¬
ment fund of RM500 million allocated by BNM. The objective of the INCEIF is to
produce high-calibre practitioners and professionals in Islamic finance as well as
specialists and researchers in the disciplines of Islamic finance. At the Governor's
Luncheon Address, Dato' Sri Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of BNM, said that the
establishment of the INCEIF represented an investment in human capital to support
the global development of the Islamic financial services industry. Sustaining and
97
Ibid., p. 161. The number of Shari'a advisers on the Shari'a Committee for Islamic banking
institutions and takaful companies has increased markedly following publication of the
Guidelines, and this would be a means of enlarging the number of Shari'a experts in the
country. Also included on the Committee are former judges, legal practitioners, economists,
and academics in the field offiqh al-mu'amalat. It is hoped that this combination of
background knowledge and expertise will greatly enhance national development.
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supporting the growth of the industry required talent and expertise to promote
innovation and improve performance.98 In addition, initiatives were taken to create
consumer education and awareness. Several road shows were organized by the Asso¬
ciation of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia (AIBIM) to state capitals around
Malaysia, in some ofwhich BNM itself took part.99
To enhance corporate governance in Islamic banks, the Guidelines on Director¬
ship of Islamic Banks were issued in March 2004. Their purpose is to strengthen the
effectiveness of the board of directors, which would assume full responsibility for the
overall management of an Islamic bank.100 To strengthen the legal framework, the
Hire Purchase Act 1967 is being reviewed to cover Islamic purchase contracts, while
other relevant legislation, including the National Land Code, the Companies Act
1965, the Civil Law Act 1956 and the Contract Act 1950, is being studied.101 This is
part of the action taken by the Malaysian government to make legislation consistent
with the Shari'a, to remove obstacles to compliance with the Shari'a in product
development and innovation and also to encourage participation in Shari'a instru¬
ments.102 In 2001, it was stated in the Financial Sector Master Plan that to expand the
Islamic financial market, one of the actions to be taken would be to encourage
mudharabah and musyarakah financing by establishing a special fund or subsidiary
for that purpose. Islamic banks would need to conduct studies to identify potential
98 Zeti Akhtar Aziz, "Governor's Luncheon Address: Launching of INCEIF", Bulletin
INCEIF (July 2006), pp. 1 -3.
99
BankNegara Malaysia (2005), op. cit., p. 165.
100 Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report (Kuala Lumpur: Bank Negara Malaysia, 2004),
p.161.
101 Bank Negara Malaysia (2005), op. cit., p. 162.
102 Ibid.
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areas where these modes of financing would be most feasible.103 However, to date,
there has been no further development in this aspect of Islamic finance.
The action described above is part ofwhat has been done so far to improve the
system for Islamic banks to operate with BNM as the central bank.104 It shows that
BNM and the Malaysian government have the serious intention of further developing
and exploiting the Islamic banking system. Nevertheless, it can be achieved only
with the close supervision of the participants and the firm enforcement of the rules.
Otherwise, the guidelines will be useless and could be described as "in the book
guidelines only".
5.4.3 BIMB: Management of Risk
Further analysis of BIMB's annual report has found that only in the year ended 2004
was there a clear statement indicating the responsibilities of the Board of Directors in
creating and implementing policies for the management of risk. This was in line with
the instructions from BNM to adopt Basel 2 in September 2004. The Board of
Directors is also responsible for ensuring the effective management of the internal
ICb Bank Negara Malaysia, Financial Sector Master Plan (Kuala Lumpur: Bank Negara
Malaysia, 2001), p. 158.
104 There have been further developments in the Islamic financial system in Malaysia. Prime
Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi has announced six major measures to help the
sector become a leading international centre of Islamic financial services: (1) exemption
from income tax for 10 years is to be granted to all Islamic banks and takaful companies that
conduct their business in foreign currencies; (2) an additional exemption from 20 per cent
stamp duty for 3 years is to be granted on instruments related to Islamic financing; (3)
exemption from income tax for 10 years is to be granted to managers of local and foreign
funds who manage Islamic funds for foreign investors; (4) personal tax relief on study fees,
up to a maximum of RM5,000 per year, will be extended to Islamic studies conducted in
institutions of higher learning, including the International Centre for Education in Islamic
Finance; (5) tax deductions are to be given on expenses incurred in establishing an Islamic
stock broking firm; (6) tax deductions on expenses incurred in the issuance of Islamic
products are to be extended from the year of assessment 2008 to 2010. See, "Six Measures to
Boost Islamic Finance", The Star Online, 2 September 2006, www.thestar.com.my. Cited 20
December 2006.
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control mechanism.105 It is assisted by the Risk Management Committee and the
Audit and Examination Committee in discharging these roles. The Risk Management
Committee is expected to formulate policies as well as identify, measure, manage,
control and monitor the credit, market, liquidity, and operational risks.106 The
Committee consists wholly of non-executive directors and is chaired by an
independent non-executive director. In the Bank's Annual Report for the financial
year 2005, it is stated:
The Committee constantly reviews risk issues to ensure effective management
of risk tolerance at the Bank. In addition, the Committee is entrusted to review
and assess the adequacy of the existing risk management framework in addres¬
sing the various risk factors faced by the Bank.107
Meanwhile, the Audit and Examination Committee is responsible for ensuring
a good internal control framework and compliance. It comprises four non-executive
directors, of whom three, including the Chairman, are independent non-executive
directors.108 In addition, the Internal Audit Department is required to conduct a risk
management audit. The audit plan includes reviews of the adequacy of risk manage¬
ment, operational controls, compliance with laws and regulations, and quality asset
management efficiency. Parallel with BNM, BIMB will improve its risk-based audit
techniques and staff competence. At the same time, it is the duty of the Shari'a
Supervisory Council (SSC) to review and appraise the operations of the Bank's
business and advise the directors to ensure that they do not include any elements not
approved by Islam. The Bank is also required to establish a Management Risk
Control Committee (MRCC), whose main responsibilities are to ensure the correct
105 Bank Negara Malaysia (2004), op. cit., p.10.
106 Ibid.
107 Bank Islam (M) Berhad (2005), op. cit., p.9.
108 Ibid.
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implementation of policies approved by the Risk Management Committee/Board of




















Figure 5.2 Responsibilities of the MRCC
Figure 5.2 was compiled during fieldwork in April 2005. At that time, the Risk
Management Control Committee (MRCC) was not fully established and there were
still vacancies to be filled. The Committee comprises five divisions: market and
operational risk, financing quality management, compliance, financing review
management and policy, and research and risk information system, each division
with its own responsibilities. From Figure 5.2, it appears that BIMB is concentrating
on market risk, operational risk and credit risk, following the instructions by BNM to
adopt the Basel 2 Accord.109 Briefly, the Compliance Division deals with compliance
with laws and regulations, while the Research and Risk Information System
concentrates on systematic risk and risk related to the information system.
109 Under the two-phase implementation, Islamic banks are given the option either to comply
with the standardized approach for credit risk in 2008 or to move directly to the internal
ratings-based approach in 2010. See, Bank Negara Malaysia (2004), op. cit., p.162.
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Figure 5.3 Importance of Shari'a compliance in risk
management
Figure 5.3, also compiled during fieldwork, shows that the Bank had realized
the importance of including Shari'a compliance under market and operational risk. In
an interview, Mr Nazri Chik, Assistant Manager of the Shari'a Compliance Division,
said that the skills required for Islamic finance were unique, with priority given to an
understanding of the Shari'a plus the knowledge of finance. He added that the
Shari'a principles must be well established in every aspect of banking operations,
including the design of products, contracts and their fulfilment, as well as asset and
wealth management. The Bank believed that the Shari'a principles must be main¬
tained by all levels of staff from the highest to the lowest, that is, from senior
management to the clerical staff, since adherence to the Shari'a reflected the integrity
of the institution. Therefore, to meet those objectives, Mr Nazri Chik and his division
had taken on the responsibility of arranging training and a series of talks on the
Shari'a for members of staff. He affirmed that much of the staff-training programme
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would be handled by his division in collaboration with the Department of Human
Resources.
It is also stated in BIMB's annual reports of 2004 and 2005 that one of the
roles of the Shari'a Supervisory Council (SSC) is to provide education and training
on mu'amalat or transactions based on Shari'a principles. It is also hoped that BIMB
will fully implement these standards and recommendations for managing risk in its
financial operations, especially to regain public confidence.
5.5 Remarks
From the discussion in Chapter 4, it is clear that managing risk is important in every
aspect of life. It is particularly true of banking, for the primary function of a financial
intermediary is the mobilization of savings from the savers of funds to the users of
funds. Therefore, as financial intermediaries, the financial institutions also act as
risk-takers between these two parties. The aim of the financial intermediaries is to
facilitate the procedures of placing savings or investments, as well as borrowing and
lending. However, in performing their function of intermediation, banks face risks
that affect their ability to compete and to meet the interests of their stakeholders,
namely, their depositors, shareholders and regulators. All financial systems are vul¬
nerable to fluctuations in interest rates and exchange rates, loan default, operational
failures, natural disasters and a range of other human, managerial and environmental
weaknesses. Therefore, financial institutions need to develop a robust system to
tackle and manage risk and thereby protect their stakeholders.
In theory, the Islamic banks appear to be less vulnerable to volatility than their
conventional counterparts, owing to the comparative advantage embedded in the
principle of risk sharing. According to this model, any negative shock to the asset
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returns of an Islamic bank is absorbed by both shareholders and investment deposi¬
tors."0 The holders of profit-sharing investment accounts in an Islamic system share
in the bank's profit and losses alongside the shareholders, and hence are exposed to
the risk of losing all or part of their initial investment. On the other hand, depositors
in the conventional system have a fixed claim on the returns to the bank's assets, for
they are paid a predetermined interest rate in addition to the guaranteed return of the
principal regardless of the bank's profitability. In practice, however, the risk-sharing
advantage is "neutralized" when Islamic banks, operating in mixed systems, pay their
investment account holders a competitive "market" return, regardless of their per¬
formance and profitability.111 As a result, equity holders' returns are displaced,
creating for them a commercial risk.112
In Malaysia, the Islamic banks' deviation from the theoretical model has been
the subject of debate. This practice is particularly noticeable in the Islamic banks'
assets, for there has been a shift from profit/loss-sharing modes of financing
activities such as mudharabah and musyarakah to other modes of financing such as
al- bai' bithaman ajil, ijarah and murabahah. BIMB's over-reliance on the non-PLS
modes of financing had a marked impact during financial crisis in 1997. BIMB saw
its profit margins reduced during the period of rising interest rates in 1997.113 Since
BIMB was unable to increase profit rates on the fixed rate al- bai' bithaman ajil
financing, the result was lower profit margins as rising interest rates drove up the
110 Discussion in section 4.5.3.
1'1 Dahlia A. El-Hawary, Wafik Grais and Zamir Iqbal, "Regulating Islamic Financial
Institutions: The Nature of the Regulated". Paper presented at the International Conference
on Islamic Banking: Risk Management, Regulation and Supervision, held in Jakarta, 30
September - 2 October 2003), p. 17.
112 Ibid.'
113
Rosly, op. cit., p.477.
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cost of its funds."4 However, conventional banking showed a creditable
performance, for floating rate loans were automatically adjusted upwards with the
rise in interest rates.115 In addition, BNM admitted in its Annual Report of 1997 that
the economic turmoil had revealed structural weaknesses in Islamic banking.
It can be said that Islamic banks in Malaysia face serious challenges when
operating under a dual system in comparison with those operating under a single
Islamic system. Owing to their structure and the intermediation model that Islamic
banks in Malaysia follow to compete with the conventional banks, innovation and
product development are particularly important. Nevertheless, in this chapter, it has
been found that structural issues such as existing bank regulations, the tax system
and other regulatory factors have restricted the ability of the Islamic financial
institutions to launch innovative products. This situation is of concern to the Islamic
banks not only in product innovation and development. It has been stated by Chapra
and Ahmed that the most important stakeholder is Islam itself.116 If the Islamic banks
do not perform well, those who declare the Islamic system to be out of step with the
modern world might try to put the blame on Islam, even though Islam itself might
have nothing to do with it.117 The losses of BIMB show that an insufficient
understanding of the risks can put a bank in a very vulnerable position. In the case of
BIMB, it also highlights the urgent need for the closer supervision and regulation of
banks because they are using other people's money. Development should not be
promoted without also ensuring a safe banking system in which the payment
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 M. Umer Chapra and Habib Ahmed, Corporate Governance in Islamic Financial
Institutions (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Research and Training Institute, Islamic
Development Bank, 2002), p. 14.
117 Ibid.
246
structure is protected from instability. The analysis in this chapter has shown that the
weaknesses in the management of the Bank itself as well as the lack of close
monitoring by the supervisory authorities (BNM) contributed to the losses. The role
that the supervisory authorities are expected to play is to ensure fair and honest
dealing with all the stakeholders by proper regulation and supervision. It is also
worth noting that customers placing deposits in Islamic banks have to bear only the
risks normally attached to these accounts, for they are not affected by other factors
such as political interference.118 Thus, effective corporate governance119 is needed. As
Chapra and Ahmed point out:
Effective corporate governance in banks as well as the firms that use bank funds is one
of the most important pillars of the new environment that needs to be created to
replace the old-socio-economic environment that no longer exists. Unfortunately,
however, corporate governance is considered to be generally weak in the corporations
of the most developing countries. This is because all the institutions that play a crucial
role in disciplining markets and ensuring efficiency and integrity are not well
developed in these countries. Information asymmetries are more severe, market parti¬
cipants less experienced, and regulations, even if they exist, do not get enforced
effectively and impartially because of political corruption and the general weakness of
judicial systems. Disclosures are also not adequate and accounting practices are not
well developed. Consequently, these corporations suffer from inefficiencies and
equities that adversely affect all stakeholders. The adverse effects of effective
corporate governance can be more serious in the case of financial institutions because
the number of their stakeholders is much larger and the systemic risks are much
greater."120
118 This chapter has shown that it is believed that the banking sector in Malaysia has
"not [been] independent of politicians who interfered with the central banks". See,
Satkunasingam and Shanmugam, op.cit., p.77. The IMF report also revealed that the
"autonomy of LOFSA within the Malaysian government is not fully transparent" and
"corporate governance standards for offshore financial institutions are not well
developed." See, Netto, op. cit.
119
Satkunasingam and Shanmugam, op.cit, p.77, state that Malaysian Code on Corporate
Governance 2000 has not addressed how to protect the independence of the management
board of the companies from political influences. They also raised up the question whether
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance can be fully implemented, for it is currently seen
as an example of "law in books" rather than "law in action"
120
See, Chapra and Ahmed, op.cit., p.8.
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He adds:
Without effective corporate governance, it may not possible to strengthen Islamic
banks and to enable them to expand rapidly and perform their role efficiently. This
need will become more and more complex - problems which erode their ability in the





This study has explored the salient features of the Islamic banking system with the
focus on risk and its management. Since a bank's prospects depend largely on its
ability to manage risk, this is a vital element of banking operations, particularly in
the Islamic banking system, whose unique features make it more vulnerable to risk.
The discussion below draws the conclusions from the findings throughout the thesis.
The prohibition of riba is indisputable according to the Qur'an and Sunna and
this is accepted by the four schools of legal thought in the Shari'a. Nevertheless, each
of these schools takes a different view of riba, which makes it one of the most
debated topics among the fuqaha and Islamic scholars. Despite the issuing of several
fatwas by certain scholars permitting interest in the banking system, most still
believe that if a bank is to conform to the Shari'a, then it is essential that riba be
eliminated from its operations.
An analysis of Islamic economics has found that it has been designed to cater
for the welfare ofGod's creation by the establishment of harmony between the moral
and material needs of human beings and the realization of socio-economic justice
and brother/sisterhood in human society. Historical evidence shows that financial
activities have existed since the early stages of human civilization, so clearly, this has
always been an important aspect of human life. Until the Middle Ages, partnership
(mudaraba) was the main feature of business. However, as business expanded, there
was an urgent necessity (darura) for financial intermediaries so that the community
could maintain its economic strength. Critics question certain areas of Islamic
economics and highlight loopholes that should be examined and closed. Since there
has never been a blueprint of Islamic economics, Muslim intellectuals and
economists face the challenge of constructing a system suitable for modern times.
This will require careful thought. Scholars such as Syed Haider Naqvi and Zia
ul-Haque point out that although mudaraba is lawful according to the Shari'a, there
is nothing sacred about it. They also ask whether it is the best principle on which an
Islamic economy should be based as visualized by scholars of Islamic economics,
bearing in mind that some of its theory does not resemble the real world of today.
Islamic scholars refer to their economic theory, whose standpoint is how individuals,
groups or governments should perform in a perfect Islamic community. However, in
reality, some Muslims do not behave in the manner expected of them by the Qur'an.
As pointed out by Dar and Presley, although the theoretical treatment of Islamic
finance offers much more support for its introduction, however, it has proved
extremely difficult to implement in practice.1 They also suggest that much could be
learnt from the Western approach, which "values empirical investigation as a means
to testing the 'realisability' of economic theory", for there has been reluctance among
Islamic scholars to undertake empirical testing.2
The first Islamic bank, Mit Ghamr Local Savings Bank, was initially adapted
from the concept of the German savings bank. However, its founder never made any
reference to Islam in the early stages of its operation, lest the project be rejected,
which indicates the over-riding influence ofWestern financial systems. However, the
1
Humayon A. Dar & John R. Presley, "Islamic Finance: A Western Perspective",
International Journal ofIslamic Financial Services, vol.1, no.l (April-June, 1999), pp.3-12.
The authors briefly discuss modern Western economic thought and agree with its underlying
basis that "in reality, Man is selfish, groups act in self-interest, indeed, individual
governments act in self-interest, and even groups of countries (like the European Union) in
the main act in their own interests - occasionally to the detriment of other countries."
2 Ibid.
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impressive expansion of Islamic banking during the last twenty years of the twentieth
century is evidence of the increasing desire of Muslims to conduct their financial
activities according to Islamic teachings. Since the global Muslim population is large
and continuing to increase, there is still a sizeable market to be tapped.
Malaysia is leading the Islamic banking industry with a well-established
system. Malaysia being a multi-racial and multi-cultural country with a particular
historical background, its government opted for a "dual banking" system to avoid
offending certain groups of its citizens. The gradual approach to Islamization is
preferred to prevent sudden changes that could result in serious economic and social
upheaval. However, the implementation of profit/loss-sharing modes of financing has
made very little progress, not only in Malaysia but also globally, which shows the
reluctance of Islamic financial institutions to accept the very high risk associated
with this type of investment. Clearly, very careful risk management is essential if an
Islamic banking system is to succeed. More innovation is needed, in particular, the
creation of new tools to assess risk more accurately, such as in the area of
derivatives. However, innovation is also limited by the lack of expertise in the
industry as well as the differences in the opinions of the schools of legal thought, as
manifested by their scholars.
In addition, to protect the interests of the stakeholders of Islamic banks, the
structure of the existing bank regulations, the tax system and other regulatory issues
need special attention by the government. It is fair to point out that the conventional
banking system in Malaysia has developed from a basis of research and experience
over a much longer period and has an institutionalized and sophisticated
infrastructure regulated by sound legislation. The Islamic banking system needs the
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type of support similar to that given to the conventional banking system, such as an
effective legal framework. If the necessary support is not provided, then the Islamic
banks will not be able to compete with the conventional banks, especially under the
dual banking system that is operated in Malaysia.
Following the huge losses in 2005 and 2006 as a result of poor risk manage¬
ment in BIMB, critics have also raised the question of dereliction of duty on the part
of the management, the regulator and the government. One lesson in particular to be
learned is that sound regulation and supervision are essential to support the system. If
not, the Islamic financial system in Malaysia will be regarded as an institution
established to promote political interests or agenda to attract international funds by
using the name of religion, that is, Islam. As a result of its losses, BIMB has realized
the importance of human capital and has developed an innovative risk management
framework. For their part, BNM and the Malaysian government have given serious
attention to the further development and exploitation of the Islamic banking system.
In Malaysia, risk management in the Islamic banking system has reached a level to
enable it to compete fully with its conventional counterpart. Although the system is
not yet perfect, the initiative shows the serious intention of the government to
develop it in parallel with the conventional system. Nevertheless, again, it can be
achieved only with the close supervision of the participants and the firm enforcement
of the rules. If not, the guidelines could be described as "theoretical" guidelines only.
Finally, although the growth of Islamic banking is encouraging, however,
owing to the different schools of legal thought, there does not appear to be a single
definition of an Islamic banking product, or even of Islamic banking itself. There is
clearly a lack of standardization in the system. Uncertainty about what is and is not
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permissible has so far prevented standardization, which could complicate risk assess¬
ment for both the banks and their customers. For example, banking products
considered Shari'a compliant in Malaysia are unacceptable in Saudi Arabia. In the
interests of the general public, differences of opinion from different schools of
thought should be put aside to bring about unity and progress.3
Another factor to be addressed is the lack of human capital, namely, the insuf¬
ficient standard of competence and efficiency in the Islamic banking industry, not
only among bank staff but also on the Shari'a Supervisory Boards (SSBs). Since the
SSBs are responsible for scrutinizing the operations of Islamic banks, they must have
a good knowledge of banking as well as the Shari'a. However, the SSBs appear to be
dilatory in issuing fatwas concerning certain questions, for instance, whether it is
wrong for Islamic banks to use the interest rates as a benchmark for setting their
mark-up percentage.4 Although this appears to be a simple question, yet it requires
serious discussion by the SSBs, which should give a constructive answer and issue a
definitive fatwa applicable to not only Malaysia but also the whole world. A point of
concern here is whether the members of the SSBs have a sufficient knowledge of
modern financial instruments as well as the Shari'a.
J In his speech at the Second World Islamic Economic Forum in Islamabad, Abdullah
Badawi, the Prime Minister ofMalaysia, raised the question of the differences among the
madhahib. He stated that these must be resolved first, for they prevented Islamic unity. See,
Kadir Dikoh, "Barat Ambil Kesempatan Perbalahan Antara Mazhab", Berita Harian , 9
November 2006.
4 Sudin Haron , Profit Sharing: Questions that Need to be Revisited", Bulletin INCEIF
(2006), p.6. Haron states that there are suggestions that the calculation of ratio and
percentages in Islamic banks should be based on the market rate of interest. However
according to Haron this idea has been rejected by eminent scholars of Islamic banking, such
as M.N. Siddiqui, Ziauddin Ahmad and M. Fahim Khan.
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However, financial liberalization enabled three Islamic banks from the Middle
East, namely, the Kuwait Finance House, al-Rajhi Banking and Investment Corpora¬
tion, and a consortium of Islamic financial institutions represented by the Qatar
Islamic Bank, RUSD Investment Bank Inc. and Global Investment House, to operate
in Malaysia from 2004. It is interesting to remember as noted above in chapter 5 that
the Kuwait Finance House, instead of offering al-bai' bithaman ajil for house
financing, has recently offered musyarakah mutanaqisah to their retail customers.
Over the coming years, it will be interesting to see how the entry of international
players will enable their distinctive capabilities and strengths to be incorporated into
the Malaysian Islamic banking system as well as foster greater harmonization in the
















(plural -fuqaha): A man learned in the knowledge offiqh, who, by virtue of his
knowledge, can give a legal judgment.
Fiqh
The science of applying the Shari'a.
Fiqh al-mu 'amalat
Islamic law of transaction.
Ghabn
Fraud, cheating, swindle. It can also mean "loss" when ghabn enters a contract
without either party being aware of it.
Gharar
Literally, deception, danger, risk and uncertainty. Technically, exposing oneself to
excessive risk and danger in a business transaction as a result of uncertainty about
the price, quality and quantity of the goods or services, the date of delivery, the
ability of either the buyer or the seller to fulfil his/her commitment, or ambiguity
in the terms of the deal.
Ghararfahish




Moderate gharar, a low level ofgharar that is tolerable because it may be
unavoidable.
al-Ghurm bi al-ghunm








Permissible in the Shari'a.
Haram
Unlawful according to the Shari'a and therefore punishable by God.
Hasa
A type of sale whose outcome is determined by the throwing of a stone. (Since it










Consensus, particularly that of the people of knowledge among the Muslims on
matters offiqh.
Ijtihad
Technically, a jurist's efforts to deduce a rule or reach a judgement according to












(plural -madhahib): A school of Islamic law. The four main schools are the
Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali.
Makruh
Reprehensible, though not unlawful in the Shari'a.
Mandub
Recommended - its performance is not compulsory and it promises rewards,






Permissible in the Shari'a.
Mujtahid
A person qualified to perform ijtihad.
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Qiyas
Logical deduction by analogy. Qiyas is the fourth source of the Shari'a. It is the
legal method used for extending the law beyond what is stated in the authoritative





Opinion, personal discretion - a legal decision based on the use of commonsense
and personal opinion in cases where there is no explicit guidance in the Qur'an




Legal testimony in a court of law.
Shari'a
Literally, a way. Technically, the way ofGod as shown by Islamic Law based on
the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet.
Sunna
The customary practice of a person or group of people. Sunna refers to all that
has been narrated from the Prophet: his actions, his sayings, and whatever he





Mutual responsibility, mutual guarantee.
Tawakkul
Literally, trust, confidence. Trusting in God's help for positive results after










Imperative - performance is compulsory and omission is punishable.
Zakat
One of the five pillars of Islam. It is a wealth tax paid on certain forms of wealth:
gold and silver, staple crops, livestock, and trading goods.
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